Invertebrate Minds: A Challenge for Ethical Theory

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us.     

Toward the Scientific Study of Polytheism: Beyond Forced‐Choice Measures of Religious Belief

This article argues that zero‐sum, forced‐choice approaches to measuring religious belief do not work well outside of the Abrahamic world. Positive‐sum approaches to measuring religious beliefs (in the plural) are better suited to the study of polytheistic societies. Using results from a nationally representative survey conducted in 2011 Taiwan, we demonstrate that in a polytheistic society like Taiwan, religious belief is not zero sum. We also contrast our results with those of the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), and seek to show that our positive‐sum approach to measuring religious beliefs can help us better understand the disparate causes and consequences of different religious beliefs in polytheistic societies. The challenge of Christocentrism in quantitative studies of religion is also discussed.     

How Norms (Might) Guide Belief

Abstract

Belief normativism is roughly the view that judgments about beliefs are normative judgments. Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss (G&W) suggest that there are two ways one could defend this view: by appeal to what might be called ‘truth-norms’, or by appeal to what might be called ‘norms of rationality’ or ‘epistemic norms’. According to G&W, whichever way the normativist takes, she ends up being unable to account for the idea that the norms in question would guide belief formation. Plausibly, if belief normativism were true, the relevant norms would have to offer such guidance. I argue that G&W’s case against belief normativism is not successful. In section 1, I defend the idea that truth-norms can guide belief formation indirectly via epistemic norms. In section 2, I outline an account of how the epistemic norms might guide belief. Interestingly, this account may involve a commitment to a certain kind of expressivist view concerning judgments about epistemic norms.     

Schadenfreude and just world belief

The present study tested the hypothesis that a threat of a just world belief intensifies experience of schadenfreude (i.e., pleasure at another's misfortune). The participants read scenarios which were designed to threaten or maintain their just world belief. Subsequently, they were transferred to an online magazine presenting funny stories about other peoples' failures. As presumed, the participants exposed to the threat of just world belief spent more time on reading. These results confirmed the existence of a link between just world threat and schadenfreude.     

Who Knows? Knowledge Activation,Belief in Certainty of Knowledge,Maximization Tendencies and Need for Cognition in Answerability Judgments

In this study, investigating answerability judgments, 123 participants judged whether each of 46 general knowledge questions could currently be answered by themselves, by someone else, or by no one. There were 26 consensus questions (high expected consensus about their answerability) and 20 non-consensus questions. Before each question, half of the participants rated the extent of their knowledge related to the question. Results showed that answering consensus questions compared with non-consensus led to a lower proportion of “No one knows” answers. Moreover, in the knowledge rating condition compared with the control condition, participants choose “No one knows” proportionally less. Participants’ ratings of belief in certainty of knowledge were associated with more “Someone else knows” for the non-consensus questions. Moreover, tendency to maximization led to a higher proportion of “Someone else knows” options for the non-consensus questions. Finally, high need for cognition was associated with fewer choices of “Someone else knows.”     

Truth in Fiction,Impossible Worlds,and Belief Revision

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

Probability,Approximate Truth,and Truthlikeness: More Ways out of the Preface Paradox

The so-called Preface Paradox seems to show that one can rationally believe two logically incompatible propositions. We address this puzzle, relying on the notions of truthlikeness and approximate truth as studied within the post-Popperian research programme on verisimilitude. In particular, we show that adequately combining probability, approximate truth, and truthlikeness leads to an explanation of how rational belief is possible in the face of the Preface Paradox. We argue that our account is superior to other solutions of the paradox, including a recent one advanced by Hannes Leitgeb (Analysis 74.1).     

An analytic tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic

A tableau is a refutation-based decision procedure for a related logic, and is among the most popular proof procedures for modal logics. In this paper, we present a labelled tableau calculus for a temporalised belief logic called TML⁺, which is obtained by adding a linear-time temporal logic onto a belief logic by the temporalisation method of Finger and Gabbay. We first establish the soundness and the completeness of the labelled tableau calculus based on the soundness and completeness results of its constituent logics. We then sketch a resolution-type proof procedure that complements the tableau calculus and also propose a model checking algorithm for TML⁺ based on the recent results for model checking procedures for temporalised logics. TML⁺ is suitable for formalising trust and agent beliefs and reasoning about their evolution for agent-based systems. Based on the logic TML⁺, the proposed labelled tableau calculus could be used for analysis, design and verification of agent-based systems operating in dynamic environments.