How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

Caffeine increases false memory in nonhabitual consumers

Insight into caffeine's equivocal effects on memory can be derived from work suggesting both emotional arousal and psychosocial stress increase false memory rates without increasing veridical memory. This study investigated how a range of caffeine doses affect veridical and false memory formation in nonhabitual consumers. A double-blind, repeated-measures design with caffeine (0 mg, 100 mg, 200 mg, 400 mg caffeine) was used to examine memory using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Results showed that caffeine modulated arousal levels, peaking at 200 mg and returning to near baseline levels at 400 mg. Main effects of caffeine demonstrated higher critical lure recall and recognition ratings (i.e., false memory) as a function of dose, again peaking at 200 mg. Those who showed the highest arousal increases as a function of caffeine also tended to produce the highest false recall and recognition rates. Veridical memory was not affected. Results demonstrate that consumption of as little as 100 mg of caffeine elicits reliable inverted-U shape changes in arousal and, in turn, false memories in individuals who do not habitually consume caffeine.     

Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure

Recent findings suggest that tracking others’ beliefs is not always effortful and slow, but may rely on a fast and implicit system. An untested prediction of the automatic belief tracking account is that own and others’ beliefs should be activated in parallel. We tested this prediction measuring continuous movement trajectories in a task that required deciding between two possible object locations. We independently manipulated whether participants’ belief about the object location was true or false and whether an onlooker’s belief about the object location was true or false. Manipulating whether or not the agent’s belief was ever task relevant allowed us to compare performance in an explicit and implicit version of the same task. Movement parameters revealed an influence of the onlooker’s irrelevant belief in the implicit version of the task. This provides evidence for parallel activation of own and others’ beliefs.     

Hemispheric asymmetries in the activation and monitoring of memory errors

Previous research on the lateralization of memory errors suggests that the right hemisphere's tendency to produce more memory errors than the left hemisphere reflects hemispheric differences in semantic activation. However, all prior research that has examined the lateralization of memory errors has used self-paced recognition judgments. Because activation occurs early in memory retrieval, with more time to make a decision, other memory processes, like strategic monitoring processes, may affect memory errors. By manipulating the time subjects were given to make memory decisions, this study separated the influence of automatic memory processes (activation) from strategic memory processes (monitoring) on the production of false memories. The results indicated that when retrieval was fast, the right hemisphere produced more memory errors than the left hemisphere. However, when retrieval was slow, the left hemisphere's error-proneness increased compared to the fast retrieval condition, while the right hemisphere's error-proneness remained the same. These results suggest that the right hemisphere's errors are largely due to activation, while the left hemisphere's errors are influenced by both activation and monitoring.     

Mood and the DRM paradigm: An investigation of the effects of valence and arousal on false memory

Recent studies regarding the effect of mood on the DRM (Deese–Roediger–McDermott) illusion have not been able to clearly establish yet whether valence or arousal is most critical in determining susceptibility to false memories, nor what the underlying processes are. In three experiments, both the valence and the level of arousal of participants' mood were manipulated. Six conditions were used: positive mood with high/low arousal, negative mood with high/low arousal, neutral mood, and a control condition. Memory was tested by means of immediate and delayed recognition and immediate free recall. The mood induction procedure was effective. For recognition memory, there was an effect of arousal on the endorsement of critical lures. Low-arousal moods elicited more false recognition than high-arousal moods, regardless of valence. Based on signal detection analyses, the effect was attributed to more liberal response criteria with low arousal, in combination with a tendency towards improved item-specific memory with high arousal.     

Claiming hidden memories as one's own: A review of inadvertent plagiarism

Inadvertent plagiarism, or cryptomnesia, occurs when an individual claims another's idea as his or her own with no recollection of having been exposed to the idea before. Although some variation exists in the explanations of this occurrence, the source monitoring framework has emerged as the most plausible account. The purpose of this paper is to review the core body of research that has been conducted on cryptomnesia over the past two decades, with particular focus on the factors that affect the propensity of this phenomenon and how these influences inform a theoretical explanation of cryptomnesia. This paper also includes some suggestions for how future research might continue to explore the phenomenon of inadvertent plagiarism.     

Cybervictimization and body esteem: Experiences of Swedish children and adolescents

This study investigates the relationship between cybervictimization and body esteem among 1076 pupils, ages 10–15. More specifically we investigated if being the victim of cyberbullying was related to body esteem, and if there were any grade and gender differences in these relationships. Additionally, we examined how often pupils' believed that cyberbullying was directed at the victims' appearance, and if this view was more common when girls were cybervictims compared to when boys were cybervictims. Pupils in fourth grade (10-year-olds), sixth grade (12-year-olds) and ninth grade (15-year-olds), from 21 different schools in Gothenburg were surveyed. The main finding was that victims of cyberbullying reported poorer body esteem than non-cybervictims. The results also showed that pupils believed that cyberbullying was directed at the victims' appearance, especially when girls were victims. This study provides unique data concerning the links between being exposed to cyberbullying and body esteem.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.     

Does syntax play a role in Theory of Mind development before the age of 3 years?

Language plays an important role in Theory of Mind development. Specifically, longitudinal and training studies indicate that the acquisition of complement syntax has an effect on three- to five-year-old children’s mastery of the concept of false belief. There is evidence for both a beginning explicit understanding of the mind and mastery of complement syntax in children before their third birthday. In the present study, we investigated longitudinally whether an early sensitivity to complement syntax is related to early development of Theory of Mind abilities in a sample of N = 159 German-speaking 27- to 36-month-old children. Children’s sensitivity to formal properties of complement syntax at 33 months was associated with their perspective-taking skills and their metacognition of own ignorance three months later. This relation remained significant when controlling for the effects of general language abilities. Furthermore, children’s sensitivity to complement syntax was concurrently related to their early false belief understanding. These findings support the view that complement syntax shares representational demands with an understanding of epistemic states and that language begins to support the acquisition of epistemic concepts earlier than was previously thought.