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11.
Anthony Curtis Adler 《Continental Philosophy Review》2007,40(4):407-433
The following paper argues that J.G. Fichte, despite his apparent philosophical neglect of art and aesthetics, does develop
a strong, original, and coherent account of art, which not only allows the theorization of modern, non-representative art
forms, but indeed anticipates Nietzsche and Heidegger in conceiving of truth in terms of art rather than scientific rationality.
While the basis of Fichte’s philosophy of art is presented in the essay “On Spirit and Letter in Philosophy,” it is not developed
systematically either in this text or anywhere else in his writings, but must be reconstructed through a broad consideration
of all his works, including, above all, his political and economic writings. For Fichte, the art-work does not exist as an
object possessing “aesthetic value” and which can, in turn, be possessed, consumed, and enjoyed through the subjective act
of aesthetic experience. Rather, it involves a mode of praxis which, grounded in a radical and original power of imagination,
creatively discloses possibilities for future forms of existence, experience, and political community that cannot be theoretically
anticipated. While Fichte cannot himself theorize specific forms of art, since the art that concerns him belongs to the future,
we can, however, retrospectively try to understand non-representational painting and non-mimetic dance as concrete realizations
of Fichte’s art-work of the future. In this way, Fichte’s philosophy of art ultimately suggests an alternative to Heidegger’s
understanding of the work of art as a projective institution of truth. Fichte suggests that the human body, rather than human
language, is the fundamental medium of art.
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Anthony Curtis AdlerEmail: |
12.
Plato Tse 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2019,62(5):527-545
ABSTRACTThough the perennial problem of consciousness has outlasted the idealists, the reductivist turn in contemporary naturalistic philosophy of mind and the non-reductivist reactions to it provoke us to re-think post-Kantian idealism. Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre makes for a classical case of non-reductivist (and probably even non-naturalist) approach to mind and his critique of ‘dogmatism’ is all the more relevant in this context. This article contains four sections. The first section is an introduction that explains why post-Kantian idealism is relevant to contemporary philosophy of mind. The second section pinpoints the placement issue that confronts not only current philosophers but also partially motivated Fichte's own philosophy. The third section is a short but essential remark about the normative and practical valence of ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ in Fichte's traditional understanding of them. In the fourth section, I provide a reconstructive analysis of Fichte's understanding and critique of physicalism. Fichte's argument can be analyzed into two horns with each targeting reductivism and epiphenomenalism respectively. The final section is a brief but positive exposition on a necessary feature, namely reflexivity, of mind and the first-person perspective. Fichte's appropriation of intellectual intuition exemplifies a non-representationalist picture that connects content transparency with the active nature of mind. 相似文献
13.
Gary Banham 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):333-339
This paper considers whether Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be considered as a refutation of solipsism. It focuses on a recent and detailed attempt to argue for this sort of reading that has been proposed by Frederick Beiser – but it argues that this reading is unconvincing, both in the historical motivations given for it in the work of Jacobi and Fichte, and as an interpretation of the text itself. An alternative reading of the dialectic is proposed, where it is argued that the central problem Hegel is concerned with is not solipsism, but the sociality of freedom. 相似文献
14.
Sebastian Gardner 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2019,27(2):271-292
ABSTRACTSeveral factors, including but not limited to his investments in Naturphilosophie and Spinoza, make it hard to determine the extent to which Schelling remains on track with Kant’s transcendental project. My aim here is to isolate Schelling’s conception of transcendental method in the first decade of his philosophical development, a topic that has received little direct and extended discussion. Schelling’s 1800 System of Transcendental Idealism stands out as of particular importance, but no single text can be regarded as Schelling’s definitive statement of his views on the question of method in his early period, necessitating a diachronic approach. I argue that, though in important respects Schelling’s concerns diverge from those of Kant and Fichte, Schelling should not be regarded as abandoning the transcendental framework, and is best understood as attempting to work out what is involved at the original point of adoption of the transcendental standpoint. This entails, I argue, exchanging transcendental philosophy’s claim to a distinctive method for a substantive interpretation of the transcendental turn. 相似文献