Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Identifying and changing the normative beliefs about aggression which lead young Muslim adults to join extremist anti‐Semitic groups in Pakistan

Two studies investigated the role of beliefs about the acceptability of aggression (“normative beliefs”) against Jews in determining who would join an extremist group. In Study 1, students in a university in Pakistan (N=144) completed self‐report attitude measures, and were subsequently approached by a confederate who asked whether they wanted to join an extremist anti‐Semitic organization. Normative beliefs about aggression against Jews were very strong predictors of whether participants agreed to join. In Study 2, participants (N=92) were experimentally assigned to either a brief educational intervention, designed to improve inter‐group relations, or to a control group. They also filled in self‐report attitude measures pre and post intervention. Participants in the intervention group were much less likely to agree to join the extremist group, and this effect of the intervention on joining was mediated by changes in normative beliefs about aggression against Jews. The results have implications for theories of inter‐group aggression and interventions to prevent people from being recruited into extremist groups. Aggr. Behav. 35:514–519, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.     

Reduced misinformation effects following saccadic bilateral eye movements

The effects of saccadic bilateral (horizontal) eye movements on memory for a visual event narrative were investigated. In the study phase, participants were exposed to a set of pictures accompanied by a verbal commentary describing the events depicted in the pictures. Next, the participants were asked either misleading or control questions about the depicted event and were then asked to engage in 30s of bilateral vs. vertical vs. no eye movements. Finally, recognition memory was tested using the remember-know procedure. It was found that bilateral eye movements increased true memory for the event, increased recollection, and decreased the magnitude of the misinformation effect. The findings are discussed in terms of source monitoring, dual-process theories of memory and the potential neural foundations of such effects.     

Superstitious,magical, and paranormal beliefs: An integrative model

Lack of conceptual clarity has hampered theory formation and research on superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs. This study offers a conceptual framework where these concepts are differentiated from other unfounded beliefs and defined identically as a confusion of core knowledge about physical, psychological, and biological phenomena. When testing this definition with questionnaire items (N = 239), the results showed that superstitious individuals accepted more violations of core ontological distinctions than skeptics did and that ontological confusions discriminated believers from skeptics better than intuitive thinking, analytical thinking, or emotional instability. The findings justify the present conceptualization of superstitious, magical, and paranormal beliefs, and offer new theoretical propositions for the familiar everyday beliefs that are yet scientifically so poorly understood.     

The Common Beliefs Survey-III and the Situational Self-Statement and Affective State Inventory: Test-Retest Reliability, Internal Consistency, and Further Psychometric Considerations

The Common Beliefs Survey-III (CBS-III), a factored measure of general irrational beliefs, has satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity. The Situational Self-Statement and Affective State Inventory (SSSASI), also with acceptable basic psychometric properties, assesses specific thoughts and feelings in response to vignettes describing frustrating events. Both inventories are potentially useful in assessing dimensions important to REBT, but information on test-retest reliability is needed. The CBS-III and the SSSASI were administered to 101 undergraduate students on two occasions, two or three weeks apart. Satisfactory test-retest reliability coefficients were obtained on all subscales of both inventories, but in the case of the SSSASI reliabilities were generally stronger when the same form of the test was used on both occasions (Form 1 presented the thoughts before the feelings, whereas Form 2 presented the feelings before the thoughts). Further exploration showed that responding to the thoughts before the feelings significantly attenuated scores on the feelings, but responding to the feelings before the thoughts had no effect on scores on the thoughts. This unexpected finding also held true in a previously unexamined data set obtained with a different sample of students several years earlier. Taking careful stock of one's emotional reactions before embarking on cognitive modification interventions seems essential to REBT, and it follows that asking questionnaire respondents to rate their affective states before they rate their self-statements could be desirable conceptually. These results provide empirical support for that strategy.     

Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT) in the New Millenium: A Cross-Cultural Approach

This paper reviews and discusses the results of five cross-cultural studies in Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Spain, and USA, using 2 (college students vs. their parents) × 2 (males vs. females) MANOVA match group designs with the Attitudes and Beliefs Inventory subscales as dependent variables, two multicultural studies investigating the relationship between some demographic variables (Pan American Health Organization's Index of Violence, and Acculturation) and people's Irrationality, and two multidisciplinary studies on the relationship between some medical conditions (skin diseases, and severity of symptoms during menopause) and Irrational Beliefs.     

On the alleged memory-undermining effects of daydreaming

In three experiments, we examined the memory-undermining effects of daydreaming for (un)related stimuli. In Experiments 1 and 2, we tested whether daydreaming fosters forgetting of semantically interrelated material and hence, catalyzes false memory production. In Experiment 3, we examined the memory effects of different daydreaming instructions. In Experiment 1, daydreaming did not undermine correct recall of semantically interrelated words, nor did it affect false memories. In Experiment 2, we again failed to find that daydreaming exerted memory-undermining effects a. In Experiment 3, no memory effects were obtained using different daydreaming instructions. Together, our studies fail to show appreciable memory-undermining effects of daydreaming.     

The propensity to perceive meaningful coincidences is associated with increased posterior alpha power during retention of information in a modified Sternberg paradigm

There are ample inter-individual differences in the frequency with which people perceive meaningful coincidences. Previous research has identified increased proactive interference, that is a reduced working memory capacity, as one possible mechanism associated with this phenomenon. The present study aimed at extending this finding into the domain of neuroscience, (1) by assessing EEG alpha oscillations during the retention of information, (2) by replicating the behavioral link between meaningful coincidences and proactive interference. In a sample of 52 participants, the behavioral replication was successful. Furthermore, participants who perceived more meaningful coincidences showed higher alpha power increases at parietal-occipital sites, and at the same time, displayed lower alpha power increases at frontal areas, during retention of information. This neurophysiological activation pattern further underlines the assumption that participants who perceive more meaningful coincidences show lower working memory capacities, since increased alpha power at parietal areas reflects a higher load on working memory demands.     

The development of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant: Evidence from children aged 8–13 years

In social‐cognitive research, little attention has been paid to the developmental course of spontaneous trait inferences about the actor (STIs about the actor) and spontaneous trait transferences about the informant (STTs about the informant). Using a false recognition paradigm, Study 1 investigated the developmental course of STIs and Study 2 investigated the developmental course of STTs, comparing 8‐, 9‐, 10‐, 11‐, 12‐ and 13‐year olds. The results of Study 1 showed that 8‐year olds could make STIs about the actor, and the magnitude of STIs increased from ages 8 to 10 years, stabilised at the age of 10, 11, 12 years, and decreased from ages 12 through 13 years. The results of Study 2 showed that 8‐year olds could make STTs about the informant, and the magnitude of STTs did not vary with age. In all age groups, the magnitude of STIs about the actor was greater than that of STTs about the informant.