Perceptuomotor rules as prediction tools in (joint) action: The case of orientation perception

The human action system has a layered structure supporting a cascade of partially overlapping information processes in multiple, interlinked representational spaces. Apart from the mirror neuron system which through motor resonance mediates one's understanding of the action goals of one's partner, perceptuomotor rules like Fitts' law, the Isogony Principle, and sequencing heuristics provide further sources of prediction in (joint) action. The present study focuses on a perceptuomotor rule that describes how the orientation of framed, tilted objects is perceived and acted upon by individuals. In two experiments involving the Rod-and-Frame Illusion (RFI) participants were asked to perform delayed responses that consisted either of (1) making a perceptual judgment in a forced-choice paradigm, or (2) rotating and propelling a hand-held cylinder. Irrespective of response type, the effects of the RFI proved robust and constant. The relevance of the findings for prediction in joint-action tasks is discussed.     

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ILLUSION: MILNER, WINNICOTT AND RYCROFT

Illusion is a word that Raymond Williams might have included among his list of keywords of British culture, since it is a word that discloses 'both continuity and discontinuity, and also deep conflicts of value and belief' within its intellectual and political history (1983, p. 23). It is a banner under which the meaning of that culture has frequently been contested. The author indicates some of the more significant of these contests, with occasional glances at the wider European context and with special reference to the history of psychoanalysis, where the conflicts that characterise the larger history of the word have been interestingly re-enacted. In particular, the author explores its significance for the English psychoanalysts Marion Milner and Charles Rycroft and, more centrally, for Donald Winnicott, not least because in Winnicott's case it is a word that has been treated only peripherally in the two books that are organised around the study of his language, Alexander Newman's Non-Compliance in Winnicott's Words (1995) and Jan Abram's The Language of Winnicott (1996).     

控制幻觉与人格、动机关系研究

目的本研究考察了人格、动机强弱分别与心理控制幻觉之间的关系。方法采用被试内实验设计的方法,用艾森克人格问卷进行测量。结果与结论动机水平的高低与控制幻觉的形成之间存在明确的关系,即前后动机水平的发生变化,信心分差异显著(t=-3.1,p=0.006<0.05),动机越强则产生控制幻觉的倾向性越大;人格中的外倾性,精神质与心理控制幻觉的产生存在显著的正相关(r=0.766,P<0.01;r=0.827,P<0.01);外倾性这一心理特质对控制幻觉的产生有较强的预测作用。     

The psychology and philosophy of luck

There has been a great deal of interest in the concept of luck in the recent psychological and philosophical literature. In philosophy, this interest has tended to focus not upon luck simpliciter but rather upon the role that luck plays in ethical and epistemological debates concerning (respectively) moral and epistemic luck. In psychology, in contrast, a number of studies have explicitly examined our everyday conceptions of luck and the manner in which these conceptions influence our lives. This article surveys both the recent psychological and philosophical literature on this topic and argues that (to different degrees) the work of both disciplines in this area has been hampered by a failure to be clearer about what luck involves. Accordingly, this article offers a specification of what is core to the notion of luck and highlights how this analysis can aid further research in this area by both psychologists and philosophers.     

Validation d’une échelle d’évaluation multi-dimensionnelle de l’illusion de contrôle dans les jeux de hasard et d’argent (EEMDIC)

IntroductionThe illusion of control is widely accepted as a key factor in the gambling behaviors. A polysemic concept, its theoretical definition remains debatable, however, and the multitude of measures used to account for it makes it difficult to compare the results of research on it.ObjectiveThe purpose of this study is to clarify what the illusion of control is and to provide a measure that captures what it is.MethodBy considering the two valences, positive (focusing on gains) and negative (focusing on losses), relating to gambling cognitions, two subscales were thus subjected to exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses on the data collected from 482 participants (82.78% of women, M_age = 36.5, SD_age = 12.31).ResultsThe results reveal that a 4-factor solution (absolute luck/series law; skills, knowledge and strategies; superstitious rituals and behaviours; personal luck/misfortune) allows us to describe the sample data for each of the two subscales. Polynomial regressions with response surface analyses make the case for presenting the two subscales simultaneously (matrix format). These analyses also show that the illusion of control is linked to gambling habits through the interaction of positive and negative valences. In particular, individuals gamble more frequently when they simultaneously attribute more their winnings and less their losses to luck.ConclusionsThe usefulness of this new tool, which addresses the illusion of control by a direct measurement of its dimensions and an indirect measurement of its affective structure, is discussed both in terms of research and practice, since it would make it possible to orient care.     

