Blame and Responsibility

This paper looks at judgments of guilt in the face of alleged wrong-doing, be it in public or in private discourse. Its concern is not the truth of such judgments, although the complexity and contestability of such claims will be stressed. The topic, instead, is what sort of activities we are engaged in, when we make our judgments on others' conduct. To examine judging as an activity it focuses on a series of problems that can occur when we blame others. On analysis, we see that these problems take the form of performative contradictions, so that the ostensible purposes of assigning guilt to others are undermined.There is clear evidence from social psychology that blame is especially frequently and inappropriately attributed to individuals in modern Western societies. On the other hand, it has often been observed how suspicious we are about the activity of judging – thus a widespread perception that a refusal to judge is somehow virtuous. My suggestion is that the sheer difficulty of attributions of responsibility, in the face of a complex and often arbitrary moral reality, frequently defeats us. This leads to a characteristic set of distortions when we blame, so that it is no surprise that we have become suspicious of all blaming activities.Yet, the paper argues, these problems need not arise when we hold others responsible. This paper therefore investigates what, exactly, can be questionable about attempts to assign guilt, and the structural logic that lies behind these problems – what will be called, adapting a term from social psychology, a belief in a just world. Such a belief takes for granted what needs to be worked for through human activity, and therefore tends to be counter-productive in dealing with misdeeds and adverse outcomes.     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

Selective Revision

We introduce a constructive model of selective belief revision in which it is possible to accept only a part of the input information. A selective revision operator ο is defined by the equality K ο α = K * f(α), where * is an AGM revision operator and f a function, typically with the property ⊢ α → f(α). Axiomatic characterizations are provided for three variants of selective revision. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Why we Believe

The radical probabilist counsels the prudent never to put away uncertainty, and hence always to balance judgment with probabilities of various sizes. Against this counsel I shall advise in favor of the practice of full belief — at least for some occasions. This advice rests on the fact that it is sometimes in a person's interests to accept certain propositions as a means of bringing it about that others recognize oneself as having accepted those propositions. With the pragmatists, therefore, I shall reject the view that belief formation must in every instance be a truth-directed affair. Unlike the pragmatists, however, I shall conclude that the enterprise of belief formation is not directed exclusively, or even primarily, at attaining knowledge. In other words, pursuit of that which it profits to believe, on the one hand, and pursuit of knowledge on the other, are distinct enterprises, which overlap (when they do) only accidentally. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Foundational belief change

This paper is concerned with the construction of a base contraction (revision) operation such that the theory contraction (revision) operation generated by it will be fully AGM-rational. It is shown that the theory contraction operation generated by Fuhrmann'sminimal base contraction operation, even under quite strong restrictions, fails to satisfy the supplementary postulates of belief contraction. Finally Fuhrmann's construction is appropriately modified so as to yield the desired properties. The new construction may be described as involving a modification of safe (base) contraction so as to make it maxichoice.     

FAITH,SCIENCE, AND NONRELIGIOUS IDENTITY FORMATION AMONG MALE KENYAN YOUTH

The faith and science dialogue has received scholarly attention in the recent past. Within the African landscape at large, the underlying assumption has been that Africans are religious. However, there has been a rising cohort of Africans who are increasingly identified as nonreligious or atheist or agnostic. This research presents a qualitative analysis of the sociocultural factors that affect or influence these minority identities within a pluralistic African context, exploring their emergence and diversities within the African context, with a specific focus on 20 male Kenyan youth who are identified as nonreligious. This research utilized purposive sampling within nonreligious groups and networks. Second, this research aims at exploring how nonreligious identities are constructed, particularly given the concomitant issues surrounding emerging adulthood and new media. This builds up on the theories around youth and identity formation, while foregrounding science and belief as a central theme of study.     

Belief in COVID-19 misinformation: Hopeful claims are rated as truer

Misinformation surrounding COVID-19 spread rapidly and widely, posing a significant threat to public health. Here, we examined whether some types of misinformation are more believable than others, to the extent that they offer people hope in uncertain times. An initial group of subjects rated a series of COVID-19 misinformation statements for whether each made them feel more or less hopeful (if true). Based on these ratings, we selected two sets of misinformation that differed in their average rated hopefulness; the two sets did not differ in word length or reading ease. In two studies, people rated their belief in each statement. Results from both studies revealed that people rated the more hopeful misinformation (e.g., COVID cures and prevention methods) as truer than less hopeful misinformation (e.g., transmission vectors). These findings are consistent with a motivated reasoning account of misinformation acceptance.     

The effects of rational emotive behavior therapy and motivational interviewing on emotions,automatic thoughts,and perceived performance of elite female volleyball players

ObjectivesThe aim of this study was to examine the effect of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy intervention alone (REBT-A) or with motivational interviewing (REBT + MI) on the emotions, automatic thoughts, and perceived performance of elite female volleyball players.Designand method: Single-case, staggered multiple-baseline AB and ABC designs were adapted in the study. Five female volleyball players participated in the study, of which three players participated in the REBT-A and two players participated in the REBT + MI. The athletes were competing in the national volleyball league (M_age = 28, SD = 5.52). All participants were elite athletes with at least ten years of sports experience. Three scores (T1, T2, T3) were calculated for the athletes' perceived performance, emotion, and automatic thoughts. T1 was the baseline score calculated before the sessions. T2 was calculated after the first two sessions (the first three sessions for REBT + MI) and T3 was calculated after the last three sessions. In the data analysis, percentage changes, effect size, and visual analyzes were used in the T1, T2, and T3 scores.ResultsREBT-A and REBT + MI interventions increased perceived performance, positive emotions, and positive automatic thoughts, and decreased negative emotions and negative automatic thoughts. REBT + MI was more advantageous than REBT-A in increasing positive emotion, positive automatic thought, and perceived performance.ConclusionsAs a result, REBT alone or with motivational interviewing has a positive effect on perceived performance, emotions, and automatic thoughts, but REBT + MI has greater potential to increase positive constructs.     

When rock bottom rocks your world: Crisis of belief as a catalyst for change

An experience of severe difficulty can turn the world upside-down, causing individuals to question important beliefs with which they identify. This phenomenon, which we label as Crisis of Belief (COB), amalgamates the disparate conceptualizations of crisis that exist across several subdisciplines of psychology. Unlike existing ideas of crisis, COB distinguishes itself from stress or trauma alone, and is a clearly specified construct that lends itself to practical operationalization and study. Thus, COB addresses a key gap in literature and offers unique value for understanding how hardship that affects closely held beliefs can catalyze change. We conclude by describing the potential utility of COB as a predictor of both positive (e.g., life satisfaction) and negative (e.g., depression) outcomes and the pressing need for a validated measure.