Competition dynamics of second-language listening

Spoken-word recognition in a nonnative language is particularly difficult where it depends on discrimination between confusable phonemes. Four experiments here examine whether this difficulty is in part due to phantom competition from “near-words” in speech. Dutch listeners confuse English /æ/ and /?/, which could lead to the sequence daf being interpreted as deaf, or lemp being interpreted as lamp. In auditory lexical decision, Dutch listeners indeed accepted such near-words as real English words more often than English listeners did. In cross-modal priming, near-words extracted from word or phrase contexts (daf from DAFfodil, lemp from eviL EMPire) induced activation of corresponding real words (deaf; lamp) for Dutch, but again not for English, listeners. Finally, by the end of untruncated carrier words containing embedded words or near-words (definite; daffodil) no activation of the real embedded forms (deaf in definite) remained for English or Dutch listeners, but activation of embedded near-words (deaf in daffodil) did still remain, for Dutch listeners only. Misinterpretation of the initial vowel here favoured the phantom competitor and disfavoured the carrier (lexically represented as containing a different vowel). Thus, near-words compete for recognition and continue competing for longer than actually embedded words; nonnative listening indeed involves phantom competition.     

Generative models for visualizing idiosyncratic impressions

In their comprehensive review of research on impressions from faces, Sutherland and Young (this issue) highlight both the remarkable progress and the many challenges facing the field. We focus on two of the challenges: the need for generative, powerful models of impressions and the idiosyncratic nature of complex impressions.     

Do facial first impressions reflect a shared social reality?

Influential facial impression models have repeatedly shown that trustworthiness, youthful–attractiveness, and dominance dimensions subserve a wide variety of first impressions formed from strangers’ faces, suggestive of a shared social reality. However, these models are built from impressions aggregated across observers. Critically, recent work has now shown substantial inter-observer differences in facial impressions, raising the important question of whether these dimensional models based on aggregated group data are meaningful at the individual observer level. We addressed this question with a novel case series approach, using factor analyses of ratings of twelve different traits to build individual models of facial impressions for different observers. Strikingly, three dimensions of trustworthiness, youthful/attractiveness, and competence/dominance appeared across the majority of these individual observer models, demonstrating that the dimensional approach is indeed meaningful at the individual level. Nonetheless, we also found differences in the stability of the competence/dominance dimension across observers. Taken together, results suggest that individual differences in impressions arise in the context of a largely common structure that supports a shared social reality.     

The Eye of the Beholder: Romantic Goals and Impression Biases

Four experiments investigated the effects of romantic goals on task and social impression formation. The clouded judgment hypothesis holds that romantic goals encourage positive biases on less relationship-relevant dimensions (e.g., task competence). The default positivity hypothesis holds that romantic goals encourage positivity biases on relationship-relevant dimensions in the absence of relevant information. The selective accuracy hypothesis posits that romantic goals encourage accuracy regarding relationship-relevant attributes (e.g., social competence) when relevant information is available. In four studies, male and female perceivers evaluated opposite-sex targets whom they expected to date (romantic goals) or to meet for nonromantic interaction (baseline). Videotaped targets displayed competence or incompetence on task (Experiments 1 and 2) or social (Experiments 3 and 4) dimensions. All three hypotheses were supported.     

Social anxiety and the shame of psychosis: a study in first episode psychosis

Social anxiety disorder (SaD) or social phobia is a co-morbid affective disorder in schizophrenia, present in up to one in three individuals. We employ 'social rank' theory to predict that one pathway to social anxiety in schizophrenia is triggered by the anticipation of a catastrophic loss of social status that the stigma of schizophrenia can entail. A group of 79 people with a first episode of psychosis were assessed for social anxiety: hypotheses were tested comparing 23 socially anxious and 56 non-anxious patients on measures of cognitive appraisals of shame/stigma of psychosis and perceived social status, controlling for depression, psychotic symptoms and general psychopathology. Participants with social anxiety experienced greater shame attached to their diagnosis and felt that the diagnosis placed them apart from others, i.e., socially marginalised them and incurred low social status. We propose a stigma model of social anxiety that makes testable predictions about how the shame beliefs may contaminate social interaction and thereby exacerbate and maintain social phobia.     

Cognitive functioning and cortisol profiles in first episode major depression

Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) is often associated with high levels of stress and disturbances in the Hypothalamic Pituitary Adrenal (HPA) system, yielding high levels of cortisol, in addition to cognitive dysfunction. Previous studies have shown a relationship between cortisol profile and cognitive functioning in recurrent MDD in general. More specifically, the association between hypercortisolism and cognitive functioning, such as memory and Executive Functioning (EF), and also more recently cortisol suppression has been explored. However, no studies have investigated these relationships in patients diagnosed with first episode MDD. The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between cortisol levels before and after the Dexamethasone suppression test (DST) and cognitive function in first episode MDD patients. Twenty‐one patients meeting the DSM‐IV criteria for a first episode of MDD diagnosis were included in the study. The control group was matched for age, gender and education level. Cortisol was measured in saliva collected with Salivette sampling devices. Saliva samples were collected 4 times during a 24 hours period over two consecutive days: at awakening, after 45 minutes, after 7 hours and at 11 pm. Dexamethasone (1.0 mg) was given orally on Day 1 at 11 pm. The neuropsychological test battery consisted of standardized tests measuring executive functioning (EF) and memory functioning. Cortisol levels did not differ significantly between patients and controls on Day 1, except for the last sample before Dexamethasone administration, where the control group showed higher levels. Both groups showed suppression after Dexamethasone. On Day 2 there was a significant difference between groups at the third sample, showing a significantly lower level in the control group, suggesting that the controls have a more effective suppression profile than the patients. There were no significant correlations between cortisol levels before or after Dexamethasone and cognitive measures. The results indicate impairment on HPA‐axis functioning in first episode MDD patients, with less suppression functioning compared to healthy controls, but no relationship between cortisol profile and cognitive functioning in EF or Memory.     

Age-related similarities and differences in first impressions of trustworthiness

Trust is a particularly under-studied aspect of social relationships in older age. In the current study, young (n = 35) and older adults (n = 35) completed a series of one-shot social economic trust games in which they invested real money with trustees. There were potential gains with each investment and also a risk of losing everything if the trustee was untrustworthy. The reputation and facial appearance of each trustee were manipulated to make them appear more or less trustworthy. Results revealed that young and older adults invest more money with trustees whose facial appearance and reputation indicate that they are trustworthy rather than untrustworthy. However, older adults were more likely than young to invest with trustees who had a reputation for being untrustworthy. We discuss whether age-related differences in responding to negative information may account for an age-related increase in trust, particularly when trusting someone with a reputation for being uncooperative.     

Judging trustworthiness from faces: Emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments in young children

By adulthood, people judge trustworthiness from appearances rapidly and reliably. However, we know little about these judgments in children. This novel study investigates the developmental trajectory of explicit trust judgments from faces, and the contribution made by emotion cues across age groups. Five‐, 7‐, 10‐year‐olds, and adults rated the trustworthiness of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces with neutral expressions. The same participants also rated faces displaying overt happy and angry expressions, allowing us to investigate whether emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments similarly in children and adults. Results revealed that the ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of faces emerges in childhood, but may not be adult like until 10 years of age. Moreover, we show that emotion cues modulate trust judgments in young children, as well as adults. Anger cues diminished the appearance of trustworthiness for participants from 5 years of age and happy cues increased it, although this effect did not consistently emerge until later in childhood, that is, 10 years of age. These associations also extended to more subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results indicate that young children are sensitive to facial trustworthiness, and suggest that similar expression cues modulate these judgments in children and adults.