The effect of superstitious thinking on psychosocial stress responses and perceived task performance

Previous research on superstitious belief, a subset of paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993 ), has suggested that people tend to invoke luck‐related superstitions in stressful situations as an attempt to gain an illusion of control over outcomes. Based on this, the current study examined whether luck‐related superstition, in the form of a “lucky” pen, could influence the psychological response to a psychosocial stressor. Participants (N = 114), aged between 17 and 59 years (M = 22.98, SD = 4.57) from James Cook University Singapore, were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: (a) no‐stress with no lucky pen; (b) no‐stress with a lucky pen; (c) stress with no lucky pen or; (d) stress with a lucky pen. The results revealed that participants provided with a lucky pen experienced lower state anxiety when exposed to the stressor. Further, participants provided with a lucky pen perceived their performance to be better than those without it. However, superstitious belief did not significantly change following exposure to stress. Taken together, the present findings add some support to the suggestion that belief in transferable luck may facilitate coping with a stressor. However, further research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms behind the potential benefits of superstitious belief.     

逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响

采用理性—经验思维方式量表对105名大学生进行测量,选出高、低理性思维方式各35名大学生进行实验,探讨了逻辑训练对不同理性思维方式大学生三段论推理的影响。结果表明：(1)高理性思维方式个体三段论推理的平均反应时快于低理性思维方式个体;非冲突类型题目推理的平均正确率高于冲突类型题目;逻辑训练可以提高个体三段论推理的平均反应时和正确率;(2)逻辑训练后非冲突任务类型题目的平均正确率高于冲突任务类型题目;(3)逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体冲突任务类型题目平均正确率的提高效果更明显。这意味着逻辑训练可以显著提升个体的推理成绩,但不能完全消除信念偏差对推理的影响,而且逻辑训练对低理性思维方式个体推理成绩的提升效果更加明显。     

The relationship between false confessions and perceptions of parental rearing practices

The main aim of the study was to investigate the relationship between a history of having made a false confession and reported parental rearing practices. It was hypothesized that the reporting of rejection and absence of warmth by parents would be associated with the making of a false confession. The participants were 804 college students in Iceland. Each was asked about false confessions made to teachers and parents in the past, as well as about false confessions made to the police during questioning. The participants completed questionnaires relating to perceived parental rearing practices (EMBU), proneness to antisocial behavior (the Gough Socialization Scale), personality (EPQ), self-esteem (Rosenberg), and compliance (GCS). Only eight participants (1% of those interrogated) claimed to have made false confessions to the police, whereas 10% claimed to have made false confessions to teachers or parents. False confessions were significantly associated with proneness to antisocial behavior and the EMBU Rejection and Warmth scales for both fathers and mothers.     

Did she mean to do it? Acquiring a folk theory of intentionality

The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills.     

