‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies

This research examined the role of different forms of positive regard for the ingroup in predicting beliefs in intergroup conspiracies. Collective narcissism reflects a belief in ingroup greatness contingent on others’ recognition. We hypothesized that collective narcissism should be especially likely to foster outgroup conspiracy beliefs. Non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity, on the other hand, should predict a weaker tendency to believe in conspiracy theories. In Study 1, the endorsement of conspiratorial explanations of outgroup actions was positively predicted by collective narcissism but negatively by non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity. Study 2 showed that the opposite effects of collective narcissism and non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity on conspiracy beliefs were mediated via differential perceptions of threat. Study 3 manipulated whether conspiracy theories implicated ingroup or outgroup members. Collective narcissism predicted belief in outgroup conspiracies but not in ingroup conspiracies, while non‐narcissistic ingroup positivity predicted lower conspiracy beliefs, regardless of them being ascribed to the ingroup or the outgroup.     

The Implicit Image of God: God as Reality and Psychological Well‐Being

Research has widely demonstrated that religiosity is related to psychological well‐being even in situations of severe illness. To assess religious beliefs, explicit measures have generally been used. In this study, we measured the belief that God is reality as opposed to myth or abstraction by using an implicit technique (the Single Category Implicit Association Test). The study was carried out in Italy, where a large majority of the population is Catholic, and the prevailing image of God is that of a compassionate and supportive father. Participants were cancer patients identifying themselves as believers. As expected, the automatic belief that God is reality (vs. abstraction) was related to beneficial outcomes: lower reported psychophysical anxiety symptoms and a weaker use of avoidance strategies to cope with stress. Thus, also, automatic religious beliefs may affect feelings and behaviors.     

Examining the role of positive and negative metacognitive beliefs in depression

Many psychological models have been developed to explain the development and maintenance of depression. The most widely evaluated model is the cognitive model of depression, and it is against this model that emerging models should be compared. Accordingly, this cross‐sectional study examined whether metacognitive beliefs, as specified in the metacognitive model of depression, would explain additional variance in depressive symptoms over dysfunctional attitudes; the core feature of the cognitive model. Moreover, mediational relationships between metacognitive beliefs, rumination, and depressive symptoms, predicted by the metacognitive model were also explored, whilst controlling for dysfunctional attitudes. A sample of 715 students completed self‐report questionnaires measuring depressive symptoms, rumination, dysfunctional attitudes, and metacognitive beliefs. Regression analyses showed that metacognitive beliefs made a significant statistical contribution to depressive symptoms, after controlling for age, gender, rumination and dysfunctional attitudes. Furthermore, as predicted by the metacognitive model, the relationship between positive metacognitive beliefs and depressive symptoms was fully mediated by rumination, whilst the relationship between negative metacognitive beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and depressive symptoms was partially mediated by rumination. The results provide further empirical support for the metacognitive model of depression and indicate that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs play an integral role in the maintenance of depressive symptoms.     

Skepticism: Genuine unbelief or implicit beliefs in the supernatural?

We examined whether skeptics hold implicit supernatural beliefs or implicit cognitive underpinnings of the beliefs. In study 1 (N = 57), participants read a biological or a religious story about death. The story content had no effect on skeptics’ (or believers’) afterlife beliefs. Study 2 examined the relationships between religious and non-religious paranormal beliefs and implicit views about whether supernatural and religious phenomena are imaginary or real (n1 = 33, n2 = 31). The less supernatural beliefs were endorsed the easier it was to connect “supernatural” with “imaginary”. Study 3 (N = 63) investigated whether participants’ supernatural beliefs and ontological confusions differ between speeded and non-speeded response conditions. Only non-analytical skeptics’ ontological confusions increased in speeded conditions. The results indicate that skeptics overall do not hold implicit supernatural beliefs, but that non-analytically thinking skeptics may, under supporting conditions, be prone to biases that predispose to supernatural beliefs.     

Someone is pulling the strings: hypersensitive agency detection and belief in conspiracy theories

We hypothesised that belief in conspiracy theories would be predicted by the general tendency to attribute agency and intentionality where it is unlikely to exist. We further hypothesised that this tendency would explain the relationship between education level and belief in conspiracy theories, where lower levels of education have been found to be associated with higher conspiracy belief. In Study 1 (N = 202) participants were more likely to agree with a range of conspiracy theories if they also tended to attribute intentionality and agency to inanimate objects. As predicted, this relationship accounted for the link between education level and belief in conspiracy theories. We replicated this finding in Study 2 (N = 330), whilst taking into account beliefs in paranormal phenomena. These results suggest that education may undermine the reasoning processes and assumptions that are reflected in conspiracy belief.     

