Précis of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium.     

The possibility of pragmatic reasons for belief and the wrong kind of reasons problem

In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e. the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative, but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.

Replies to commentators on <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Virtue Epistemology</Emphasis> (Oxford University Press, 2007)

Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.

关系推理中信念偏差效应的研究

采用结论评估范式,考察时向和空间关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式,以及心理模型理论对关系推理中信念偏差效应的解释力。研究结果表明,关系推理中信念偏差效应的表现形式与三段论有所不同,不论是时间推理还是空间推理中都存在信念主效应,但没有发现信念与逻辑的交互作用;心理模型理论不能对关系推理中信念偏差效应作出合理解释。     

Relations between mental verb and false belief understanding in Cantonese-speaking children

Previous research has shown that linguistic forms that codify mental contents bear a specific relation with children’s false belief understanding. These forms include mental verbs and their following complements, yet the two have not been considered separately. The current study examined the roles of mental verb semantics and the complement syntax in children’s false belief understanding. Independent tasks were used to measure verb meaning, complements, and false belief understanding such that the verbs in question were present only in the verb meaning test, and no linguistic devices biased toward false belief were used in the false belief test. We focused on (a) some mental verbs that obligatorily affirm or negate what follows and (b) sentential complements, the content of which is to be evaluated against the mind of another person, not reality. Results showed that only (a) predicted false belief understanding in a group of Cantonese-speaking 4-year-olds, controlling for nonverbal intelligence and general language ability. In particular, children’s understanding of the strong nonfactive semantics of the Cantonese verbs /ji5-wai4/ (“falsely think”) predicted false belief understanding most strongly. The current findings suggest that false belief understanding is specifically related to the comprehension of mental verbs that entail false thought in their semantics.     

Reduced misinformation effects following saccadic bilateral eye movements

The effects of saccadic bilateral (horizontal) eye movements on memory for a visual event narrative were investigated. In the study phase, participants were exposed to a set of pictures accompanied by a verbal commentary describing the events depicted in the pictures. Next, the participants were asked either misleading or control questions about the depicted event and were then asked to engage in 30s of bilateral vs. vertical vs. no eye movements. Finally, recognition memory was tested using the remember-know procedure. It was found that bilateral eye movements increased true memory for the event, increased recollection, and decreased the magnitude of the misinformation effect. The findings are discussed in terms of source monitoring, dual-process theories of memory and the potential neural foundations of such effects.     

公共物品两难中相互依赖关系对合作行为的影响

本文关注初始关系建立过程中互动双方相互依赖关系对个体合作行为的影响,认为情境中表征个体间相互依赖关系的线索会对激活被试在情境中的社会动机并影响被试的信任信念,进而影响互动双方的合作行为。操作互动双方问基于互动制约的相互依赖和基于利益共同的相互依赖,模拟高相互依赖和低相互依赖关系情境。结果表明：①不同的相互依赖关系能够激活不同的社会动机和信任信念;②不同的相互依赖关系中,被试的合作行为有显著差异;③在特定的相互依赖关系中,被试的合作行为与其本身的信任倾向无显著相关;④特定相互依赖关系下被试的社会动机带有策略性,信任信念对被试合作行为的预测能力较强。     

5～8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解

参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。     

高中生认识论信念调查研究

本研究以526名高中生为被试,运用自行编制的"高中生认识论信念问卷",考察了高中生认识论信念的性别差异、年龄特点以及学校类型差异。结果表明:高中生认识论信念的各个维度上不存在性别差异,但存在着极其显著的学校差异;在整合建构信念、能力信念方面,存在着显著的年级差异;在零散接受信念上存在着学校与年级的交互作用。     

三段论推理中的个体内在影响因素

推理是人们认知的根本。人们在推理过程中,受到许多因素的影响,大致可以分为内在（个体差异）因素和外在（任务）因素。该文主要针对影响三段论推理的内在因素（个体差异）进行评论,并且讨论了将来的研究方向。