Effects of positive and negative delusional ideation on memory

We investigated the relationship between levels of delusional ideation (whether positive or negative delusions) and the activation and distortion of memory by using pairs of positive and negative adjectives describing personality traits where those adjectives had similar meanings. We presented one of each pair of adjectives in the learning phase. Immediately after the learning phase in Experiment 1, we asked whether each adjective had been presented. Participants with high (positive or negative) delusional ideation were more likely to indicate that they had learned adjectives that they had not actually learned. This finding suggested that non-learned positive (or negative) adjectives that were associated with learned negative (or positive) adjectives were more likely to be activated in participants prone to positive (or negative) delusional ideation. However, in Experiment 2, two forced-choice tests were conducted immediately after the learning phase. In this context, participants, regardless of their proneness to delusional ideation, could almost always correctly distinguish what had and had not been presented, suggesting that the activation of learned items was still stronger than that for non-learned items in the immediate test. As time passed, the proportion of false alarms for positive or negative adjectives was higher in the two forced-choice tests among those with high proneness to (positive or negative) delusional ideation, suggesting that participants with delusional ideation were increasingly likely to depend on internal conditions for retrieval over time. Nous avons examiné la relation entre les niveaux d'idéation illusoire (qu'elle soit positive ou négative) et l'activation et la distorsion de la mémoire, en utilisant des paires d'adjectifs positifs et négatifs à significations similaires décrivant des traits de personnalité. Nous avons présenté un membre de chaque paire d'adjectifs lors d'une phase d'apprentissage. Dans une première expérience, immédiatement après la phase d'apprentissage, nous avons demandé si chaque adjectif avait été présenté. Les participants ayant un niveau d'idéation illusoire (positive ou négative) élevé étaient plus susceptibles d'indiquer qu'ils avaient appris les adjectifs qu'ils n'avaient pas appris. Ce résultat suggérait que les adjectifs positifs (ou négatifs) non appris qui étaient associés à des adjectifs négatifs (ou positifs) appris étaient plus susceptibles d'être activés chez les participants portés à l'idéation illusoire positive (ou négative). Dans une deuxième expérience, deux tests à choix forcés ont été menés immédiatement après la phase d'apprentissage. Dans ce contexte, les participants, indépendamment de leur tendance à l'idéation illusoire, pouvaient presque toujours distinguer correctement ce qui avait été présenté de ce qui n'avait pas été présenté, suggérant que l'activation des items appris était encore plus forte que celle des items non appris dans le test immédiat. Avec le temps, la proportion de fausses alarmes pour les adjectifs positifs ou négatifs était plus élevée dans les deux tests à choix forcés chez les participants portés à l'idéation illusoire (positive ou négative), ce qui suggère que les participants avec idéation illusoire étaient de plus en plus susceptibles de dépendre de leurs conditions internes lors du rappel à mesure que le temps passait. En este estudio se investigó la relación entre los niveles de ideación delusional (tanto delusiones positivas como negativas) y la activación y distorsión de la memoria a través del uso de pares de adjetivos positivos y negativos que describen rasgos de personalidad. Estos pares de adjetivos tenían significados similares. En la fase de aprendizaje se presentó un miembro de cada par de adjetivos. Inmediatamente después de la fase de aprendizaje se realizó el primer experimento, en el cual se preguntó al participanten si es que se le habían presentado cada uno de los adjetivos. Los participantes con elevada ideación delusiva (positiva o negativa) reportaran con una mayor probabilidad haber aprendido adjetivos que en realidad no se les había presentado. Este hallazgo sugiere que adjetivos positivos (o negativos) no aprendidos que estaban asociados con adjetivos negativos (o positivos) aprendidos, tenían una mayor probabilidad de ser activados en participantes propensos a una ideación delusiva positiva (o negativa). En el segundo experimento se llevaron a cabo inmediatamente después de la fase de aprendizaje dos pruebas de decisión forzada. En este contexto se pudo observar que los participantes a pesar de su tendencia hacia una ideación delusional, lograron distinguir en la mayoría de los casos correctamente entre los adjetivos que les fueron presentado y lo que no. Esto sugiere que la activación de los items aprendidos fue mucho más intensa que la de los items no aprendidos en el test. Sin embargo se pudo observar en los participantes de las dos pruebas de decisión forzada que con el paso del tiempo el porcentaje de falso reconocimiento de adjetivos positivos y negativos fue más elevado entre aquellas personas con una alta tendencia hacia una ideación delusional (positiva o negativa). Esto sugiere que en participantes con ideación delusional el reconocimiento de información a lo largo del tiempo probablemente es muy dependiente de condiciones internas.     

Personal and general belief in a just world as judgement norms

Research on the belief in a just world (BJW) has focused on its intra-individual functions (e.g., psychological well-being) and its inter-individual consequences (e.g., derogation of victims). Recent theorizing, however, has indicated that the BJW may also have more societal functions and consequences, serving as a legitimizing device of the status quo. The studies in the current paper focus on this latter view and are based on Alves and Correia's ( 2008 ) research which found that the expression of high personal and general belief in a just world is injunctively normative. Two experimental studies aimed at ascertaining three issues: (1) the dimension(s) of social value (social utility and/or social desirability) on which the BJW normativity anchors; (2) whether the expression of moderate BJW is also injunctively normative; and (3) whether the injunctive normativity of the BJW is related to perceptions of truth. Results indicate that moderate and high personal and general BJW are normative. Yet, whereas the normativity of personal BJW anchors both on social utility and social desirability, that of general BJW anchors only on social utility. We discuss personal and general BJW as judgement norms, whose normativity may not be personally acknowledged (in the case of general BJW) and does not necessarily derive from being perceived as true, but from the fact that such norms carry social value at least in individualistic societies.     

