The “Deliberative Digital Divide:” Opinion Leadership and Integrative Complexity in the U.S. Political Blogosphere

This study examined the association between political ideology and linguistic indicators of integrative complexity and opinion leadership in U.S. political blog posts (N = 519). Using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text analysis, we found that the posts of conservative bloggers were more integratively simple than those of liberal bloggers. Furthermore, in support of a proposed opinion leadership model of integrative complexity, the relationship between ideology and integrative complexity was mediated by psychological distancing (an indicator of a hierarchical communication style). These findings demonstrate an ideological divide in the extent to which the blogosphere reflects deliberative democratic ideals.     

The Flushtration Count Illusion: Attribute substitution tricks our interpretation of a simple visual event sequence

When faced with a difficult question, people sometimes work out an answer to a related, easier question without realizing that a substitution has taken place (e.g., Kahneman, 2011, Thinking, fast and slow. New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux). In two experiments, we investigated whether this attribute substitution effect can also affect the interpretation of a simple visual event sequence. We used a magic trick called the ‘Flushtration Count Illusion’, which involves a technique used by magicians to give the illusion of having seen multiple cards with identical backs, when in fact only the back of one card (the bottom card) is repeatedly shown. In Experiment 1, we demonstrated that most participants are susceptible to the illusion, even if they have the visual and analytical reasoning capacity to correctly process the sequence. In Experiment 2, we demonstrated that participants construct a biased and simplified representation of the Flushtration Count by substituting some attributes of the event sequence. We discussed of the psychological processes underlying this attribute substitution effect.     

Using optical illusions in the shoulder of a cycle path to affect lateral position

An important factor in single-sided accidents of older cyclists is that they ride off the cycle path onto the verge. Two experiments were performed to assess the feasibility of using virtual 3D objects in the verge to affect the lateral position of bicyclists. In the first experiment, different virtual objects were placed in the shoulder and 1150 passing bicyclists were observed using a fixed camera. The (standard deviation of the) lateral position and speed in four conditions with virtual objects differing in colour, structure, or 3D effect were compared with a control condition in which no virtual objects were applied. In a second experiment, the behaviour of 32 bicyclists aged 50 years or older was measured by mounting two digital action cameras with GPS on the participants’ bicycles. The participants cycled a route of approximately 12 km in which several locations were passed, one of these contained 15 virtual objects similar to the ones used in the first experiment placed in the shoulder of the cycle path. Cyclist behaviour was compared with behaviour at a control location consisting of a solitary two-way cycle path with a grass shoulder. Results indicate that the virtual objects in the tested format had little overall effect on cyclists’ behaviour. However, bicyclists were positioned closer to the virtual objects and the shoulder when they looked at the objects or when they reported that they saw them while cycling. This suggests that the overall visibility of the object design may have been too conservative.     

Let me take the wheel: Illusory control and sense of agency

Illusory control refers to an effect in games of chance where features associated with skilful situations increase expectancies of success. Past work has operationalized illusory control in terms of subjective ratings or behaviour, with limited consideration of the relationship between these definitions, or the broader construct of agency. This study used a novel card-guessing task in 78 participants to investigate the relationship between subjective and behavioural illusory control. We compared trials in which participants (a) had no opportunity to exercise illusory control, (b) could exercise illusory control for free, or (c) could pay to exercise illusory control. Contingency Judgment and Intentional Binding tasks assessed explicit and implicit sense of agency, respectively. On the card-guessing task, confidence was higher when participants exerted control than in the baseline condition. In a complementary model, participants were more likely to exercise control when their confidence was high, and this effect was accentuated in the pay condition relative to the free condition. Decisions to pay were positively correlated with control ratings on the Contingency Judgment task, but were not significantly related to Intentional Binding. These results establish an association between subjective and behavioural illusory control and locate the construct within the cognitive literature on agency.     

Listeners influence speakers’ perceived communication effectiveness

People have an exaggerated sense of self-efficacy. This paper investigates the mechanism behind speakers’ tendency to overestimate their communication efficacy. Two competing mechanisms were tested: intrapersonal and interpersonal. Speakers communicated a series of ambiguous statements to a co-present or absent listener and then estimated their success. Speakers overestimated their ability to communicate their intended message (relative to listeners’ actual comprehension of their message) when a listener was co-present, but not when a listener was absent. Our findings support an interpersonal explanation of speakers’ perceived communication efficacy.     

Mental control and visual illusions: Toward explaining race-biased weapon misidentifications

People are biased to misidentify harmless objects as weapons when the objects are associated with African Americans (Payne, 2001). Two studies examined the processes underlying this bias. The illusory perception hypothesis argues that stereotypes alter the subjective construal of the object. In contrast, the executive failure hypothesis argues that even when perception of the item is intact, misidentifications can result from failures to control responses. Immediately after making an error, participants were able to accurately express that they had made a mistake via confidence ratings (Experiment 1) and by correcting their judgment (Experiment 2). Subjective confidence judgments were extremely well calibrated to accuracy, and participants virtually never believed their own mistakes. Conditions likely to create errors through both illusions and control failures are discussed.     

