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101.
When humans carry out actions in response to external stimulation, they acquire associations between the stimulus and the action it triggered. When the same stimulus is used in two different tasks, the retrieval of associations compiled in the competing task hampers current performance. Previous research suggests that this across-task priming depends on the task set for the preceding task remaining active across the switch of tasks and, thus, competing with the activations needed for the new task. We present two experiments investigating this notion. Participants switched between two semantic classification tasks. In Experiment 1, participants switched between short runs of the two tasks. Across-task priming was observed on switch and repeat trials. In Experiment 2, participants switched between longer runs of the two tasks. Across-task priming was markedly reduced on repeat trials. The data suggest that whether or not across-task priming affects behaviour after the switch trial depends, amongst others, on whether the task set necessary for the previous task spills into the repeat trials. The implications of these findings for mechanisms of cognitive and mnemonic control are discussed.  相似文献   
102.
How is our cognitive control system modulated by emotional information, especially fearful stimuli? An intuitive hypothesis is that fearful stimuli would enhance cognitive control so that people could switch from the ongoing task to emergent events more quickly to secure themselves. To test this hypothesis, we investigated the influence of emotional information on the shift function of cognitive control by using the task-cueing procedure, in which face images were presented as cues. With the gender of faces indicating which task to do, we manipulated the emotional valence of faces (neutral vs. fearful), finding that the switch costs were larger in the trials containing fearful cues than in the trials containing neutral cues (Experiment 1). This effect was not caused by enlarging task-set interference (Experiment 2), nor by slowing down cue encoding (Experiment 3). Contrary to the intuitive hypothesis, our results suggested that the endogenous task-set reconfiguration process was impaired when fearful faces were presented. We speculated that the benefit of decreasing cognitive flexibility in face of fearful stimuli is to speed up response in a dangerous environment, and this accelerating response is achieved by suppressing the goal-directed system to permit the fast, automatic stimulus-driven system to govern behaviours.  相似文献   
103.
Recent studies have shown that switch costs (i.e., slower responding on task-alternation trials than on task-repetition trials) are not observed when on the preceding trial a no-go signal instructed the participant to withhold the response to the target stimulus. This finding suggests that neither task set is inhibited on no-go trials, and that the origin of switch costs is located in the application of the task set to the target stimulus. However, these studies also showed that responding after a no-go trial is substantially slower than after a go trial. This suggests that both task sets are inhibited on no-go trials and that switch costs originate from the preparation of a task set. In two experiments we created conditions that revealed an absence of switch costs in conjunction with relatively fast responding after no-go trials. Together these findings confirm that switch costs originate from the application of the task set.  相似文献   
104.
In a previous study, it was proposed that executing a task leads to task strengthening. In other words, task activation at the moment of response execution determines subsequent switch effects (Steinhauser & Hübner, 2006). The authors investigated this issue by comparing switch effects after task and response errors. However, the use of bivalent stimulus–response mappings might have obscured some of the effects. Therefore, we replicated the experiment using univalent stimulus–response mappings. With this adjusted design, which overcomes some shortcomings of the original study, we were able to replicate the finding of switch benefits after task errors. Closer inspection of the data showed the importance of preexecution processes on subsequent switch effects. In a second experiment, we further elaborated on these preexecution processes. More precisely, we investigated the effect of task preparation on subsequent switch effects. Taken together, our data extend current accounts of task switching by showing that the preparatory processes occurring before the response on trial n influence the switch cost on trial n?+?1.  相似文献   
105.
The present study investigated whether the processing characteristics of categorizing emotional facial expressions are different from those of categorizing facial age and sex information. Given that emotions change rapidly, it was hypothesized that processing facial expressions involves a more flexible task set that causes less between-task interference than the task sets involved in processing age or sex of a face. Participants switched between three tasks: categorizing a face as looking happy or angry (emotion task), young or old (age task), and male or female (sex task). Interference between tasks was measured by global interference and response interference. Both measures revealed patterns of asymmetric interference. Global between-task interference was reduced when a task was mixed with the emotion task. Response interference, as measured by congruency effects, was larger for the emotion task than for the nonemotional tasks. The results support the idea that processing emotional facial expression constitutes a more flexible task set that causes less interference (i.e., task-set “inertia”) than processing the age or sex of a face  相似文献   
106.
