Visual impressions of forces between objects: Entraining,enforced disintegration,and shattering

When a moving object (A) contacts a stationary one (B) and Object B then moves, visual impressions of force occur along with a visual impression of causality. It is shown that findings about force impressions that occur with launching effect stimuli generalize to other forms of phenomenal causality, namely entraining, enforced disintegration, and shattering stimuli. In particular, evidence is reported for generality of the force asymmetry, in which the amount of perceived force exerted by Object A is greater than the amount of perceived resistance put up by Object B. Effects of manipulations of kinematic variables also resembled those found in previous experiments. Some unpredicted findings occurred. It is argued that these reflect a change in perceptual interpretation when both objects are in motion prior to contact, due to both objects being perceived as in autonomous motion. The results are consistent with a theoretical account in which force impressions occur by a process of matching kinematic information in visual stimuli to stored representations of actions on objects, which supply information about forces.     

Children's strategic compensation for size underconstancy: Dependence on distance and relation to reasoning ability

When asked to judge the size of a distant object, older children are more likely than younger ones to report deliberately inflating their judgements to compensate for size underconstancy (Granrud, in press). The current investigation examined whether use of this strategy depends on object distance and whether it is related to individual differences in reasoning, knowledge about size perception, or cognitive style. In two studies, children in Grades 1–3 estimated the size of a distant (61 m away) and near (6.1 m away) disc. In each, half of the children reported inflating their judgement of the distant disc to compensate for a tendency to underestimate its size, but only a few reported using this strategy for the near disc. Self-reported strategy users tended to either judge the distant disc accurately or to overestimate its size, whereas the other children tended to underestimate its size. Strategy reporters obtained higher scores on a test of verbal reasoning, but did not differ from the other children in reflectivity-impulsivity. In Study 1, strategy reporters also showed a better understanding of how distance affects the apparent size of objects in photographs. This understanding was strongly related to verbal reasoning ability. In Study 2, visuospatial reasoning ability was also found to predict who would report strategy use, and this predictive relation was independent of verbal reasoning ability.     

Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.     

Empathic Access: The Missing Ingredient in Personal Identity

Abstract

Philosophical discussions of personal identity depend upon thought experiments which describe psychological vicissitudes and question whether the original person survives in the person resulting from the described change. These cases are meant to determine the types of psychological change compatible with personal continuation. Two main accounts of identity try to capture this distinction; psychological continuity theories and narrative theories. I argue that neither fully succeeds since both overlook the importance of a relationship I call “empathic access.” I define empathic access and discuss its role in a complete account of personal identity.     

Motor Response Variations: Peripheral and Central Sources of Error

The purpose of this research was to test the hypothesis that the relative involvement of peripheral versus central nervous system activity during response variations determines the locus of error production in a subsequent criterion response. The hypothesis was tested by comparing ipsilateral and contralateral transfer of a criterion response following response variations that emphasized proportionately different involvement of the peripheral and central systems. When subjects were provided with knowledge of results (KR) to maintain a 30% maximum voluntary contraction (MVC), ipsilateral but not contralateral bias errors occurred on a subsequent dynamic response. When subjects maintained a 30% MVC without KR, however, subsequent ipsilateral bias errors were greater than contralateral bias errors. Finally, when subjects imaged a 30% MVC, subsequent bias errors were equivalent across limbs. These results are interpreted as support for the hypothesis.     

Challenges for the sequential two-system model of moral judgement

Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system (“default interventionist”) model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements (utilitarian or deontological) subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task.     

Professional judgement in the assessment of risk: is there a role for systemic practice?

Risk assessment is an example of professional decision‐making pared to its stark essentials. Political pressures towards accountability and the need for defensible decisions encourage a ‘tick‐box’ approach to risk assessment, but this can create unrealistic expectations of certainty. In practice, as technological approaches produce ever more complex formal tools for assessing risk, their effectiveness remains dubious while our human decision‐making apparatus is marginalized. This article examines whether we should respect our ability to apprehend complex multi‐stranded narrative realities intuitively, with the hope that such intuitions might contribute to professional decision‐making. This idea is explored with reference to a case study.     

It's immoral,but I'd do it! Psychopathy traits affect decision‐making in sacrificial dilemmas and in everyday moral situations

This research investigated whether emotional hyporeactivity affects moral judgements and choices of action in sacrificial moral dilemmas and in everyday moral conflict situations in which harm to other's welfare is differentially involved. Twenty‐six participants with high trait psychopathy (HP) and 25 with low trait psychopathy (LP) were selected based on the primary psychopathy scale of the Levenson Self‐Report Psychopathy Scale. HP participants were more likely to sacrifice one person to save others in sacrificial dilemmas and to pursue a personal advantage in everyday moral situations entailing harm to another's good. While deciding in these situations, HP participants experienced lower unpleasantness as compared to LP participants. Conversely, no group differences emerged in choice of action and unpleasantness ratings for everyday moral situations that did not entail harm to others. Importantly, moral judgements did not differ in the two groups. These results suggest that high psychopathy trait affects choices of action in sacrificial dilemmas because of reduced emotional reactivity to harmful acts. The dissociation between choice of action and moral judgement suggests that the former is more closely related to emotional experience. Also, emotion seems to play a critical role in discriminating harmful from harmless acts and in driving decisions accordingly.     

Aesthetic judgements and motivation

Are aesthetic judgements cognitive, belief-like states or non-cognitive, desire-like states? There have been a number of attempts in recent years to evaluate the plausibility of a non-cognitivist theory of aesthetic judgements. These attempts borrow heavily from non-cognitivism in metaethics. One argument that is used to support metaethical non-cognitivism is the argument from Motivational Judgement Internalism. It is claimed that accepting this view, together with a plausible theory of motivation, pushes us towards accepting non-cognitivism. A tempting option, then, for those wishing to defend aesthetic non-cognitivism, would be to appeal to a similar argument. However, both Caj Strandberg and Walter Sinnott-Armstong have argued that Internalism is a less plausible claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements by raising objections against aesthetic internalism. In this paper, I will argue that both of these objections can be raised against internalism about moral judgements as well. As a result, internalism is no less plausible a claim to make about aesthetic judgements than about moral judgements. I will then show how a theory of internalism about normative judgements in general is capable of avoiding both of these objections.     

From personal goals disclosed to personality judgments composed: Trait perceptions made on the basis of idiographic goals

Traits and goals represent discrete units of personality. Here, we examined the consensus, validity, and cues of trait judgments made on the basis of targets’ goals. Targets (N = 409) generated lists of personal goals and rated their traits. Observers were provided with targets’ (a) lists of goals, (b) first goals, or (c) fifth goals, and then reported trait judgments of targets. Perceptions of targets, which were formed on the basis of the emotional content of goals, were largely consistent among observers. Furthermore, observer reports made on the basis of participants’ lists of goals converged with self-reports of all traits whereas reports made on the basis of single goals converged with self-reports of certain (e.g., extraversion), but not all, traits.