排序方式: 共有20条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
11.
Jack M. C. Kwong 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):309-325
In this paper, I present an alternative argument for Jerry Fodor's recent conclusion that there are currently no tenable theories of concepts in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind. Briefly, my approach focuses on the ‘theory-theory’ of concepts. I argue that the two ways in which cognitive psychologists have formulated this theory lead to serious difficulties, and that there cannot be, in principle, a third way in which it can be reformulated. Insofar as the ‘theory-theory’ is supposed to replace, and to rectify the problems of, the earlier ‘classical’ and ‘probabilistic’ theories, its failure confirms Fodor's original observation. Since my critique does not rest on controversial philosophical assumptions and is readily available from within the cognitive sciences, it is a stronger argument than Fodor's. 相似文献
12.
Arrindell WA Eisemann M Richter J Oei TP Caballo VE van der Ende J Sanavio E Bagés N Feldman L Torres B Sica C Iwawaki S Hatzichristou C;Cultural Clinical Psychology Study Group 《Behaviour research and therapy》2003,41(7):795-807
Hofstede's dimension of national culture termed Masculinity-Femininity [. Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. London: McGraw-Hill] is proposed to be of relevance for understanding national-level differences in self-assessed agoraphobic fears. This prediction is based on the classical work of Fodor [. In: V. Franks & V. Burtle (Eds.), Women in therapy: new psychotherapies for a changing society. New York: Brunner/Mazel]. A unique data set comprising 11 countries (total N=5491 students) provided the opportunity of scrutinizing this issue. It was hypothesized and found that national Masculinity (the degree to which cultures delineate sex roles, with masculine or tough societies making clearer differentiations between the sexes than feminine or modest societies do) would correlate positively with national agoraphobic fear levels (as assessed with the Fear Survey Schedule-III). Following the correction for sex and age differences across national samples, a significant and large effect-sized national-level (ecological) r=+0.67 (P=0.01) was found. A highly feminine society such as Sweden had the lowest, whereas the champion among the masculine societies, Japan, had the highest national Agoraphobic fear score. 相似文献
13.
Ordinary semantic compositionality (meaning of whole determined from meanings of parts plus composition) can serve to explain how a hearer manages to assign an appropriate meaning to a new sentence. But it does not serve to explain how the speaker manages to find an appropriate sentence for expressing a new thought. For this we would need a principle of inverse compositionality, by which the expression of a complex content is determined by the expressions of it parts and the mode of composition. But this presupposes that contents have constituent structure, and this cannot be taken for granted. However, it can be proved that if a certain principle of substitutivity is valid for a particular language, then the meanings expressed by its sentences can justifiably be treated as structured. In its simplest form, this principle says that if in a complex expression a constituent is replaced by another constituent with a different meaning, the new complexhas a meaning different from the original. This principle is again inversely related to the normal compositional principle of substitutivity. The combination of ordinary and inverse compositionality is here called strong compositionality. The proof is carried out in the algebraic framework developed by Wilfrid Hodges and Dag Westerståhl. 相似文献
14.
15.
Bradley Rives 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(2):211-238
This paper concerns the dialectal role of Frege Cases in the debate between Concept Cartesians and Concept Pragmatists. I
take as a starting point Christopher Peacocke’s argument that, unlike Cartesianism, his ‘Fregean’ Pragmatism can account for
facts about the rationality and epistemic status of certain judgments. I argue that since this argument presupposes that the
rationality of thoughts turn on their content, it is thus question-begging against Cartesians, who claim that issues about
rationality turn on the form, not the content, of thoughts. I then consider Jerry Fodor’s argument that ‘modes of presentation’
are not identical with Fregean senses, and argue that explanatory considerations should leads us to reject his ‘syntactic’
treatment of Frege cases. Rejecting the Cartesian treatment of Frege cases, however, is not tantamount to accepting Peacocke’s
claim that reasons and rationality are central to the individuation of concepts. For I argue that we can steer a middle course
between Fodor’s Cartesianism and Peacocke’s Pragmatism, and adopt a form of Pragmatism that is constrained by Fregean considerations,
but at the same time denies that concepts are constitutively tied to reasons and rationality.
相似文献
Bradley RivesEmail: |
16.
Thomas W. Polger 《Synthese》2009,167(3):457-472
Consider what the brain-state theorist has to do to make good his claims. He has to specify a physical–chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical–chemical structure; and (b) its brain is in that physical–chemical state. This means that the physical–chemical state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a mollusc’s brain (octopuses are mollusca, and certainly feel pain), etc. At the same time, it must not be a possible (physically possible) state of the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain. Even if such a state can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. It is not altogether impossible that such a state will be found... . But this is certainly an ambitious hypothesis. (Putnam 1967/1975, p. 436)The belief that mental states are multiply realized is now nearly universal among philosophers, as is the belief that this fact decisively refutes the identity theory. I argue that the empirical support for multiple realization does not justify the confidence that has been placed in it. In order for multiple realization of mental states to be an objection to the identity theory, the neurological differences among pains, for example, must be such as to guarantee that they are of distinct neurological kinds. But the phenomena traditionally cited do not provide evidence of that sort of variation. In particular, examples of neural plasticity do not provide such evidence. 相似文献
17.
18.
David Merli 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):535-556
Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational
and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation
or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession
of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against
conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail
because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications
of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to
share moral concepts.
相似文献
David MerliEmail: |
19.
Mark H. Bickhard 《Synthese》2009,166(3):547-591
A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative
phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity,
and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational
forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This
process model of representation, called interactivism, compels changes in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief
attention to three domains in which changes are induced by the representational model: perception, learning, and language. 相似文献
20.
Todd Edwin Jones 《Cognitive Science》2004,28(3):409-432
Jerry Fodor has argued that the multiple realizability argument, as discussed in his original “Special Sciences” article, “refutes psychophysical reductionism once and for all.” I argue that his argument in “Special Sciences” does no such thing. Furthermore, if one endorses the physicalism that most supporters of the “Special Sciences” view endorse, special science laws must be reducible, in principle. The compatibility of MR with reduction, however, need not threaten the autonomy of the special sciences. 相似文献