Differences in false recollection according to the cognitive reserve of healthy older people

We present an associative recognition experiment comparing three samples of healthy people (young people, older people with high cognitive reserve [HCR], and older people with low cognitive reserve [LCR], with each sample consisting of 40 people), manipulating stimuli repetition during the study phase. The results show significant differences among the three samples in their overall performance. However, these differences are not due to a different use of familiarity, but rather due to a different way of using recollection: although there are no differences in the hit rates between the HRC and LRC samples, the LCR group makes significantly more recollective false alarms than the HCR group. Moreover, repetition provokes an increase in the recollective false alarms in the LCR group, but this does not occur in the group of young people or in the HCR group. These findings are explained in terms of recollection-based monitoring errors and seem to provide support for the cognitive reserve hypothesis.     

Changing teachers' beliefs regarding autonomy support and structure: The role of experienced psychological need satisfaction in teacher training

ObjectivesGrounded in Self-Determination Theory, this study examined whether physical education (PE) teachers' psychological need satisfaction experienced during continuous professional development (CPD) on need-supportive teaching predicted changes in their effectiveness and feasibility beliefs regarding the proposed teaching approach, as well as their intentions to apply this approach and subsequent changes in their self-reported in-class behaviors.MethodsPrior to the training, a sample of 80 PE teachers (57.5% men, Mage = 42.70 ± 10.15 years) reported on their effectiveness and feasibility beliefs regarding autonomy-supportive and structuring teaching strategies and their in-class application of these strategies. Immediately following the training, these beliefs were assessed again and participants reported on their psychological need satisfaction experienced during the training and their intentions to apply the proposed strategies. Finally, two weeks after the training, participants' self-reported in-class application of the teaching strategies was measured for the second time.ResultsPsychological need satisfaction experienced during the training related to a change in effectiveness and feasibility beliefs regarding autonomy support and structure, and to teachers' intentions to apply the proposed strategies as reported immediately after receiving the training. In addition, teachers' intentions related to a change in their self-reported in-class application of structuring, but not autonomy-supportive, teaching strategies.ConclusionsExperiences of psychological need satisfaction during CPD can help to increase the likelihood that teachers become more convinced about the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed change and can produce greater intentions toward change, which may relate to actual (albeit) self-reported behavior change.     

Memory conjunction clusters: Influence of familiarity and recollection

In the memory conjunction paradigm, the number of times that constituents of conjunction lures were studied and the method of presentation were varied. In two experiments, participants were presented with eight parent items that could be recombined at test to form a conjunction lure. The constituents that were shared between the parent items and the conjunction lures were either presented in the same words (e.g., blackmail and jailbird presented four times each for the conjunction lure blackbird) or in different words (e.g., the targets footstool, footlocker, foothill, footbridge, baseball, softball, basketball, and golfball for the conjunction lure football). In both experiments, rates of false recognition were higher in the Different condition as opposed to the Same condition. These results provide evidence that participants in the Same condition were able to utilise a recall-to-reject strategy by remembering the repeatedly presented parent word. In the Different condition, participants were not able to utilise that strategy and instead relied on the familiarity of the repeatedly presented constituents which led to higher rates of false recognition.     

Instructor and student knowledge of study strategies

Students' self-reported study skills and beliefs are often inconsistent with empirically supported (ES) study strategies. However, little is known regarding instructors' beliefs about study skills and if such beliefs differ from those of students. In the current study, we surveyed college students' and instructors' knowledge of study strategies and had both groups evaluate the efficacy of learning strategies described in six learning scenarios. Results from the survey indicated that students frequently reported engaging in methods of studying that were not optimal for learning. Instructors' responses to the survey indicated that they endorsed a number of effective study skills but also held several beliefs inconsistent with research in learning and memory (e.g., learning styles). Further, results from the learning scenarios measure indicated that instructors were moderately more likely than students to endorse ES learning strategies. Collectively, these data suggest that instructors exhibited better knowledge of effective study skills than students, although the difference was small. We discuss several notable findings and argue for the improvement of both students' and instructors' study skill knowledge.     

How fuzzy-trace theory predicts true and false memories for words,sentences, and narratives

Fuzzy-trace theory posits independent verbatim and gist memory processes, a distinction that has implications for such applied topics as eyewitness testimony. This distinction between precise, literal verbatim memory and meaning-based, intuitive gist accounts for memory paradoxes including dissociations between true and false memory, false memories outlasting true memories, and developmental increases in false memory. We provide an overview of fuzzy-trace theory, and, using mathematical modeling, also present results demonstrating verbatim and gist memory in true and false recognition of narrative sentences and inferences. Results supported fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process view of memory: verbatim memory was relied on to reject meaning-consistent, but unpresented, sentences (via recollection rejection). However, verbatim memory was often not retrieved, and gist memory supported acceptance of these sentences (via similarity judgment and phantom recollection). Thus, mathematical models of words can be extended to explain memory for complex stimuli, such as narratives, the kind of memory interrogated in law.