The cognitive deficits observed in schizophrenia have been characterized as a failure to utilize task-setting information to guide behaviour, especially in situations in which there is response conflict. Recently, we have provided support for this account; high schizotypy individuals demonstrated inferior biconditional discrimination performance compared to low scorers, but were not impaired on a simple discrimination that did not require the use of task-setting cues. These results may, however, also be explained by the way in which individuals with high schizotypy process stimulus compounds. Here, we examine the initial approaches to solving biconditional and control discrimination tasks of participants with high and low schizotypy scores. In particular, we focus on performance during the first block of training trials to capture processing style before the acquisition of the discrimination tasks. Participants scoring highly on the introvertive anhedonia subscale (which has been allied to the negative and cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia) demonstrated better biconditional performance during the first block of training trials than did low-schizotypy individuals, consistent with a highly elemental approach to stimulus processing. Subsequent recognition tests confirmed this analysis demonstrating that the pattern of performance observed in participants with high schizotypy was associated with a failure to discriminate conjunctions of items that had been seen before from those that had not. These results suggest that the negative/cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia may reflect an extreme bias towards elemental, as opposed to configural, processing of stimulus conjunctions.  相似文献   
107.
Under conditions of volitional control in multitask environments, subjects may engage in a variety of strategies to guide task selection. The current research examines whether subjects may sometimes use a top-down control strategy of selecting a task-irrelevant stimulus dimension, such as location, to guide task selection. We term this approach a stimulus set selection strategy. Using a voluntary task switching procedure, subjects voluntarily switched between categorizing letter and number stimuli that appeared in two, four, or eight possible target locations. Effects of stimulus availability, manipulated by varying the stimulus onset asynchrony between the two target stimuli, and location repetition were analysed to assess the use of a stimulus set selection strategy. Considered across position condition, Experiment 1 showed effects of both stimulus availability and location repetition on task choice suggesting that only in the 2-position condition, where selection based on location always results in a target at the selected location, subjects may have been using a stimulus set selection strategy on some trials. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings in a visually more cluttered environment. These results indicate that, contrary to current models of task selection in voluntary task switching, the top-down control of task selection may occur in the absence of the formation of an intention to perform a particular task.  相似文献   
108.
In the current study we examined the relationship between working memory capacity, inhibition/susceptibility to interference and fluid intelligence, measured by the Raven's Progressive Matrices (PM38), comparing groups of young (aged 18–35), young-old (aged 65–74), and old-old (aged 75–86) participants. Groups were administered two working memory tasks tapping into different mechanisms involved in working memory. The ability to control for irrelevant information was measured both considering memory errors (intrusion errors) in a working memory task and an index of susceptibility to interference obtained with a variant of the Brown-Peterson task. Regression analyses showed that the classical working memory measure was the most potent predictors of the Raven's score. Susceptibility to interference and intrusions errors contributed, but to a lower extent, to the Raven explained variance. These results confirm that working memory shares cognitive aspects with the fluid intelligence measure considered, whereas the role of inhibition to Raven scores is still in need of better evidence.  相似文献   
109.
When switching tasks, if stimuli are presented that contain features that cue two of the tasks in the set (i.e., bivalent stimuli), performance slowing is observed on all tasks. This generalized slowing extends to tasks in the set which have no features in common with the bivalent stimulus and is referred to as the bivalency effect. In previous work, the bivalency effect was invoked by presenting occasionally occurring bivalent stimuli; therefore, the possibility that the generalized slowing is simply due to surprise (as opposed to bivalency) has not yet been discounted. This question was addressed in two task switching experiments where the occasionally occurring stimuli were either bivalent (bivalent version) or merely surprising (surprising version). The results confirmed that the generalized slowing was much greater in the bivalent version of both experiments, demonstrating that the magnitude of this effect is greater than can be accounted for by simple surprise. This set of results confirms that slowing task execution when encountering bivalent stimuli may be fundamental for efficient task switching, as adaptive tuning of response style may serve to prepare the cognitive system for possible future high conflict trials.  相似文献   
110.
Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half (56% and 58%) rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.  相似文献   
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