Counterexamples to Recovery and the Filtering Condition

David Makinson has argued that the compelling character of counterexamples to the Recovery Condition on contraction is due to an appeal to justificational structure. In “naked theories” where such structure is ignored or is not present, Recovery does apply. This note attempts to show that Makinson is mistaken on both counts. Recovery fails when no appeal is made to justificational structure. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Radical Orthodoxy, Luther, and the Challenge of Western Secularization

This "Theology Update" analyzes the Radical Orthodoxy of John Milbank in light of Martin Luther's dialectic between Law and Gospel. Milbank and his colleagues attack contemporary secularized culture in a manner parallel to Luther's attack on the 16^th century Holy Roman Empire for being soulless, aggressive, litigious, materialistic, and finally nihilistic. By re–engaging the battle between Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, the radical orthodox party seeks to become post–modern by making a half turn back to the pre–modern Thomas, for whom philosophy and theology were integrated, subject was united to object, and being could be understood as relational because the Trinity is relational. Luther is mistakenly dismissed when reducing him to Scotus' nominalism, however. Lutheranism complements radical orthodoxy's analysis of secularized culture; yet Lutheranism maintains an integrity to faith–as the presence of Christ–that this new school fails to grant.     

The three bases for the enthymeme: A dialogical theory

In traditional logic, an enthymeme is said to be an argument, or chain of argumentation, with one or more missing (implicit) premises or conclusions. In this paper a new theory of enthymemes, based on recent developments in argumentation technology including argumentation schemes, argument visualization tools and formal dialogue systems, is put forward. The dialogical theory hypothesizes three bases for the enthymeme in a formal dialogue system CBVK: (1) the participants' commitment sets, (2) sets of argumentation schemes (especially including presumptive schemes) shared by both participants, and (3) a set of propositions representing common knowledge shared by both participants. The formal dialogue system CBVK is the backbone of the theory of enthymemes into which these three components are built. Three examples of enthymemes of a kind commonly found in everyday conversational argumentation are used to show how the theory applies.     

Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean “is-ought” dictum

Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be.     

The evidential support theory of conditionals

According to so-called epistemic theories of conditionals, the assertability/acceptability/acceptance of a conditional requires the existence of an epistemically significant relation between the conditional’s antecedent and its consequent. This paper points to some linguistic data that our current best theories of the foregoing type appear unable to explain. Further, it presents a new theory of the same type that does not have that shortcoming. The theory is then defended against some seemingly obvious objections.     

Are facilitated mentoring programs beneficial? A randomized experimental field study

Results from a pretest–posttest randomized field experiment study with a control group comparing the impact of high- and low-level-facilitated mentoring programs on new employees’ performance and perceptions about their jobs and organization were reported in this paper. Results indicated increases in job satisfaction, organizational commitment, person-organization fit and performance by participants in both mentoring programs with larger gains made by the high-level-facilitated group. These results suggest that a formal mentoring program can have positive effects on employee’s work-related attitudes, cognition and behavior with significantly greater gains made by formal mentoring programs with higher levels of facilitation.     

Are Intuitions Quasi‐Perceptual “Presentations”?

John Bengson has offered a detailed theory of the nature and epistemology of intuition according to which intuitions are quasi‐perceptual conscious experiences that “present” their contents as true. The paper offered here argues that Bengson’s terminology of “presentations” is difficult to interpret. Bengson does not provide a clear meaning for “presentation” or “presentational state,” and this makes it impossible to evaluate his proposal that intuitions are presentations. This paper argues, furthermore, that intuitions are not phenomenal mental states and therefore have no perception‐like phenomenology or epistemology. It concludes that Bengson’s theory fails to metaphysically, epistemologically, or methodologically legitimize intuitions.     

Luck and Risk

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1 , the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event.     

A metaphysics for practical knowledge

Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical knowledge shares features with knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category.     

胰腺干细胞研究中的思考

从干细胞研究发展和胰腺生理病理学研究发展两个方面,横向和纵向两个角度阐述了胰腺干细胞研究的思路,用辩证认识论和普遍联系与对立统一原理分析了胰腺干细胞研究中所面临的问题和挑战,提出应对的策略和方法,并结合胰腺干细胞发展现状,展望其应用前景。