How fuzzy-trace theory predicts true and false memories for words,sentences, and narratives

Fuzzy-trace theory posits independent verbatim and gist memory processes, a distinction that has implications for such applied topics as eyewitness testimony. This distinction between precise, literal verbatim memory and meaning-based, intuitive gist accounts for memory paradoxes including dissociations between true and false memory, false memories outlasting true memories, and developmental increases in false memory. We provide an overview of fuzzy-trace theory, and, using mathematical modeling, also present results demonstrating verbatim and gist memory in true and false recognition of narrative sentences and inferences. Results supported fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process view of memory: verbatim memory was relied on to reject meaning-consistent, but unpresented, sentences (via recollection rejection). However, verbatim memory was often not retrieved, and gist memory supported acceptance of these sentences (via similarity judgment and phantom recollection). Thus, mathematical models of words can be extended to explain memory for complex stimuli, such as narratives, the kind of memory interrogated in law.     

高师生心理健康教育实验研究

本文采用自然教学实验的研究方法,探讨心理健康教育对高师生健康信念、健康行为和健康水平的影响,以高师９５级大学三年级学生１２６个为实验组,进行５４个课时的心理健康课程教学,并以同校同级学生１０９个对照组。采用健康信念和健康行为调查表和Ｃａｗｔｅ健康量表,对实验组和控制组被试进行调查和测试。结果表明,心理健康教育不仅明显改善了高师生的健康信念和健康行为,而且提高了他们的身心健康水平。     

用户换位型思维的形成及对机会信念绩效的影响

用户换位型思维是创业者进行机会识别并应对市场竞争的重要因素,但已有研究忽视了其模式、形成机理及对机会信念绩效的影响。针对此问题,基于结构映射理论与注意力参与模型解构用户换位型思维模式,包括吸收式、归纳式、启发式和分析式;然后,从“个体-用户”双元视角探讨与用户有关的先验知识、灵活的角色导向、认知复杂性以及用户需求不确定性和碎片化等因素对用户换位型思维形成的正向影响;最后,以机会信念形成速度和创新性为绩效指标,阐释用户换位型思维模式对机会信念形成绩效的影响,并考察适应新的信息环境和调用自身知识结构的认知管理策略对用户换位型思维模式与机会信念形成绩效的调节作用。研究结论将丰富用户换位型思维的内涵,拓展结构映射理论与注意力参与模型的解释范围,也为指导创业者运用用户换位型思维去识别机会提供参考,对创业者思考与理解用户有重要意义。     

Demonstrating the effect of context on order effects for an army air defense task using the patriot simulator

The results reported herein support the hypotheses that (1) situation-specific, contextual features of a task can cause people to use explanation-based reasoning (Pennington and Hastie, 1993); (2) such reasoning can cause experienced personnel, both individually and in two-person teams, to reinterpret the meaning of the same information when it is presented in two different ordered sequences; and (3) the result will be primacy or recency (or no) effects depending on whether the most recent conflicting information can be explained away or not, respectively. These results extend the belief-adjustment model proposed by Hogarth and Einhorn (1992), which does not address information reinterpretations, and always predicts recency effects for an evaluation task with a short series of conflicting information. More generally, the results demonstrate the importance of situation-specific, contextual features in understanding judgment processes. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Truth in Fiction,Impossible Worlds,and Belief Revision

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.     

A Clash of Civilizations? Muslims,Christians, and Preferences for Democracy

The incompatibility of Islam with democracy has been the focal point of many public and scholarly debates. However, very few studies have attempted to investigate empirically whether the followers of Islam are less favorable to democracy than the followers of Christianity. This study extends previous research by conducting empirical and representative analyses of whether Muslims in general and religious and practicing Muslims in particular prefer democracy less than their Christian counterparts. Using country fixed effects regression and data from the World Values Survey (WVS6) that include 52,326 Muslims and Christians, the analyses show that Muslims in general, as well as religious and practicing Muslims, endorse democracy to the same extent as do Christians. Thereby, this study is the first to provide comparative, individual‐level evidence of the influence these religions may have on democratic attitudes.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

Hope as an irreducible concept

I argue for a novel answer to the question “What is hope?”. On my view, rather than aiming for a compound account, i.e. analysing hope in terms of desire and belief, we should understand hope as an irreducible concept. After criticizing influential compound accounts of hope, I discuss Segal and Textor's alternative of describing hope as a primitive mental state. While Segal and Textor argue that available developments of the standard definition do not offer sufficient conditions for hope, I question the deep‐seated idea that desire and belief are even necessary conditions for hope. My suggestion is that we should take seriously the fact that we hope in a great variety of ways and should question the search for elements that are common to all cases. A promising alternative follows the Wittgensteinian idea that cases of hope are related in terms of family resemblance, i.e. are multiply realizable on the ontological level while falling under the non‐definable concept of hope.     

When ignorance excuses

An ingenious argument – we may call it the Argument from Excuse – purports to show that the Standard View of Ignorance is false and the New View of Ignorance is true. On the former, ignorance is lack of knowledge; on the latter, ignorance is lack of true belief. I defend the Standard View by arguing that the Argument from Excuse is unsound. I also argue that an implication of my case is that Factual Ignorance Thesis (FIT) is false. According to FIT, whenever an agent A acts from factual ignorance, A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the act only if A is morally blameworthy (culpable) for the ignorance from which A acts.