Extinction in human learning and memory

In two experiments, participants were given extinction training in a human causal learning task. In both experiments, three critical experimental cues were paired with different outcomes in a first phase of training and were then extinguished in a second phase. Three control cues were given the same treatment in the first phase of training, but were not then presented in the second phase. Participants' ability to correctly identify the outcome with which each cue had been paired in the first phase was lower for extinguished than for control cues. Causal attributions to the extinguished cues were also lower than those to the control cues, a difference that correlated with outcome memory. These data are consistent with the idea that extinction in causal judgement is due, at least in part, to a failure to remember the cue–outcome relationship encoded in the first phase of training.     

Retrieval dynamics in self-terminated memory search

Attended stimuli are perceived as occurring earlier than unattended stimuli. This phenomenon of prior entry is usually identified by a shift in the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) in temporal order judgements (TOJs). According to its traditional psychophysical interpretation, the PSS coincides with the perception of simultaneity. This assumption is, however, questionable. Technically, the PSS represents the temporal interval between two stimuli at which the two alternative TOJs are equally likely. Thus it also seems possible that observers perceive not simultaneity, but uncertainty of temporal order. This possibility is supported by prior-entry studies, which find that perception of simultaneity is not very likely at the PSS. The present study tested the percept at the PSS in prior entry, using peripheral cues to orient attention. We found that manipulating attention caused varying temporal perceptions around the PSS. On some occasions observers perceived the two stimuli as simultaneous, but on others they were simply uncertain about the order in which they had been presented. This finding contradicts the implicit assumption of most models of temporal order perception, that perception of simultaneity inevitably results if temporal order cannot be discriminated.     

Moral emotions and the envisaging of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgements of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgements, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.     

Cognitive load on working memory both encourages and discourages reasoning bias regarding the mental states of others

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to reason about the mental states of others. An increasing number of studies have revealed that working memory (WM) plays an important role in ToM. The present study applied WM loads to adults during a ToM task in order to investigate the impact on mental‐state reasoning performance. The task required participants to estimate the probabilities of several possible behaviours for a protagonist following the presentation of a ToM story. Participants were also required to maintain a meaningless two‐ (light WM load) or seven‐letter English alphabet string (heavy WM load) during story comprehension and mental‐state reasoning. The results show that the combination of light WM load applied during story comprehension with heavy WM load during mental‐state reasoning results in an overestimation of the probability that the protagonist's behaviour will accord with a participant's knowledge. Conversely, a heavy WM load applied during story comprehension, regardless of the type of WM load during mental‐state reasoning, did not result in this probability estimation bias. We discuss these findings from the perspective of a WM representation account.     

Alexithymia increases moral acceptability of accidental harms

Previous research shows that when people judge moral acceptability of others' harmful behaviour, they not only take into account information about the consequences of the act but also an actor's belief while carrying out the act. A two-process model has been proposed to account for this pattern of moral judgements and posits: (1) a causal process that detects the presence of a harmful outcome and is motivated by empathic aversion stemming from victim suffering; (2) a mental state-based process that attributes beliefs, desires, intentions, etc. to the agent in question and is motivated by imagining personally carrying out harmful actions. One prediction of this model would be that personality traits associated with empathy deficits would find accidental harms more acceptable not because they focus on innocent intentions but because they have reduced concern for the victim's well-being. In this study, we show that one such personality trait, viz. alexithymia, indeed exhibits the predicted pattern and this increased acceptability of accidental harm in alexithymia is mediated by reduced dispositional empathic concern. Results attest to the validity of two-process model of intent-based moral judgements and emphasise key role affective empathy plays in harm-based moral judgements.     

