How fuzzy-trace theory predicts true and false memories for words,sentences, and narratives

Fuzzy-trace theory posits independent verbatim and gist memory processes, a distinction that has implications for such applied topics as eyewitness testimony. This distinction between precise, literal verbatim memory and meaning-based, intuitive gist accounts for memory paradoxes including dissociations between true and false memory, false memories outlasting true memories, and developmental increases in false memory. We provide an overview of fuzzy-trace theory, and, using mathematical modeling, also present results demonstrating verbatim and gist memory in true and false recognition of narrative sentences and inferences. Results supported fuzzy-trace theory's dual-process view of memory: verbatim memory was relied on to reject meaning-consistent, but unpresented, sentences (via recollection rejection). However, verbatim memory was often not retrieved, and gist memory supported acceptance of these sentences (via similarity judgment and phantom recollection). Thus, mathematical models of words can be extended to explain memory for complex stimuli, such as narratives, the kind of memory interrogated in law.     

False consensus in situational judgment tests: What would others do?

We introduce an alternative response instruction to reduce the fakability of situational judgment tests. This novel instruction is based on the false consensus effect, a robust social psychological bias whereby people infer that the majority of other people’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors are aligned with their own. In four studies, including both field and laboratory data (total N = 882), we demonstrate that participants show a false consensus bias when asked what others would do in situational judgment tests. Furthermore, the situational judgment test based on the false consensus effect turned out to relatively difficult to be fake, and produced scores that were meaningfully correlated with conceptually related traits, as well as both self-reported and behavioral outcomes.     

Reduced effects of pictorial distinctiveness on false memory following dynamic visual noise

High levels of false recognition for non-presented items typically occur following exposure to lists of associated words. These false recognition effects can be reduced by making the studied items more distinctive by the presentation of pictures during encoding. One explanation of this is that during recognition, participants expect or attempt to retrieve distinctive pictorial information in order to evaluate the study status of the test item. If this involves the retrieval and use of visual imagery, then interfering with imagery processing should reduce the effectiveness of pictorial information in false memory reduction. In the current experiment, visual-imagery processing was disrupted at retrieval by the use of dynamic visual noise (DVN). It was found that effects of DVN dissociated true from false memory. Memory for studied words was not influenced by the presence of an interfering noise field. However, false memory was increased and the effects of picture-induced distinctiveness was eliminated. DVN also increased false recollection and remember responses to unstudied items.     

Thinking about representations: the case of opaque contexts

To address the question of whether young children are differentially sensitive to referential opacity, an advanced Theory of Mind skill, we assessed 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds on three types of opaque contexts: epistemic, quotational, and intentional. Children’s performance improved as a function of age and varied significantly by opacity type. Performance was best for epistemic opacity (using the verb “know”) and poorest for intentional opacity (using “mean to”), with quotational opacity (using “said”) falling in-between. Importantly, the current results suggest that children’s sensitivity to referential opacity is not an all-or-nothing competence but rather one that varies across the contexts examined. Possible reasons for this variability are discussed.     

Who do you think I think I am? Accuracy in perceptions of others’ self-esteem

This study was conducted to assess the accuracy of perceptions of others’ self-esteem and to examine the potential moderating variables of target gender, perceiver gender, and degree of acquaintance. Degree of acquaintance was the only hypothesized moderator reliably related to accuracy. An overall tendency to overestimate targets’ self-esteem was evinced, but was not related to any of the hypothesized moderators. The data suggested that perceivers are influenced by a false consensus effect when estimating others’ level of self-esteem, independent of their degree of acquaintance with targets. Implications of the findings and directions for future investigation are discussed.     

Children's false memory and true disclosure in the face of repeated questions

The current study was designed to investigate children's memory and suggestibility for events differing in valence (positive or negative) and veracity (true or false). A total of 82 3- and 5-year-olds were asked repeated questions about true and false events, either in a grouped order (i.e., all questions about a certain event asked consecutively) or in a nongrouped order (i.e., questions about a certain event were interspersed with questions about other events). Interviewer gender was also varied. Individual differences, including attachment style, inhibition, and behavioral adjustment, were examined as potential predictors of memory and suggestibility. Results revealed significant age, valence, and veracity effects on children's memory reports. Path analysis demonstrated that individual differences in behavioral problems and inhibitory ability predicted children's provision of inaccurate information. Implications for psychological theory and legal application are discussed.