Content externalism and phenomenal character: a new worry about privileged access

Some philosophers argue that the thesis of content externalism, according to which the contents of a subject’s thoughts are in part individuated by environmental factors, threatens the standard idea that a subject can know the contents of her thoughts without empirical investigation. It is typically assumed, however, that this thesis does not threaten another common idea about privileged access: that a subject can know the phenomenal character of her experience–its “what it’s like” aspect–without empirical investigation. That is, even if content externalism is true and does imply that a subject cannot know without empirical investigation the contents of some of her thoughts (e.g., her thoughts about water), surely she can know without empirical investigation what it’s like for her to be having whatever experience she is having. I argue that if content externalism threatens privileged access to content (I do not discuss whether it does), then it also threatens privileged access to phenomenal character. My argument does not involve claiming that phenomenal character is itself externally individuated. Rather, it depends on two other claims: (1) that introspective access to phenomenal character is conceptual; and (2) that standard arguments for content externalism suggest that some phenomenal concepts are externally individuated.     

Cross‐national examination of the perpetrator–victim account estimation bias as a function of different types of accounts

In two cross‐national studies, we investigated the existence of a perpetrator–victim account estimation bias and how this bias can be reduced or eliminated when estimating the perpetrator's use of a mixed account; that is, an account in which the perpetrator not only apologizes but also explains mitigating and justifiable circumstances. Japanese and American participants took either the perspective of the perpetrator or the victim and estimated the likelihood of the perpetrator's use of each account. The results supported our hypothesis in both national samples. The implications of the bias and the role of the mixed account in reducing it are discussed.     

3～5岁幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势

基于以往支持心理理论执行功能表达论的研究结果,对标准错误信念任务修正后采用阶段性错误信念任务,运用实验法对101名3~5岁儿童进行研究。结果发现:(1)新任务保留了标准错误信念任务的优势,能勾勒出幼儿错误信念理解能力的发展趋势;(2)3~5岁儿童表现出不同层次和水平的错误信念理解能力;(3)具体分析儿童错误信念的理解能力发展的心理模式,发现每一年龄组具有的错误信念理解能力,都是其更高水平能力发展的基础,支持表达论。     

Psychologists' representations of gender identity between Spain and Greece: A qualitative cross-cultural study

Trans people's relationship with mental health providers carries historical tensions. Counseling services have been tied to standardized procedures or diagnostic certification of dysphoria and gender evaluations, while other psychosocial demands have been largely disregarded. Moreover, protocols and approaches focus disproportionately on Anglo-American frameworks, in terms of epistemic resources established to describe gender-diverse experiences. These issues affect both representations of gender identity and attitudes toward counseling. The present study aimed to address psychologists' accounts cross-culturally, by using qualitative data acquired through interviews with active practitioners from Spain and Greece. Eighteen qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted in both countries in order to delve into the narratives related to trans mental health care provision. Thematic analysis using Atlas.ti was used to systematize the data. The accounts centered on gender identity representations and attributions, attitudes toward counseling, relationship with diagnoses, psychological approaches, and competent training. Findings point to the need for all-encompassing, obligatory training of psychologists on trans mental health, followed by situated considerations of the contextual factors that may contribute to experiencing gender diversity differently. More cross-cultural qualitative accounts are thus encouraged, to enrich and update the upcoming trans literature on the matter.     

First-person approaches in neuroscience of consciousness: Brain dynamics correlate with the intention to act

The belief in free will has been frequently challenged since Benjamin Libet published his famous experiment in 1983. Although Libet’s experiment is highly dependent upon subjective reports, no study has been conducted that focused on a first-person or introspective perspective of the task. We took a neurophenomenological approach in an N = 1 study providing reliable and valid measures of the first-person perspective in conjunction with brain dynamics. We found that a larger readiness potential (RP) is attributable to more frequent occurrences of self-initiated movements during negative deflections of the slow cortical potentials (SCP). These negative deflections occur in parallel with an inner impulse reported by an expert meditator which may in turn lead to a voluntary act. We demonstrate in this proof-of-principle approach that the first-person perspective obtained by an expert meditator in conjunction with neural signal analysis can contribute to our understanding of the neural underpinnings of voluntary acts.     

