Development in children's attribution of embarrassment and the relationship with theory of mind and shyness

The present study examined the two-stage developmental theory of the understanding of embarrassment (Modigliani & Blumenfeld, 1979) through the administration of verbal and non-verbal measures. Moreover, the relationship between children's attributions of embarrassment and their ability to understand false beliefs and propensity to be shy was investigated. Ninety-five children (4 to 9 years old) were presented with brief stories in which the main character received negative, neutral, or positive social reactions. Verbal and non-verbal attributions of embarrassment were examined. In addition, a false-belief task and a shyness-propensity questionnaire were administered. Using verbal measures, older children reported more embarrassment in the negative and neutral conditions compared to younger children. However, using non-verbal measures, these age differences disappeared. This suggests that young children may have a “mature” understanding of embarrassment, but may not be able to express this linguistically. Verbal and non-verbal embarrassment attributions were not related to the understanding of false beliefs, but they were related to shyness propensity. The results are discussed in terms of socio-cognitive and emotional factors in understanding emotions.     

A few seemingly harmless routes to a false memory

Since the invention of photography we have learned to rely on photos to help us remember significant moments in our lives. We have come to believe that photographs are accurate and valuable records of events that—years down the track—we may not be able to remember. In this paper, we review recent research demonstrating that photographs can also help us to “remember” events that never really happened. We trace the development of the leading false autobiographical memory paradigm, and we then describe research on the power of both fake narrative stories and fake photographs to cultivate false memories.     

Using warnings to reduce categorical false memories in younger and older adults

Warnings about memory errors can reduce their incidence, although past work has largely focused on associative memory errors. The current study sought to explore whether warnings could be tailored to specifically reduce false recall of categorical information in both younger and older populations. Before encoding word pairs designed to induce categorical false memories, half of the younger and older participants were warned to avoid committing these types of memory errors. Older adults who received a warning committed fewer categorical memory errors, as well as other types of semantic memory errors, than those who did not receive a warning. In contrast, young adults' memory errors did not differ for the warning versus no-warning groups. Our findings provide evidence for the effectiveness of warnings at reducing categorical memory errors in older adults, perhaps by supporting source monitoring, reduction in reliance on gist traces, or through effective metacognitive strategies.     

Gist-based illusions within and across stimulus modalities in autism spectrum disorder

Some studies have reported a low rate of false recognition (FR) in individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) relative to non-autistic comparison participants (CPs). This finding, however, has not always been replicated and the source of the discrepancy remains unknown. We hypothesised that poor episodic memory functions may account for this finding. We used an adapted version of the Deese, Roediger and McDermott paradigm which presents lists of words, pictures or word–picture pairs to obtain measures of performance which reflect episodic [hits and false alarms (FAs)] and semantic (FR) memory functions. Results showed a decreased rate of FR in ASD individuals with lists of words which rose above the rate seen in non-autistic CPs with lists of word–picture pairs. This increased rate of FR in ASD was accompanied by a parallel increase in hits and a decrease in FA which reached a similar level in the two groups. Poor episodic memory functions may prevent individuals with ASD from acquiring item information which in turn precludes the formation of semantic links between items. This could render them less prone to FR.     

Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study

Prior studies document cross cultural variation in the developmental onset of mindreading. In particular, Japanese children are reported to pass a standard false belief task later than children from Western countries. By contrast, we know little about cross-cultural variation in young children’s metacognitive abilities. Moreover, one prominent theoretical discussion in developmental psychology focuses on the relation between metacognition and mindreading. Here we investigated the relation between mindreading and metacognition (both implicit and explicit) by testing 4-year-old Japanese and German children. We found no difference in metacognition between the two cultural groups. By contrast, Japanese children showed lower performance than German children replicating cultural differences in mindreading. Finally, metacognition and mindreading were not related in either group. We discuss the findings in light of the existing theoretical accounts of the relation between metacognition and mindreading.     

Why do doctored images distort memory?

Doctored images can cause people to believe in and remember experiences that never occurred, yet the underlying mechanism(s) responsible are not well understood. How does compelling false evidence distort autobiographical memory? Subjects were filmed observing and copying a Research Assistant performing simple actions, then they returned 2 days later for a memory test. Before taking the test, subjects viewed video-clips of simple actions, including actions that they neither observed nor performed earlier. We varied the format of the video-clips between-subjects to tap into the source-monitoring mechanisms responsible for the ‘doctored-evidence effect.’ The distribution of belief and memory distortions across conditions suggests that at least two mechanisms are involved: doctored images create an illusion of familiarity, and also enhance the perceived credibility of false suggestions. These findings offer insight into how external evidence influences source-monitoring.     

How does the extraversion personality trait influence false recall with the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm?

Relative to more introverted persons, extraverts have been found to exhibit better recall and recognition in a range of memory paradigms including demonstrating a superior semantic priming effect. The present study sought to establish whether this aspect of personality might be associated with the false memory paradigm developed by Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (the DRM paradigm). Lists containing semantically related words were presented to extraverts, ambiverts, and introverts. Compared to the other two groups, extraverts falsely recalled more critical lures (words that although semantically related were not in the original lists) and non-list words. The results are discussed in relation to the concept of spreading activation.     

Adaptive constructive processes: evidence from priming verbal reasoning with false memories

Previous research has demonstrated that false memories produced by the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm serve adaptive functions both in related memory tasks and in various cognitive processes. The present study investigated whether memory errors induced by associated words could influence performance on verbal reasoning tasks. Participants were asked to solve sentence-based verbal reasoning problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of word lists where the critical lures were also the solutions to the problems. The results showed that when false memories were generated, problems were solved more often and significantly faster than those that were primed without false memories or those that were unprimed, and that there was no evidence that the effect of priming with false memories observed in experiments was due to testing effects. The findings extend false memory priming effects to verbal reasoning processes, providing evidence with adaptive constructive processes.     

Manipulating memory associations changes decision-making preferences in a preconditioning task

Memories of past experiences can guide our decisions. Thus, if memories are undermined or distorted, decision making should be affected. Nevertheless, little empirical research has been done to examine the role of memory in reinforcement decision-making. We hypothesized that if memories guide choices in a conditioning decision-making task, then manipulating these memories would result in a change of decision preferences to gain reward. We manipulated participants’ memories by providing false feedback that their memory associations were wrong before they made decisions that could lead them to win money. Participants’ memory ratings decreased significantly after receiving false feedback. More importantly, we found that false feedback led participants’ decision bias to disappear after their memory associations were undermined. Our results suggest that reinforcement decision-making can be altered by false feedback on memories. The results are discussed using memory mechanisms such as spreading activation theories.