The Empathy Quotient (EQ) predicts perceived strength of bodily illusions and illusion-related sensations of pain

In this study we test the possible implications of high empathising skills on bodily self–other distinction by measuring the strength of a body ownership illusion and a related experience of illusory pain. One-hundred adult participants completed the Empathy Quotient (EQ) questionnaire. Twenty participants from the top quintile and 20 participants from the bottom quintile of the EQ distribution took part in a laboratory experiment. In the experiment, a classical Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI) was induced followed by the presentation of a series of painful stimuli to the rubber hand. Participants were asked to self-rate the strength of their subjective experience of the RHI and of the illusory pain. A proprioceptive location judgment on the position of the hidden hand was also required before and after RHI induction, to record drifts towards the rubber hand. We found a significant difference between high- and low-empathy participants in RHI and pain score. The EQ was not related with the proprioceptive location judgement drift. It thus appears to be a better predictor of subjective ownership feelings and phenomenological self–other merging than of the behavioural components of bodily illusions.     

La connaissance du gain d’autrui : une incitation au risque ?

This research aims at suggesting a causal model of risk-taking, following the announcement of another player's gains in a gamble with elementary characteristics. Risk-taking was measured by investment ratio, the amount the participant decided to bet divided by his current total assets. According to Langer's definition [J Perso Soc Psychol 32 (1975) 311-328], the illusion of control was measured by the level of personal success. The results show that the knowledge of another's gain increased risk-taking and the expectancy of personal success. These results validated the causal-model wherein the effect of the knowledge of another's gain on risk-taking was mediated by the expectancy of personal success. The discussion relates mainly to the need for taking into account the fact that gamblers are not isolated decision-makers, but takes account of some social parameters which guide their choices and actions.     

被洞悉错觉中的锚定及其调节效应

根据锚定及其调节效应的理论解释,通过两个情境实验对被洞悉错觉产生过程中的锚定及其调节效应进行研究。研究表明,在紧张、愉快情绪状态下个体均倾向高估他人对自己内部状态的洞悉水平,即产生被洞悉错觉。内心感受强度,即锚定值对被洞悉错觉的产生有重要影响;而有无认知负荷,即认知状态在被洞悉错觉产生过程中与锚定值的调节水平无关,对被洞悉错觉是否发生亦没有明显作用。     

Evolved navigation theory and horizontal visual illusions

Environmental perception is prerequisite to most vertebrate behavior and its modern investigation initiated the founding of experimental psychology. Navigation costs may affect environmental perception, such as overestimating distances while encumbered (Solomon, 1949). However, little is known about how this occurs in real-world navigation or how it may have evolved. We manipulated the most commonly navigated surfaces with a non-intuitive cost derived from evolved navigation theory. Observers in realistic settings unknowingly overestimated horizontal distances that contained a risk of falling and did so by the relative degree of falling risk. This manipulation produced previously unknown, large magnitude illusions in everyday vision in the environments most commonly navigated by humans. These results bear upon predictions from multiple fundamental theories of visual cognition.     

Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration

Prior research has claimed that people exaggerate probabilities of success by overestimating personal control in situations that are heavily or completely chance-determined. We examine whether such overestimation of control persists in situations where people do have control. Our results suggest a simple model that accounts for prior findings on illusory control as well as for situations where actual control is high: People make imperfect estimates of their level of control. By focusing on situations marked by low control, prior research has created the illusion that people generally overestimate their level of control. Across three studies, we show that when they have a great deal of control, people under-estimate it. Implications for research on perceived control and co-variation assessment are discussed.     

BETWEEN KNOWING AND BELIEVING: SALVAGING ILLUSION'S RIGHTFUL PLACE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Illusion has historically received insufficient psychoanalytic attention, even though it plays an indispensable and adaptive role that helps protect individuals from becoming traumatized by the most psychically noxious aspects of reality. Trauma is mitigated by an individual's knowing about the existence of such realities yet simultaneously believing them non‐existent, with neither position granted exclusivity. Psychoanalytic theory is surprisingly predicated on the employment of illusions that picture an individual capable of controlling the potentially traumatic actions of others, just so long as the individual effectively manages his own intrapsychic processes (wishes, fantasies, impulses, etc.). The role of illusion in everyday life is highlighted.     

Predictive and postdictive mechanisms jointly contribute to visual awareness

One of the fundamental issues in visual awareness is how we are able to perceive the scene in front of our eyes on time despite the delay in processing visual information. The prediction theory postulates that our visual system predicts the future to compensate for such delays. On the other hand, the postdiction theory postulates that our visual awareness is inevitably a delayed product. In the present study we used flash-lag paradigms in motion and color domains and examined how the perception of visual information at the time of flash is influenced by prior and subsequent visual events. We found that both types of event additively influence the perception of the present visual image, suggesting that our visual awareness results from joint contribution of predictive and postdictive mechanisms.     

A psychologically based taxonomy of Magicians’ forcing Techniques: How magicians influence our choices,and how to use this to study psychological mechanisms

Magicians have developed a wide range of techniques to influence and control spectators’ choices of such things as card, word, or number. These techniques are what is called forcing. The present paper develops a psychologically-based taxonomy of forcing techniques with two goals in mind. Firstly, it should help uncover the different psychological mechanisms that underlie forcing techniques. Secondly, it should facilitate knowledge transfer between magicians and psychologists. The main division present two basic categories that can be used as a way of focussing separately on (1) decision-making processes and external influences on choices, and (2) links between sense of agency over action and outcome as well as the illusion of control over this outcome. This taxonomy allows us to clearly differentiate between forces in which there is or is not a free choice, and whether this choice has an impact on the following events.¹     

The influence of desire for control on drivers' risk-taking behaviour

Increases in perceived control over the driving task are known to increase intended driving speeds. Also, some people like being in control more than others. In the present study, we compared drivers with a high desire for control and drivers with a low desire for control, as measured on Burger and Cooper's (1979) [Motivation and Emotion 3 (4) (1979) 381] Desirability of Control Scale. Using validated video simulation techniques, we found that drivers with a high desire for control intended to drive at faster speeds and were willing to pull out into smaller gaps in traffic. We discuss the results in terms of an illusion of control and we describe implications for road safety interventions.     

Events and the ontology of individuals: verbs as a source of individuating mass and count nouns

What does mass-count syntax contribute to the interpretation of noun phrases (NPs), and how much of NP meaning is contributed by lexical items alone? Many have argued that count syntax specifies reference to countable individuals (e.g., cats) while mass syntax specifies reference to unindividuated entities (e.g., water). We evaluated this claim using the quantity judgment method, and tested the interpretation of words used in mass and count syntax that described either protracted, "durative" events (e.g., mass: some dancing; count: a dance), or instantaneous, "punctual" events (e.g., mass: some jumping; count: a jump). For durative words, participants judged, for example, that six brief dances are more dances but less dancing than two long dances, thus showing a significant difference in their interpretation of the count and mass usages. However, for punctual words, participants judged, for example, that six small jumps are both more jumps and more jumping than two long jumps, resulting in no difference due to mass-count syntax. Further, when asked which dimensions are important for comparing quantities of durative and punctual events, participants ranked number as first in importance for durative and punctual words presented in count syntax, but also for punctual words presented in mass syntax. These results indicate that names for punctual events individuate when used in either mass or count syntax, and thus provide evidence against the idea that mass syntax forces an unindividuated construal. They also indicate that event punctuality as encoded by verbs is importantly linked to the individuation of NPs, and may access a common underlying ontology of individuals.