The language used in describing autobiographical memories prompted by life period visually presented verbal cues,event-specific visually presented verbal cues and short musical clips of popular music

Here, we examined linguistic differences in the reports of memories produced by three cueing methods. Two groups of young adults were cued visually either by words representing events or popular cultural phenomena that took place when they were 5, 10, or 16 years of age, or by words referencing a general lifetime period word cue directing them to that period in their life. A third group heard 30-second long musical clips of songs popular during the same three time periods. In each condition, participants typed a specific event memory evoked by the cue and these typed memories were subjected to analysis by the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) program. Differences in the reports produced indicated that listening to music evoked memories embodied in motor-perceptual systems more so than memories evoked by our word-cueing conditions. Additionally, relative to music cues, lifetime period word cues produced memories with reliably more uses of personal pronouns, past tense terms, and negative emotions. The findings provide evidence for the embodiment of autobiographical memories, and how those differ when the cues emphasise different aspects of the encoded events.     

The self-attribution bias and paranormal beliefs

The present study investigated the relation between paranormal beliefs, illusory control and the self-attribution bias, i.e., the motivated tendency to attribute positive outcomes to oneself while negative outcomes are externalized. Visitors of a psychic fair played a card guessing game and indicated their perceived control over randomly selected cards as a function of the congruency and valence of the card. A stronger self-attribution bias was observed for paranormal believers compared to skeptics and this bias was specifically related to traditional religious beliefs and belief in superstition. No relation between paranormal beliefs and illusory control was found. Self-report measures indicated that paranormal beliefs were associated to being raised in a spiritual family and to anomalous experiences during childhood. Thereby this study suggests that paranormal beliefs are related to specific cognitive biases that in turn are shaped by socio-cultural factors.     

To infinity and beyond: Children generalize the successor function to all possible numbers years after learning to count

Recent accounts of number word learning posit that when children learn to accurately count sets (i.e., become “cardinal principle” or “CP” knowers), they have a conceptual insight about how the count list implements the successor function – i.e., that every natural number n has a successor defined as n + 1 (Carey, 2004, 2009; Sarnecka & Carey, 2008). However, recent studies suggest that knowledge of the successor function emerges sometime after children learn to accurately count, though it remains unknown when this occurs, and what causes this developmental transition. We tested knowledge of the successor function in 100 children aged 4 through 7 and asked how age and counting ability are related to: (1) children’s ability to infer the successors of all numbers in their count list and (2) knowledge that all numbers have a successor. We found that children do not acquire these two facets of the successor function until they are about 5½ or 6 years of age – roughly 2 years after they learn to accurately count sets and become CP-knowers. These findings show that acquisition of the successor function is highly protracted, providing the strongest evidence yet that it cannot drive the cardinal principle induction. We suggest that counting experience, as well as knowledge of recursive counting structures, may instead drive the learning of the successor function.     

Counting to Infinity: Does Learning the Syntax of the Count List Predict Knowledge That Numbers Are Infinite?

By around the age of 5½, many children in the United States judge that numbers never end, and that it is always possible to add 1 to a set. These same children also generally perform well when asked to label the quantity of a set after one object is added (e.g., judging that a set labeled “five” should now be “six”). These findings suggest that children have implicit knowledge of the “successor function”: Every natural number, n, has a successor, n + 1. Here, we explored how children discover this recursive function, and whether it might be related to discovering productive morphological rules that govern language-specific counting routines (e.g., the rules in English that represent base-10 structure). We tested 4- and 5-year-old children’s knowledge of counting with three tasks, which we then related to (a) children’s belief that 1 can always be added to any number (the successor function) and (b) their belief that numbers never end (infinity). Children who exhibited knowledge of a productive counting rule were significantly more likely to believe that numbers are infinite (i.e., there is no largest number), though such counting knowledge was not directly linked to knowledge of the successor function, per se. Also, our findings suggest that children as young as 4 years of age are able to implement rules defined over their verbal count list to generate number words beyond their spontaneous counting range, an insight which may support reasoning over their acquired verbal count sequence to infer that numbers never end.     

Illusion and offense in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Philosophical Fragments</Emphasis>: Kierkegaard’s inversion of Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity

The article shows the “Appendix” to Søren Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments to be a response to Ludwig Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity. While previous studies have detected some influence by Feuerbach on Kierkegaard, they have so far discovered little in the way of specific responses to Feuerbach’s ideas in Kierkegaard’s published works. The article first makes the historical argument that Kierkegaard was very likely reading Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity while he was writing Philosophical Fragments, as several of Kierkegaard’s journal entries from that period discuss Feuerbach in relation to central ideas in Fragments. The article then shows how Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes Climacus inverts Feuerbach’s projection theory, turning it against critics like Feuerbach. At the heart of Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity is the claim that religion is a conceptual illusion, whereby the individual projects his or her personal limits onto the species and then projects the unlimited onto a supposed divine being. Furthermore, Feuerbach sees Christianity as rife with absurdities that tell against its reasonableness. In exploring a hypothetical transcendent avenue toward the truth, Climacus inverts both of these philosophical moves. He argues that on the transcendent hypothesis, the immanentist critic is himself a victim of an “acoustical illusion”: the absolute paradox of the appearance of the god in time is in fact not judged by, but rather judges, the critic as absurd. In inverting and not repudiating Feuerbach’s critique, Climacus reveals the critic as a Socratic figure who displays the heights—and ultimately, the limits—of secular philosophy’s capabilities.