Phenomenology and naturalism: a hybrid and heretical proposal

Abstract

In this paper I aim to develop a largely non-empirical case for the compatibility of phenomenology and naturalism. To do so, I will criticise what I take to be the standard construal of the relationship between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism, and defend a ‘minimal’ version of phenomenology that is compatible with liberal naturalism in the ontological register (but incompatible with scientific naturalism) and with weak forms of methodological naturalism, the latter of which is understood as advocating ‘results continuity’, over the long haul, with the relevant empirical sciences. Far from such a trajectory amounting to a Faustian pact in which phenomenology sacrifices its soul, I contend that insofar as phenomenologists care about reigning in the excesses of reductive versions of naturalism, the only viable way for this to be done is via the impure and hybrid account of phenomenology I outline here.     

‘I want to be a hope champion!’ – Research as hope intervention with rural South African children

This study explored how visual participatory research-as-intervention enabled a strengthening of hope among a group of South African primary school children. Twelve learners aged 9–13 years from a rural village in the QwaQwa region of South Africa participated in the study. Data on the children’s experiences of hope were co-constructed with them, applying various visual participatory approaches, while data on their engagement in the research itself was generated using group discussion, individual interviews, and notes captured in a research journal. Thematic analysis of the data revealed a strengthening of the children’s hope on personal, relational, and collective levels from engaging in hope-oriented visual participatory processes. The findings suggest that research-as-intervention has hope-enhancing value for rural South African children.     

What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification

Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing.     

Sorting Out Support for Democracy: A Q‐Method Study

Support for democracy is crucial to democratic stability. Yet the nature and range of democratic belief systems, and whether these belief systems are idiosyncratic to specific individuals and polities or are more general, remain largely unknown. Such unknowns complicate an already daunting measurement task. Extant survey‐based measures are fraught with validity problems and say little about the democratic beliefs individuals most strongly hold or reject. To address these problems, this study blends focus groups, interviews, and Q‐sort methodology to examine patterns of subjective, behavioral renderings of democratic support profiles. It finds seven shared profiles of beliefs concerning democracy, alternative regimes, and political and civil freedoms across Chile and Argentina. Their resemblance to democratic belief systems found with other methods bolsters their validity and generalizability. The analyses reveal the relative weight of each orientation within each belief profile and their intensity across profiles. In so doing, they identify which items are crucial for within‐ and across‐case comparisons. Altogether, these insights should inform survey‐based approaches to detecting and describing the democratic support profiles latent in the polity.     

The experimental critique and philosophical practice

Some experimental philosophers have criticized the standard intuition-based methodology in philosophy. One worry about this criticism is that it is just another version of the general skepticism toward the evidential efficacy of intuition, and is thereby subject to the same difficulties. In response, Weinberg provides a more nuanced version of the criticism by targeting merely the philosophical use of intuition. I contend that, though Weinberg’s approach differs from general skepticism about intuition, its focus on philosophical practices gives rise to a new difficulty. Most extant experimental surveys investigate intuitions about particular cases through vignettes giving little contextual information. However, philosophical practices crucially depend on intuitions about general claims and typically provide more contextual background. I argue that, due to these two differences between surveys’ and philosophers’ appeals to intuition, Weinberg’s critique lacks enough support from current experimental data. I conclude that experimental philosophers who engage in the negative program should pay more attention on testing philosophers’ use of general intuitions and context-rich intuitions.     

How Do Logics Explain?

Anti-exceptionalists about logic maintain that it is continuous with the empirical sciences. Taking anti-exceptionalism for granted, we argue that traditional approaches to explanation are inadequate in the case of logic. We argue that Andrea Woody's functional analysis of explanation is a better fit with logical practice and accounts better for the explanatory role of logical theories.     

Utilizing Community Partnerships to Devise a Framework for Cultural Adaptations to Evidence-Based Mental Health Practice in Diverse Communities

Mental health disparities for diverse communities (particularly immigrants and people of color) in terms of access to evidence-based treatments, lack of education/awareness about mental health symptoms and treatment options, and lack of culturally responsive treatments have been frequently documented. Hence, diversity considerations in the diagnosis, assessment, and treatment of psychological disorders remain vital and imperative in clinical practice. There is also substantial work indicating that cultural values likely play an essential role in shaping how individuals conceptualize and experience mental or emotional health. Therefore, the present study was developed for community-engaged clinicians and researchers to outline the process by which to create a culturally responsive, evidence-based treatment framework for community mental health interventions in close partnership with communities of color. This study was conceptualized and designed collaboratively with community leaders across five different communities of color: African American/Black, Latino/a, Native American, Pacific Islander, and African immigrant communities in a major U.S. city. This paper describes the mixed methods for such a community-engaged collaboration, highlighting critical elements for ongoing culturally engaged clinical work/research, and providing recommendations for culturally adapted interventions for mental health based on specific process observations made in the current example.     

An Oblique Epistemic Defence of Conceptual Analysis

This article argues, against contemporary experimentalist criticism, that conceptual analysis has epistemic value, with a structure that encourages the development of interesting hypotheses which are of the right form to be valuable in diverse areas of philosophy. The article shows, by analysis of the Gettier programme, that conceptual analysis shares the proofs and refutations form Lakatos identified in mathematics. Upon discovery of a counterexample, this structure aids the search for a replacement hypothesis. The search is guided by heuristics. The heuristics of conceptual analysis are similar to those in other interesting areas of scholarship, and so hypotheses generated by it are of the right form to be applicable to diverse areas. The article shows that the explanationist criterion in epistemology was developed and applied in this way. The epistemic value of conceptual analysis is oblique because it contributes not towards the main purpose of conceptual analysis but towards the reliable development of epistemically valuable hypotheses in philosophy and scholarship.     

“If We’re Going to Change Things, It Has to Be Systemic:” Systems Change in Children’s Mental Health

Communities that undertake systems change in accordance with the system of care philosophy commit to creating new systems entities for children and adolescents with serious emotional disturbance. These new entities are values-based, voluntary, and cross-agency alliances that include formal child-serving entities, youth, and families. Describing the scope and intent of one such implementation of systems of care, a mental health administrator commented, "If we're going to change things, it has to be systemic" (B. Baxter, personal communication, December 2, 2005). This paper explores the concept of "systemic" in the context of systems of care. Systems theory is used to understand strategies of purposeful systems change undertaken by stakeholders in established system of care communities. The paper presents a conceptual model of systems change for systems of care that is grounded in data from a national study of system of care implementation (Research and Training Center for Children's Mental Health in Case Studies of system implementation: Holistic approaches to studying community-based systems of care: Study 2, University of South Florida, Louis de la Parte Florida Mental Health Institute, Research and Training Center for Children's Mental Health, Tampa, FL, 2004). The model is based on Soft Systems Methodology, an application of systems theory developed to facilitate practical action around systems change in human systems (Checkland in Systems thinking, systems practice, Wiley, Chichester, 1999). The implications of these findings to real world actions associated with systems change in systems of care are discussed.     

An Integration of Feminism into Experiential Psychotherapy

Abstract

Feminist therapy altered how marriage and family therapists conceptualized their clients’ realities and psychopathology. Upon an extensive search of the literature, there is a sparse amount of literature regarding the integration of feminist therapy with experiential therapy. The authors discuss feminist and experiential therapy models, propose a model of feminist-experiential therapy, and highlight the need and fit of these theories. A discussion on giving space to silenced voices, establishing an egalitarian relationship, expanding the definition of deviance, and exploring the importance of language will be done to aid the experiential therapist in their work and expand their client’s experience.