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131.
D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(3):419-437
I raise the question of what cognitive attitude self-deception brings about. That is: what is the product of self-deception?
Robert Audi and Georges Rey have argued that self-deception does not bring about belief in the usual sense, but rather “avowal”
or “avowed belief.” That means a tendency to affirm verbally (both privately and publicly) that lacks normal belief-like connections
to non-verbal actions. I contest their view by discussing cases in which the product of self-deception is implicated in action
in a way that exemplifies the motivational role of belief. Furthermore, by applying independent criteria of what it is for
a mental state to be a belief, I defend the more intuitive view that being self-deceived that p entails believing that p. Beliefs (i) are the default for action relative to other cognitive attitudes (such as imagining and hypothesis) and (ii)
have cognitive governance over the other cognitive attitudes. I explicate these two relations and argue that they obtain for
the product of self-deception.
相似文献
D. S. Neil Van LeeuwenEmail: |
132.
“This way!”, “No! That way!”—3-year olds know that two people can have mutually incompatible desires
In theory of mind research, there is a long standing dispute about whether children come to understand the subjectivity of both desires and beliefs at the same time (around age 4), or whether there is an asymmetry such that desires are understood earlier. To address this issue, 3-year olds’ understanding of situations in which two persons have mutually incompatible desires was tested in two studies. Results revealed that (i) children were quite proficient at ascribing incompatible desires to two persons, and in simpler scenarios even incompatible desire-dependent emotions; (ii) children showed this proficiency even though they mostly failed the false belief task. Overall, these results suggest that there is an asymmetry such that young children come to understand the subjective nature of desires before they understand the corresponding subjectivity of beliefs. Possible explanations for this asymmetry are discussed in light of conceptual change and information-processing accounts of theory of mind development. 相似文献
133.
A classic study conducted by Ross, Lepper, and Hubbard (1975) revealed a perseverance effect wherein people who received positive performance feedback on an alleged social perceptiveness test reported more favorable self-perceptions in this domain than those who received negative feedback despite the fact that they had received standard outcome debriefing (i.e., been informed about the false, predetermined, and random nature of the feedback) prior to reporting self-assessments. The present studies extend this past research by revealing that (a) there is a form of outcome debriefing (i.e., informing participants about the bogus nature of the test as well as the bogus nature of the feedback) that effectively eliminates the perseverance effect, (b) the perseverance effect that occurs after standard outcome debriefing is limited to perceptions of specific task-relevant skills rather than more global abilities, and (c) affective reactions do not underlie the perseverance effect that occurs in the false feedback paradigm. 相似文献
134.
超越心理健康:精神健康的追求 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
区别于一般心理概念的、狭义的精神概念有三个特征:终极关怀、内发自生以及自由意志。诸如精神信仰危机、生活目标迷茫等区别于传统心理问题的精神问题已经成为现代人的顽疾。现代心理健康标准开始关注并尝试吸纳精神健康。精神健康是21世纪的健康主题,现代人不应仅仅满足于生理和心理的健康,还应寻求更高层次的精神健康。 相似文献
135.
136.
Peter Carruthers 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):275-297
This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense
of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning
psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating
that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us. 相似文献
137.
Sarah Bachelard 《Sophia》2009,48(2):105-118
A central theme in the Christian contemplative tradition is that knowing God is much more like ‘unknowing’ than it is like
possessing rationally acceptable beliefs. Knowledge of God is expressed, in this tradition, in metaphors of woundedness, darkness,
silence, suffering, and desire. Philosophers of religion, on the other hand, tend to explore the possibilities of knowing
God in terms of rational acceptability, epistemic rights, cognitive responsibility, and propositional belief. These languages
seem to point to very different accounts of how it is that we come to know God, and a very different range of critical concepts
by which the truth of such knowledge can be assessed. In this paper, I begin to explore what might be at stake in these different
languages of knowing God, drawing particularly on Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology of Christian belief. I will argue that his
is a distorted account of the epistemology of Christian belief, and that this has implications for his project of demonstrating
the rational acceptability of Christian faith for the 21st century.
相似文献
Sarah BachelardEmail: |
138.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):107-109
This is a summary of A Virtue Epistemology, the book that is the subject of this book symposium. 相似文献
139.
Andrew Reisner 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):257-272
In this paper I argue against the stronger of the two views concerning the right and wrong kind of reasons for belief, i.e.
the view that the only genuine normative reasons for belief are evidential. The project in this paper is primarily negative,
but with an ultimately positive aim. That aim is to leave room for the possibility that there are genuine pragmatic reasons
for belief. Work is required to make room for this view, because evidentialism of a strict variety remains the default view
in much of the debate concerning normative reasons for belief. Strict versions of evidentialism are inconsistent with the
view that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief.
相似文献
Andrew ReisnerEmail: |
140.
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):137-147
Paul Boghossian discusses critically my account of intuition as a source of epistemic status. Stewart Cohen takes up my views
on skepticism, on dreams, and on epistemic competence and competences and their relation to human knowledge. Hilary Kornblith
focuses on my animal/reflective distinction, and, along with Cohen, on my comparison between how dreams might mislead us and
how other bad epistemic contexts can do so. In this paper I offer replies to my three critics.
相似文献
Ernest SosaEmail: |