Special random numbers: Beyond the illusion of control

Previous research has shown that gamblers prefer numbers they choose themselves because this choice allows them to feel more in control of the (random) outcome. We identify other conditions under which people find numbers “special” (i.e., worthy of betting more on than other numbers). By manipulating gambling task type and assigning participants a number by an endogenous system outside their own control (as is done in numerology, astrology, and other paranormal systems), we find that indeed people prefer to bet on numbers derived from particular special systems. The mechanism underlying this preference is enjoyment with the task—not control. Further, the enjoyment associated with this “specialness” is related to the prevalence of certain types of numbers (i.e., numbers based on dates and names) in the fortune-telling world and not to other factors such as individuality or even belief in the associated system. We replicate these findings using actual money and show that this prevalence-to-enjoyment link already exists in memory for dates and names and is activated and strengthened by priming the fortune-telling systems relevant to those special random numbers. Finally, we present a model of special random numbers that integrates our findings with other determinants of valuation such as regret and subjective probability. Our results expand the realm of special random numbers beyond control. Our enjoyment model has implications not only for understanding gambling, but also for understanding how reasoning under uncertainty is influenced by little-understood phenomena (such as fortune-telling systems) without affecting subjective probability or actual beliefs.     

The big two dictionaries: Capturing agency and communion in natural language

Four studies developed and validated two dictionaries to capture agentic and communal expressions in natural language. Their development followed the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) approach (Study 1) and we tested their validity with frequency-based analyses and semantic similarity measures. The newly developed Agency and Communion dictionaries were aligned with LIWC categories related to agency and communion (Study 2), and corresponded with subjective ratings (Study 3), confirming their convergent validity. Very low or absent correspondence between proposed dictionaries and unrelated LIWC categories demonstrated their discriminant validity (Study 2). Finally, we applied both dictionaries to language used in advertisements. In correspondence to gender stereotypes, male-dominated jobs were advertised with more agentic than communal words, and female-dominated jobs with more communal than agentic words (Study 4). Both dictionaries represent reliable tools for quantifying agentic and communal content in natural language, and will improve and facilitate future research on agency and communion.     

Language, thought, and real nouns

We test the claim that acquiring a mass-count language, like English, causes speakers to think differently about entities in the world, relative to speakers of classifier languages like Japanese. We use three tasks to assess this claim: object-substance rating, quantity judgment, and word extension. Using the first two tasks, we present evidence that learning mass-count syntax has little effect on the interpretation of familiar nouns between Japanese and English, and that speakers of these languages do not divide up referents differently along an individuation continuum, as claimed in some previous reports [Gentner, D., & Boroditsky, L. (2001). Individuation, relativity, and early word learning. In M. Bowerman, & S. Levinson (Eds.), Language acquisition and conceptual development (pp. 215-256). Cambridge University Press]. Instead, we argue that previous cross-linguistic differences [Imai, M., & Gentner, D. (1997). A cross-linguistic study of early word meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence. Cognition, 62, 169-200] are attributable to “lexical statistics” [Gleitman, L., & Papafragou, A. (2005). Language and thought. In K. Holyoak, & R. Morrison (Eds.), Cambridge handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 633-661). Cambridge University Press]. Speakers of English are more likely to think that a novel ambiguous expression like “the blicket” refers to a kind of object (relative to speakers of Japanese) because speakers of English are likely to assume that “blicket” is a count noun rather than a mass noun, based on the relative frequency of each kind of word in English. This is confirmed by testing Mandarin-English bilinguals with a word extension task. We find that bilinguals tested in English with mass-count ambiguous syntax extend novel words like English monolinguals (and assume that a word like “blicket” refers to a kind of object). In contrast, bilinguals tested in Mandarin are significantly more likely to extend novel words by material. Thus, online lexical statistics, rather than non-linguistic thought, mediate cross-linguistic differences in word extension. We suggest that speakers of Mandarin, English, and Japanese draw on a universal set of lexical meanings, and that mass-count syntax allows speakers of English to select among these meanings.     

Illusory control as a function of the motivation to avoid randomly determined aversive outcomes

Previous research has provided evidence that the need to attain appetitive outcomes positively affects the certainty of winning that outcome in purely chance-based games. Three experiments were conducted to test the notion that the need to avoid an aversive outcome affects winning confidence in the same fashion. In Experiment 1, participants were given the opportunity to avoid having to give an introductory remark (low need) or an impromptu speech (high need) to a group of peers by winning a chance-based card-drawing game. As predicted, confidence-in-winning ratings were found to be a positive function of outcome need. In Experiment 2, participants faced a similar card-drawing procedure but this time could avoid ostensibly having their arms submersed in either room temperature water (low need) or cold water (high need) need. Again as expected, results showed that participants in the high need condition not only displayed greater winning confidence but also believed more skill was involved in playing the purely chance-based game. In Experiment 3, the methodology of Experiment 1 was replicated incorporating a skill measure. The results of this experiment mirrored those of Experiment 2. Results of these investigations are discussed in terms of control theory.