学前儿童的“心理理论”在不同ToM任务中的发展特点

考察了72名3～5岁儿童在三个改造过的经典错误信念任务中的表现,结果显示,大部分4岁儿童能够正确认识自我错误信念;大部分5岁儿童能够正确认识他人错误信念;大部分3～4岁儿童的自我错误信念认识显著好于他人（真人和玩偶）错误信念认识,5岁时这两种认识才没有显著差异;学前儿童对真人与玩偶错误信念的认识没有显著差异;学前儿童对“意外地点”任务和“意外内容”任务中错误信念问题回答的一致性较高,而对“外表—真实”任务的回答与前两种任务的一致性较低。     

Pictorial encoding effects and memory confusions in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm: Evidence for the activation of spontaneous imagery

The purpose of the experiments reported in this paper was to examine the possible role of spontaneous imagery and list-specific cues on pictorial encoding effects induced by the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) task. After viewing pictures and words referring to thematically related materials, by way of a picture/word source-judgement task, participants were asked to remember the way in which these materials were presented. Participants reported “seeing” pictures of items that were presented as words, an effect predicted by the imaginal activation hypothesis in its suggestion that incidental images experienced during encoding will later be mistaken as memories for pictures. Whether participants made the same picture misattributions on related lures (or non-presented related items) depended on the way in which the lures’ respective thematic lists were experienced during encoding (Experiments 1 and 2), pointing to the effects of list-specific cues in picture/word judgements. These findings have intriguing implications for interpretations of picture-encoding effects induced by the DRM task. The findings also speak to the use of DRM false-memory rates when marshalling evidence against the use of imagery in applied settings.     

Modifying memory for a museum tour in older adults: Reactivation-related updating that enhances and distorts memory is reduced in ageing

Memory reactivation, the activation of a latent memory trace when we are reminded of a past experience, strengthens memory but can also contribute to distortions if new information present during reactivation is integrated with existing memory. In a previous study in young adults we found that the quality of memory reactivation, manipulated using the principle of encoding specificity and indexed by recollection ratings, modulated subsequent true and false memories for events experienced during a museum tour. Here in this study, we examined age-related changes in the quality of memory reactivation on subsequent memory. Memories of museum stops in young and older adults were reactivated and then immediately followed by the presentation of a novel lure photo from an alternate tour version (i.e., reactivation plus new information). There was an increase in subsequent true memories for reactivated targets and for subsequent false memories for lures that followed reactivated targets, when compared to baseline target and lure photos. However, the influence of reactivation on subsequent memories was reduced in older adults. These data reveal that ageing alters reactivation-related updating processes that allow memories to be strengthened and updated with new information, consequently reducing memory distortions in older adults compared to young adults.     

The influence of forward and backward associative strength on false memories for encoding context

Two experiments examined the effects of forward associative strength (FAS) and backward associative strength (BAS) on false recollection of unstudied lure items. Themes were constructed such that four associates were strongly related to a lure item in terms of FAS or BAS and four associates were weakly related to a lure item in terms of FAS or BAS. Further, when FAS was manipulated, BAS was controlled across strong and weak associates, while FAS was controlled across strong and weak associates when BAS was manipulated. Strong associates were presented in one font while weak associates were presented in a second font. At test, lure items were disproportionately attributed to the source used to present lures' strong associates compared to lures' weak associates, both when BAS was manipulated and when FAS was manipulated. This outcome demonstrates that both BAS and FAS influence lure item false recollection, which favours global-matching models' explanation of false recollection over the explanation offered by spreading activation theories.