Perceptual and response components in repetition priming of spoken words and pseudowords

Two experiments explored repetition priming effects for spoken words and pseudowords in order to investigate abstractionist and episodic accounts of spoken word recognition and repetition priming. In Experiment 1, lexical decisions were made on spoken words and pseudowords with half of the items presented twice (～12 intervening items). Half of all repetitions were spoken in a “different voice” from the first presentations. Experiment 2 used the same procedure but with stimuli embedded in noise to slow responses. Results showed greater priming for words than for pseudowords and no effect of voice change in both normal and effortful processing conditions. Additional analyses showed that for slower participants, priming is more equivalent for words and pseudowords, suggesting episodic stimulus–response associations that suppress familiarity-based mechanisms that ordinarily enhance word priming. By relating behavioural priming to the time-course of pseudoword identification we showed that under normal listening conditions (Experiment 1) priming reflects facilitation of both perceptual and decision components, whereas in effortful listening conditions (Experiment 2) priming effects primarily reflect enhanced decision/response generation processes. Both stimulus–response associations and enhanced processing of sensory input seem to be voice independent, providing novel evidence concerning the degree of perceptual abstraction in the recognition of spoken words and pseudowords.     

Metascientific foundations for pluralism in psychology

In this paper, I explore the metascientific basis for pluralism in psychology. In the first half, I outline the two levels of the metaparadigm: the epistemological and the methodological. The epistemological level includes the dichotomy between an internal, first-person point of view and an external, third-person one. The methodological level includes the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. The continuing debate regarding methodology, explanation versus understanding, has distinguished the human sciences from the natural sciences. Similarly, the continuing debate regarding the epistemological point of view has distinguished psychology from other sciences. I illustrate these points by placing various trends in psychology into the two-dimensional space formed by the two coordinate axes depicting the methodological and the epistemological dimensions. Each quadrant represents one definition of the object of psychology: quadrant 1 (internal, first-person - explanation) represents “consciousness;” quadrant 2 (internal, first-person - understanding) represents “experiences;” quadrant 3 (external, third-person - understanding) represents “meaningful acts and expressions;” and quadrant 4 (external, third-person - explanation) represents “behaviors and higher processes of the brain.” All of the trends within the history of psychology can be placed within this two-dimensional space. In the second half of the paper, I introduce the third level of the metaparadigm: the metapsychological level. This level includes the three different, and incompatible conceptions of humans: the first-person, the second-person, and the third-person conceptions. A third-person conception of humans is most compatible with trends placed in quadrant 4. A second-person conceptualization is most congruent with quadrant 3, and so on. Thus, the unification of psychologies emerges as not only difficult but actually unreasonable, because the plurality of psychological paradigms originates from the epistemological, methodological, and metapsychological levels of the metaparadigm.     

The effect of emotion on statistical reasoning: Findings from a base rates task

In this paper we explore the effect of emotion on statistical reasoning. We employed a base rates task to examine reliance on statistical information in the presence of congruent or incongruent anecdotal information. The impact of emotional content on statistical reasoning was investigated in controls and victims of sexual abuse. Two types of emotional contents were used, one generally emotional, and one related to sexual abuse. The latter category was included to investigate the effect of semantically identical stimuli that could potentially produce different levels of emotion in the victim and control groups. For control participants, emotional contents were associated with decreased use of statistical information and increased use of anecdotal information compared to neutral contents. Results from the victims group showed this effect to be increased for contents related to sexual abuse, suggesting that the effect is linked to the emotional connotation rather than semantic content. Victims perceived contents relating to their experience as more emotional and this was associated with specific reasoning impairments for these topics.     

The Archaelogy of Spirit and the Unique Self: A Husserlian Reading of Conrad-Martius

Although the connections of Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ ontological phenomenology, what she called, “realontology,” to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology were constant concerns that usually remained in the background of her work, on occasion they became foreground. Similarly the problems surrounding the individuation of the person and spirit were persistent but rather marginal in her writings. In this paper I want first to review some of the issues as they are connected to ontological and transcendental phenomenology. Then I want to relate them to the cosmological and theological issues that were no less important for Conrad-Martius.