Depression, Existential Family Therapy, and Viktor Frankl's Dimensional Ontology

In existential family therapy, it is believed that Viktor Frankl's dimensional ontology is a useful way to understand the different levels of depression that are important in both family assessment and family treatment. This article reviews Frankl's dimensional ontology, its usefulness for existential family treatment, the must, can, and ought levels of family depression, and presents clinical material illustrating the described existential family treatment approach.     

Children's understanding of death as the cessation of agency: a test using sleep versus death

An important problem faced by children is discriminating between entities capable of goal-directed action, i.e. intentional agents, and non-agents. In the case of discriminating between living and dead animals, including humans, this problem is particularly difficult, because of the large number of perceptual cues that living and dead animals share. However, there are potential costs of failing to discriminate between living and dead animals, including unnecessary vigilance and lost opportunities from failing to realize that an animal, such as an animal killed for food, is dead. This might have led to the evolution of mechanisms specifically for distinguishing between living and dead animals in terms of their ability to act. Here we test this hypothesis by examining patterns of inferences about sleeping and dead organisms by Shuar and German children between 3 and 5-years old. The results show that by age 4, causal cues to death block agency attributions to animals and people, whereas cues to sleep do not. The developmental trajectory of this pattern of inferences is identical across cultures, consistent with the hypothesis of a living/dead discrimination mechanism as a reliably developing part of core cognitive architecture.     

马克思的本体论思想及其当代意义

马克思的本体论思想日益引起学界的关注。本文认为,必须从马克思的哲学革命变革的宗旨和使命出发,把本体论问题放到“解释世界”和“改变世界”的框架内,才能给马克思的本体论思想以及正确的诠释和定位,马克思终点了传统的思辨形而上学本体论,但却继承和光大了人类的形而上情结和追求,并以人和人的实践活动底蕴,深刻地回答了世界本真存在的追问,关爱生命,提高人的素质,促进人的全面发展,这就是马克思本体论思想的当代价值所在。     

Should Religious Naturalists Promote a Naturalistic Religion?

Religious naturalism refers here to a view of reality, and it will be contrasted with versions of supernaturalism and of atheistic naturalism. Naturalistic religion refers to certain varieties of religion, especially some inspired by the universality of science and the need for a global ethics. In this essay I explicate why a religious naturalist need not advocate a naturalistic religion. Rather, a religious naturalist can build upon the heritage of religious traditions and be open to, but at the same time be agnostic about, the idea of a nonnatural ground of reality . The religious naturalism I defend has been criticized from various directions: one reviewer in this journal considered it too much indebted to the traditions, and hence "reactionary" and supernaturalistic; another considered it too minimalist in its religion ("virtually nonexistent") as a consequence of the preference for a too sober version of naturalism. My distinction between religious naturalism and naturalistic religion may answer some of these objections.     

Can Semantics Guide Ontology?

Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple, equally semantically adequate, treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given this, I argue that semantics can fail to deliver determinate ontological commitments and determinate answers to ontological questions, more generally.     

Nina Coltart and the border of Bethlehem

Nina Coltart's freedom in addressing delicate areas such as spirituality and Buddhism within a psychoanalytic framework has opened borders between different psychoanalytic communities. This paper sets out to identify a deep‐rooted philosophical tension that runs through several aspects of Coltart's work starting from her ‘Slouching towards Bethlehem … or, thinking the unthinkable in psychoanalysis’. In exploring this central topic in depth psychology, of the distinction between thinkable and unthinkable contents, the author argues that it is not a fundamental distinction in Coltart's work but is rather a particular example of a more fundamental structural dichotomy which pervades her approach and which manifests in several different guises. It is the breadth and sincerity of Coltart's writings which make this a useful exercise, not only for understanding the structure of her work but also in illuminating some structural tensions which permeate depth‐psychological pursuits in general.     

Folk-linguistic fictions and the explananda of the language sciences

For the past two millennia, the explananda of language theory have been inherited from the Western linguistic tradition. The legacy is what might be called “the Western linguistic imaginary”: An indeterminate but deeply mesmerizing inventory of entities, properties, and powers of language commonly attributed to language and language-users and which therefore seem to stand in need of explanation. In recent years, naturalistic research programs in the cognitive sciences have provided illuminating explanations of basic (“lower-order”) cognitive phenomena. The challenge today for the science of language is whether, in transforming itself along the lines of epistemological naturalism, it can provide similarly illuminating explanations of any of its traditional explananda. In addressing this challenge, greater attention needs to be given to the source of such explananda in the everyday, culturally-diverse practices of folk metalinguistics.     

Towards More Rigorous Personality Trait–Outcome Research

Much of personality research attempts to identify causal links between personality traits and various types of outcomes. I argue that causal interpretations require traits to be seen as existentially and holistically real and the associations to be independent of specific ways of operationalizing the traits. Among other things, this means that, to the extents that causality is to be ascribed to such holistic traits, items and facets of those traits should be similarly associated with specific outcomes, except for variability in the degrees to which they reflect the traits (i.e. factor loadings). I argue that, before drawing causal inferences about personality trait–outcome associations, the presence of this condition should be routinely tested by, for example, systematically comparing the outcome associations of individual items or facets, or sampling different indicators for measuring the same purported traits. Existing evidence suggests that observed associations between personality traits and outcomes at least sometimes depend on which particular items or facets have been included in trait operationalizations, calling trait‐level causal interpretations into question. However, this has rarely been considered in the literature. I argue that when outcome associations are specific to facets, they should not be generalized to traits. Furthermore, when the associations are specific to particular items, they should not even be generalized to facets. Copyright © 2016 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Oneself in practitioner research,with Vygotsky and Bakhtin

Practitioner action and reflection are understood as central to practitioner research in this paper. While Vygotskian-based premise highlights instructional practices and intervention as central to practitioner understanding, Bakhtin-based dialogical premise draws on relational constructs and attend to practitioner being, answerability and authorship. Vygotskian and Bakhtinian units of analysis used are viewed as means with which to conceive practitioner action/reflection and build a community of practitioners. Taken together, practitioner knowing is found inextricable with practitioner ontology, making practitioner research of ongoing instructional practices more human in line with Dewey.