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211.
In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level. 相似文献
212.
Beyond Skills and Structure: Justice Dispositions as Antecedents of Young Citizens' Volunteering and Political Participation
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Max Neufeind Patrick Jiranek Theo Wehner 《Journal of community & applied social psychology》2014,24(4):278-295
Community involvement is usually attributed to opportunity structures and individuals' ability to be involved. Building on psychological justice research, this paper proposes that justice dispositions add to explaining why young citizens become active in their communities or not. Furthermore, it is argued that justice dispositions help to understand why most studies find only moderate relationships between youth volunteering and forms of political involvement. In a sample of 321 young Swiss volunteers, this study shows justice centrality and belief in a just world to predict the extent of volunteering and political participation, even after controlling for civic skills and opportunity structures. However, scrutinising the motivations to volunteer, self‐oriented motivations (enhancement, social, career and understanding) more strongly affected the level of volunteering than motivations related to justice dispositions (political responsibility and social responsibility). These findings have implications for the attraction and retention of volunteers as well as for the politics of volunteering and community development in general. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
213.
People learn more from new information when it leads to favorable future outlooks and thus can maintain optimism despite conflicting evidence. In two studies (N = 20 and 26), we investigated whether this optimism bias in belief updating is self‐specific by modifying a recently introduced learning paradigm. In each trial, participants had to estimate the probability of experiencing a negative future event, were then presented with the population base rate of that event, and were subsequently asked for a second, updated estimation. In half of the 88 trials with varying events, estimations were made for oneself, in the other half for a similar other. We tested whether the updates (differences between the first and second estimates) following undesirable base rate were lower than those following desirable base rates, and whether this difference was greater for self relative to other. In both studies, the overall results support the presence of a self‐specific optimism bias in belief updating. However, taking into account trait optimism (TO) as a moderator variable revealed that this was the case only in participants with high TO, whereas those with low TO showed optimistic belief updating for both self and other. In Study 2, we additionally controlled for possible misclassifications of base rate desirability. Taken together, the optimism bias in belief updating was demonstrated by a selective neglect of unfavorable information. A self‐specific influence of this bias in individuals with high TO may ultimately cause the impression of a more positive future outlook relative to others. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
214.
In a recent paper, Fernández (2015) argues that memory distortion can have beneficial outcomes. Although we agree with this, we find his reasoning and examples flawed to such degree that they will lead to misunderstandings rather than clarification in the field of memory (distortion). In his paper, Fernández uses the terms belief and memory incorrectly, creating a conceptual blur. Also, Fernández tries to make the case that under certain circumstances, false memories of abuse are beneficial. We argue against this idea as the reasoning behind this claim is based on controversial assumptions such as repression. Although it is true that memory distortions can be beneficial, the examples sketched by Fernández are not in line with recent documentation in this area. 相似文献
215.
Economic and psychological studies have determined the tendency to improve cooperation in initial interactions in which people are required to contribute in public good games. The current study examined the behavioural changes of individuals during finite interaction times. Participants were invited to make decisions twice in a step‐level public good game, and their belief in achieving the collective interest was measured. Participants were divided into three groups based on their first decisions. Results showed that high contributors demonstrated high levels of contribution in their subsequent interactions, whereas low and equal contributors increased their levels of contribution after the initial interaction. Additionally, the cooperative level of low contributors increased along with their cooperative belief. The theoretical and practical implications of changes of behaviour and belief in repeated social dilemmas were identified. 相似文献
216.
Theodore J. Everett 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):273-286
This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion. 相似文献
217.
Brian P. Meier Adam K. Fetterman Michael D. Robinson Courtney M. Lappas 《The Journal of psychology》2015,149(3):219-238
Atheists are often portrayed in the media and elsewhere as angry individuals. Although atheists disagree with the pillar of many religions, namely the existence of a God, it may not necessarily be the case that they are angry individuals. The prevalence and accuracy of angry-atheist perceptions were examined in 7 studies with 1,677 participants from multiple institutions and locations in the United States. Studies 1–3 revealed that people believe atheists are angrier than believers, people in general, and other minority groups, both explicitly and implicitly. Studies 4–7 then examined the accuracy of these beliefs. Belief in God, state anger, and trait anger were assessed in multiple ways and contexts. None of these studies supported the idea that atheists are particularly angry individuals. Rather, these results support the idea that people believe atheists are angry individuals, but they do not appear to be angrier than other individuals in reality. 相似文献
218.
Elmar Unnsteinsson 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2016,46(2):204-227
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication. 相似文献
219.
We investigated illusory recollection by dividing lists of associated words into three subsets (high, medium and low) based on their backward associative strength (BAS) to an unstudied theme. Participants studied these subsets at different visual locations on a computer screen and afterwards were given a source memory test. In Experiment 1, we varied the order in which high- and medium-BAS subsets were studied. In Experiment 2, we again manipulated study order as well as the associative strength of the medium-BAS subsets (strong or weak). Across both experiments, illusory recollection was constrained by both study order and BAS. Source attributions to the high-BAS location were more likely (a source-strength effect) when high-BAS items were studied first or studied following items of relatively low associative strength. However, attributions to the strong medium-BAS studied location were more likely when these items were studied before high-BAS items. These findings are interpreted as resulting from misbinding of source details at encoding which can be explained by the activation-monitoring theory of illusory recollection. 相似文献
220.
The misinformation and Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigms are used to study forms of false memories. Despite the abundance of research using these two paradigms, few studies have examined the relationship between the errors that arise from them. In the present study, 160 participants completed a misinformation task and two DRM tasks, receiving a warning about the effect before the second DRM task. Participants demonstrated misinformation and DRM effects (with and without the warning), but susceptibility to these forms of false memory were not significantly related across individuals. The DRM warning reduced the DRM effect, and signal detection analysis revealed that the DRM warning reduced a liberal response bias in this task. Sensitivity and response bias in both DRM tasks were not significantly related to these measures in the misinformation task. These findings suggest that these two forms of false memories are not interchangeable and they appear to be the result of different cognitive processes. 相似文献