风险取向类型与爱荷华赌博任务成绩的影响

神经科学领域的研究者们设计了测量情感决策的经典爱荷华赌博任务并提出了体细胞标记假说来解释其研究结果,但迄今为止这一假说还没有得到一致认可。许多研究提出了可能影响爱荷华赌博任务成绩的其他因素。本研究试图在前人研究的基础上采用实验法探讨风险取向类型这一人格因素是否影响正常个体的爱荷华赌博任务成绩。实验结果显示,不同风险取向类型的个体在爱荷华赌博任务中的成绩和表现截然不同。典型风险趋向型个体在爱荷华赌博任务中的表现类似于某些神经系统患者,倾向于更多地选择不利纸牌,其任务成绩显著差于典型风险回避型个体。这一研究结果表明：风险取向类型是影响正常个体爱荷华赌博任务成绩的重要因素之一。     

真实的道德冲突对个体道德成长的意义

个体的道德成长是在不断解决道德冲突的过程中逐步实现的。个体道德成长应该面向真实,接触真实,向真实发问,而并不仅仅是通过虚拟情景下简单的道德选择模拟实现。真实的道德冲突及其选择对个体道德成长的意义,集中表现在主体在道德选择的过程中和道德实践的基础上,主体的道德认识、道德情感、道德意志、道德信念都得到了具体实在的检验和升华,实现了道德选择和道德行为的统一。在真实的道德情境中恰当的设置道德冲突,才能真正促进个体道德的成长。     

Probing the link between narcissism and gambling: the mediating role of judgment and decision‐making biases

In this paper, three studies link narcissism to gambling in general, and gambling‐related problems in particular, and the predictive link is shown to be mediated by judgment and decision processes. In Study 1, we demonstrate that narcissism relates to greater self‐reported gambling frequency and gambling‐related monetary expenditures in two samples. We extend these initial findings in Study 2 by showing that narcissism predicts higher reports of gambling‐related pathology, as measured with a DSM‐IV‐based pathological gambling (PG) screen. Finally, we demonstrate in Study 3 that the link between gambling pathology and narcissism is partially mediated by narcissists' overconfidence, heightened risk acceptance, and myopic focus on reward, as measured by participants' behavioral performance on the Georgia Gambling Task (GGT) and Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). Discussion focuses on the empirical validation of the long‐assumed narcissism–gambling link, the decision processes that underlie this link, and relations between narcissists' self‐perceptions and their self‐defeating behavior, especially in risk‐relevant contexts. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ownership Status and the Representation of Assets of Uncertain Value: The Balloon Endowment Risk Task (BERT)

Owners tend to overvalue possessions relative to non‐owners: a phenomenon known as the endowment effect. In three experiments, using markets for goods of uncertain value, we investigated whether this can be partly attributed to misperceiving an asset's profitability or to uncertainty about a good's utility. To test our hypotheses, we devised the Balloon Endowment Risk Task, in which participants can sell or buy their right to participate in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Once purchased/retained, a virtual balloon is pumped to accrue money, which is lost if the balloon bursts. Participants first learn about the risky asset (balloon) by observing others playing the Balloon Analogue Risk Task before they enter the market. In Experiment 1, we replicated the endowment effect; yet, owners and non‐owners predicted pumping the same number of times and subsequently did so when given that opportunity. In Experiments 2 and 3, the level of uncertainty about the balloon's profitability was manipulated by modifying the number of bursts that participants viewed in the initial learning stage. When more diagnostic information was provided, making the average burst point easier to estimate and reducing value uncertainty and increasing confidence in valuation, the endowment effect diminished although mean estimates of the average burst point did not differ between owners and non‐owners. Thus, endowment effects were partly attributable to value uncertainty but could not be explained by owners and non‐owners having divergent perceptions of the asset's payoff distribution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Delayed reconfiguration of a non-emotional task set through reactivation of an emotional task set in task switching: an ageing study

ABSTRACT

In our everyday life, we frequently switch between different tasks, a faculty that changes with age. However, it is still not understood how emotion impacts on age-related changes in task switching. Using faces with emotional and neutral expressions, Experiment 1 investigated younger (n?=?29; 18–38 years old) and older adults’ (n?=?32; 61–80 years old) ability to switch between an emotional and a non-emotional task (i.e. responding to the face's expression vs. age). In Experiment 2, younger and older adults also viewed emotional and neutral faces, but switched between two non-emotional tasks (i.e. responding to the face's age vs. gender). Data from Experiment 1 demonstrated that switching from an emotional to a non-emotional task was slower when the expression of the new face was emotional rather than neutral. This impairment was observed in both age groups. In contrast, Experiment 2 revealed that neither younger nor older adults were affected by block-wise irrelevant emotion when switching between two non-emotional tasks. Overall, the findings suggest that task-irrelevant emotion can impair task switching through reactivation of the competing emotional task set. They also suggest that this effect and the ability to shield task-switching performance from block-wise irrelevant emotion are preserved in ageing.     

初中生风险决策表现的认知建模分析:自尊及性别的影响

选取山东省某初中308名学生,采用爱荷华博弈任务,使用“效用-固着”模型对决策包含的动机、认知、反应心理过程进行认知建模分析,探究自尊水平和性别对初中生风险决策表现的影响。结果发现,初中生的风险决策表现不佳,对损失不敏感。在控制年级的影响后,分层回归分析表明:(1)自尊水平和性别对决策的动机过程的影响存在交互作用,男生无论自尊高低对收益都较为关注,女生中高自尊者更加关注收益。(2)决策成绩不存在显著的性别差异,但男生更多选择有着较高损失值的不利选项,而女生更多选择损失频率较低的有利选项。(3)自尊的影响主要体现在动机和认知过程,高自尊水平者在动机过程中更多表现出对损失的规避,在认知过程中更多地考虑维持之前的决策选择。     

Consumer Wisdom: A Theoretical Framework of Five Integrated Facets

We establish a parsimonious theoretical framework of consumer wisdom based on five mutually reinforcing psychological facets. Our research draws from wisdom literature and a set of 31 phenomenological interviews with informants who were identified through a multi‐stage nomination process. The five facets of consumer wisdom that emerged are Intentionality, Contemplation, Emotional Mastery, Openness, and Transcendence. Together, they comprise a data‐grounded, aspirational model of consumer wisdom—for researchers as well as consumers—to understand, maintain, and improve personal and collective well‐being. We discuss the implications of the framework and directions for future research.     

Mistaking randomness for free will

Belief in free will is widespread. The present research considered one reason why people may believe that actions are freely chosen rather than determined: they attribute randomness in behavior to free will. Experiment 1 found that participants who were prompted to perform a random sequence of actions experienced their behavior as more freely chosen than those who were prompted to perform a deterministic sequence. Likewise, Experiment 2 found that, all else equal, the behavior of animated agents was perceived to be more freely chosen if it consisted of a random sequence of actions than if it consisted of a deterministic sequence; this was true even when the degree of randomness in agents’ behavior was largely a product of their environments. Together, these findings suggest that randomness in behavior—one’s own or another’s—can be mistaken for free will.