Truth table task: Working memory load,latencies, and perceived relevance

The aim of the present study is to uncover the relation between cognitive ability and the answer patterns yielded by the truth table task. According to the Classical Mental Models Theory, people with high working memory capacity answer according to two-valued or “logical” answer patterns. The Suppositional Theory and the Revised Mental Models Theory predict that the answer patterns given by the most intelligent ones are three-valued or “defective”. Correlations are examined, and in three experiments it is tested with a dual task paradigm whether a differential working memory load alters participants' answer patterns. A positive correlation is observed between cognitive ability and three-valued answer patterns, but no effect of the working memory load manipulation is revealed. With an inspection of the classification times we shed light on the processes underlying truth table judgements. We conclude that the Revised Mental Models Theory provides the best account for our results.     

Mindreading abilities in sexual offenders: an analysis of theory of mind processes

The paper aims to assess the theory of mind (ToM) of sexual offenders. We administered to 21 sexual offenders and to 21 nonoffenders two classical first- and second-order ToM tasks, a selection of six Strange Stories, and a semi-structured interview, the Theory of Mind Assessment Scale (Th.o.m.a.s), which provides a multi-dimensional evaluation of ToM, investigating first- vs. third-person and egocentric vs. allocentric perspectives. Results show that sexual offenders performed worse than controls on second-order ToM tasks, on Strange Stories and on each of the Th.o.m.a.s dimensions, whereas they did as well as the control group on first-order ToM tasks. A detailed analysis of participants’ performance on Th.o.m.a.s. showed that sex offenders performed worse on the third-person than on the first-person ToM scale, and worse on the allocentric than on the egocentric perspective; these findings did not apply to the controls. Implications for future research and treatment are discussed.     

First-person science of consciousness: Theories,methods, applications

First-person science, one of the traditional forms of psychological enquiry, has significant contributions to make to psychological theory-building as it can add an in-depth understanding to phenomena that are difficult to access from a third-person perspective. At the same time, first-person enquiry is widely considered to be an anachronistic and unreliable mode of research. This view is debatable in itself, however. In a recent theme-call we sought to compile different views and perspectives on various facets of first-person enquiry and in the following provide a brief synopsis of the papers published under this theme-call.     

Elimination of bias in introspection: Methodological advances,refinements, and recommendations

Building on past constructive criticism, the present study provides further methodological development focused on the elimination of bias that may occur during first-person observation. First, various sources of errors that may accompany introspection are distinguished based on previous critical literature. Four main errors are classified, namely attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error. Furthermore, methodological recommendations for the possible elimination of these errors have been determined based on the analysis and focused excerpting of introspective scientific literature. The following groups of methodological recommendations were determined: 1) a better focusing of the subject's attention to their mental processes, 2) providing suitable stimuli, and 3) the sharing of introspective experience between subjects. Furthermore, the potential of adjustments in introspective research designs for eliminating attentional, attributional, conceptual, and expressional error is discussed.     

Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed.     

Meditative introspection promotes the First-person's science of consciousness via intuitive pathways: A hypothesis based on traditional Buddhist and contemporary Monist frameworks

What forms the basis for validating any knowledge? Should it be always verified based on the objective and analytical methods that we adapt according to our progressive advancements in science or is there any other way of conceiving knowledge? This is the context where modern sophistication should embrace an ancient perspective. Recently, there have been great advancements in the science of consciousness and meditation. Meditation received much attention as a practice for wellbeing and as a tool for cognitive enhancement. Even though, hundreds of objective studies have been conducted on different practices of meditation across different traditions, there is one essential element missing in almost all of these studies: the discussion of the subjective experience of meditation. Embracing the traditional insights on meditation, we study this element by defining meditation based on the concept of introspection. In addition, we hypothesize that introspective meta-awareness associated with the non-conceptual experience of meditation may result in the conceptual understanding of natural phenomena via pathways of intuition. The proposed advancement bears implications for the ontological and epistemological basis of experiential knowledge, as well as, for developing introspection and meditation-based interventions for self and consciousness disorders.