The efficiency of binding spontaneous trait inferences to actors’ faces

Three experiments tested the hypothesis that the process of binding spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) to actors’ representations is relatively independent of attentional resources. Participants were presented with faces paired with single behaviors. Binding of STIs to actors was revealed by a higher false recognition of implied traits paired with actors’ faces than of implied traits randomly paired with other familiar faces. This effect replicated when each face-behavior pair was presented for 2 s (Experiment 1), when the processing of the information was shallow (Experiment 2), and when participants performed a secondary task during the presentation of behaviors (Experiment 3). Experiment 4 showed that explicit on-line trait judgments of the actor, but not explicit behavior judgments, predicted the false recognition of implied traits in the context of the actor. The possibility that the process of binding STIs to actors’ representations is automatic is discussed.     

Verbatim and gist memory and individual differences in inhibition,sustained attention,and working memory capacity

In the present study, we explored whether individual differences in inhibition, sustained attention, and working memory capacity (WMC) are related to false memory task performance. We defined the processes in such a task according to the fuzzy trace theory and used multinomial modelling methodology to measure the contribution of these latent processes. We found higher verbatim memory in participants with a high WMC, as measured by the Rotation Span task, and in individuals who committed more errors in the Sustained Attention Response Task (SART). Participants with a high WMC and low-error level in SART showed higher gist memory for targets, and individuals high in WMC also rejected orthographically related distractors more effectively due to the recollection of distractors’ corresponding targets. We also observed that participants with better inhibition control were more conservative in guessing that an item was old.     

Mental Rotation in False Belief Understanding

This study examines the spontaneous use of embodied egocentric transformation (EET) in understanding false beliefs in the minds of others. EET involves the participants mentally transforming or rotating themselves into the orientation of an agent when trying to adopt his or her visuospatial perspective. We argue that psychological perspective taking such as false belief reasoning may also involve EET because of what has been widely reported in the embodied cognition literature, showing that our processing of abstract, propositional information is often grounded in concrete bodily sensations which are not apparently linked to higher cognition. In Experiment 1, an agent placed a ball into one of two boxes and left. The ball then rolled out and moved either into the other box (new box) or back into the original one (old box). The participants were to decide from which box they themselves or the agent would try to recover the ball. Results showed that false belief performance was affected by increased orientation disparity between the participants and the agent, suggesting involvement of embodied transformation. In Experiment 2, false belief was similarly induced and the participants were to decide if the agent would try to recover the ball in one specific box. Orientation disparity was again found to affect false belief performance. The present results extend previous findings on EET in visuospatial perspective taking and suggest that false belief reasoning, which is a kind of psychological perspective taking, can also involve embodied rotation, consistent with the embodied cognition view.     

Rear negativity: Verbal messages coming from behind are perceived as more negative

Many studies have explored the evaluative effects of vertical (up/down) or horizontal (left/right) spatial locations. However, little is known about the role of information that comes from the front and back. Basing our investigations on multiple theoretical considerations, we propose that spatial location of sounds is a cue for message valence, such that a message coming from behind is interpreted as more negative than a message presented in front of a listener. Here we show across a variety of manipulations and dependent measures that this effect occurs in the domain of social information. Our data are most compatible with theoretical accounts which propose that social information presented from behind is associated with uncertainty and lack of control, which is amplified in conditions of self-relevance.