Causal judgements about two causal candidates: Accounting for occurrences,estimating strength,and the importance of interaction judgements

When two possible causes of an outcome are under consideration, contingency information concerns each possible combination of presence and absence of the two causes with occurrences and nonoccurrences of the outcome. White (2008) proposed that such judgements could be predicted by a weighted averaging model integrating these kinds of contingency information. The weights in the model are derived from the hypothesis that causal judgements seek to meet two main aims, accounting for occurrences of the outcome and estimating the strengths of the causes. Here it is shown that the model can explain many but not all relevant published findings. The remainder can be explained by reasoning about interactions between the two causes, by scenario-specific effects, and by variations in cell weight depending on quantity of available information. An experiment is reported that supports this argument. The review and experimental results support the case for a cognitive model of causal judgement in which different kinds of contingency information are utilised to satisfy particular aims of the judgement process.     

Judgements vs affective evaluations of counterfactual outcomes

Counterfactual thoughts are imagined alternatives to past events and outcomes. Such thoughts may address possible consequences and effects of a counterfactual turn of events, and also an affective evaluation of that simulated outcome. Previous research has shown that estimates of counterfactual consequences are exaggerated (Teigen, Kanten, & Terum, 2011). The present research compared both consequence estimates and affective evaluations of factual and counterfactual outcomes. Consistent with previous findings, participants exaggerated consequence estimates, but affective evaluations indicated an opposite effect: Factual events were evaluated as more emotionally impressive than comparable counterfactual outcomes, for both negative (Experiment 1) and positive outcomes (Experiment 2). We discuss these apparently contradictory findings within the framework of construal level theory and suggest that both findings are compatible with an abstract, high-level account of counterfactual thinking.     

Quantifiers and propositional attitudes: Quine revisited

Quine introduced a famous distinction between the ‘notional’ sense and the ‘relational’ sense of certain attitude verbs. The distinction is both intuitive and sound but is often conflated with another distinction Quine draws between ‘dyadic’ and ‘triadic’ (or higher degree) attitudes. I argue that this conflation is largely responsible for the mistaken view that Quine’s account of attitudes is undermined by the problem of the ‘exportation’ of singular terms within attitude contexts. Quine’s system is also supposed to suffer from the problem of ‘suspended judgement with continued belief’. I argue that this criticism fails to take account of a crucial presupposition of Quine’s about the connection between thought and language. The aim of the paper is to defend the spirit of Quine’s account of attitudes by offering solutions to these two problems. See also chapters four and five of Word and Object (Quine, 1960) and ‘Intensions Revisited’ (Quine, 1977).     

Is the principle of minimization of secondary moments validated during various fingertip force production conditions?

During the application of fingertip forces with simultaneous flexion of the four fingers, namely index, middle, ring, and little fingers, a stable force sharing among fingers is adopted. Several studies have hypothesized that this stable force sharing is established to minimize unnecessary rotational moments (different from the main flexion moments). This principle labeled "minimization of secondary moments" is presented in the literature as a principle used by the central nervous system to solve musculoskeletal redundancy. However, this principle has only been tested with one solicited degree of freedom and in one finger posture. Our study tests this principle with various degrees of freedom solicited as secondary moments and in two different finger postures. Participants (n=6) were asked to apply a downward vertical force using their four fingers with the forearm placed in two different configurations: a "horizontal" condition (involving flexion/extension and pronation/supination at the wrist joint) and a "vertical" condition (involving flexion/extension and radial/ulnar deviation at the wrist joint). Additionally, two finger postures were tested in each forearm configuration: in the first, the distal inter-phalangeal joints (DIP) were extended and the proximal inter-phalangeal joints (PIP) highly flexed. In the second finger posture, both DIP and PIP joints were flexed. The resultant four-finger force and the relative involvement of each finger in the resultant four-finger force (force sharing) were analyzed. Results showed that the finger postures did not influence the finger force sharing, showing that the minimization of the secondary moment principle was stable among the finger joint angle configurations. Nonetheless, the relative involvement of each finger was dependent on the secondary degree of freedom solicited (pronation/supination vs. radial/ulnar). The modifications of the finger force sharing between the "horizontal" and "vertical" conditions were in accordance with the principle of minimization of the secondary moments.