The effect of mood on confidence in false memories

The goal of this study was to examine the effect of mood on suggestibility in the misinformation paradigm. To investigate the relative effects of valence and arousal, as well as affect-specific influences, six mood conditions were included: positive mood with low/high arousal (serene/happy), negative mood with low/high arousal (sad/angry), neutral mood, and a control condition. Participants watched a movie and were exposed to misleading information by means of a narrative. Memory was tested in a surprise forced-choice recognition task, with confidence judgements. The mood induction procedure was shown to be effective. A significant misinformation effect confirmed that participants were misled by the false information provided. Mood did not affect susceptibility to the misinformation effect, but did significantly influence participants’ belief in their false memories. Feeling sad induced the highest confidence ratings. Results are discussed in terms of different problem-solving strategies associated with discrete affective states, and have implications for both legal and clinical settings.     

How you lie affects what you remember

We investigated how telling different types of lies may impact memory. Participants studied pictures of objects, and later lied and told the truth about these and new objects once or multiple times by describing them or by denying they had seen them. Forty-eight hours later, participants were tested on their source memory. Results revealed that participants had good memory for having falsely described a never-seen object, but relatively poor memory for having falsely denied seeing a studied object. These results suggest that telling certain types of lies may make a person more likely to forget having lied. In addition, repeated truthful denials of having seen a picture paradoxically increased false memories for having seen it. Thus, telling the truth does not always prevent the possibility of memory distortion.     

Claiming hidden memories as one's own: A review of inadvertent plagiarism

Inadvertent plagiarism, or cryptomnesia, occurs when an individual claims another's idea as his or her own with no recollection of having been exposed to the idea before. Although some variation exists in the explanations of this occurrence, the source monitoring framework has emerged as the most plausible account. The purpose of this paper is to review the core body of research that has been conducted on cryptomnesia over the past two decades, with particular focus on the factors that affect the propensity of this phenomenon and how these influences inform a theoretical explanation of cryptomnesia. This paper also includes some suggestions for how future research might continue to explore the phenomenon of inadvertent plagiarism.     

Caffeine increases false memory in nonhabitual consumers

Insight into caffeine's equivocal effects on memory can be derived from work suggesting both emotional arousal and psychosocial stress increase false memory rates without increasing veridical memory. This study investigated how a range of caffeine doses affect veridical and false memory formation in nonhabitual consumers. A double-blind, repeated-measures design with caffeine (0 mg, 100 mg, 200 mg, 400 mg caffeine) was used to examine memory using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Results showed that caffeine modulated arousal levels, peaking at 200 mg and returning to near baseline levels at 400 mg. Main effects of caffeine demonstrated higher critical lure recall and recognition ratings (i.e., false memory) as a function of dose, again peaking at 200 mg. Those who showed the highest arousal increases as a function of caffeine also tended to produce the highest false recall and recognition rates. Veridical memory was not affected. Results demonstrate that consumption of as little as 100 mg of caffeine elicits reliable inverted-U shape changes in arousal and, in turn, false memories in individuals who do not habitually consume caffeine.     

Misinformation effect and centrality

Introduction and objectivesThe two objectives of this study are to examine the effects of the introduction of post-event information (correct and incorrect) on the memory of the central and peripheral aspects of a given situation and to determine the effects of this additional information on the level of confidence claimed by the participants regarding their reported memories.MethodOne hour and a half after watching a film, the participants were presented with three types of information, by means of open questions: leading, misleading and neutral. One week later, they carried out a recognition task, during which they had to assess to what extent they were sure of their answers.ResultsWhile the memory of the event was more accurate concerning the central aspects of the event than the peripheral elements, the misinformation effect appeared only in the central condition. In addition, following the presentation of incorrect information, the participants were more certain of their answers related to the central aspects.ConclusionThese results highlight the importance of taking into account the centrality factor in studies about the misinformation phenomenon.     

Correcting socially introduced false memories: The effect of re-study

This study examined whether participants could utilize re-study and perceptual elaboration to correct erroneous suggestions from their partner in the social contagion of memory paradigm. Participants studied household scenes and then collaboratively recalled the scenes with a confederate who interjected erroneous items. Before completing subsequent individual recall and recognition tests, participants were allowed to re-study the original items and/or to generate perceptual details of the items. Across two experiments, participants who re-studied the original material were less likely to incorporate the confederate's misleading suggestions. Re-study reduced false recall and recognition and increased veridical recall and recognition (Experiment 1) and the effect was especially pronounced with longer re-study episodes (Experiment 2). Items generated on the perceptual elaboration test offered no corrective benefit above and beyond the effects of re-study. These data demonstrate that participants can rely on self-initiated correction processes engaged during re-study to reduce socially suggested false memories.     

Do people automatically track others’ beliefs? Evidence from a continuous measure

Recent findings suggest that tracking others’ beliefs is not always effortful and slow, but may rely on a fast and implicit system. An untested prediction of the automatic belief tracking account is that own and others’ beliefs should be activated in parallel. We tested this prediction measuring continuous movement trajectories in a task that required deciding between two possible object locations. We independently manipulated whether participants’ belief about the object location was true or false and whether an onlooker’s belief about the object location was true or false. Manipulating whether or not the agent’s belief was ever task relevant allowed us to compare performance in an explicit and implicit version of the same task. Movement parameters revealed an influence of the onlooker’s irrelevant belief in the implicit version of the task. This provides evidence for parallel activation of own and others’ beliefs.     

Post hoc versus predictive accounts of children’s theory of mind: A reply to Ruffman

Ruffman (2014) argues for a minimalist account of infants’ performance on theory of mind tasks. This commentary argues that because Ruffman’s minimalist account is post hoc, it neither generates testable predictions about how infants will respond in new situations, nor does it offer a coherent explanation for existing false-belief findings. An alternative, mentalist account is presented. This account integrates infancy findings with prior theory of mind literature and generates novel predictions about children’s false belief performance.     

Counterfactual thinking and false belief: the role of executive function

The purpose of the current study was to examine further the relationship between counterfactual thinking and false belief (FB) as examined by Guajardo and Turley-Ames (Cognitive Development, 19 (2004) 53-80). More specifically, the current research examined the importance of working memory and inhibitory control in understanding the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB. Participants were 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds (N = 76). Counterfactual thinking statements generated accounted for significant variance in FB performance beyond age and language. Working memory and inhibitory control each partially mediated the relationship between counterfactual thinking and FB performance. The maturation of executive functioning skills is important in children’s developing understanding of counterfactual reasoning and FB.     

跨视听通道的相继错误记忆效应

本研究以12名大学生为被试采用DRM范式,考察了视觉与听觉通道在编码阶段的错误记忆ERP效应,以从更深层面认识错误记忆的内在加工机制。研究结果表明,在编码阶段,在300-500ms及500-700ms的时间窗视觉通道均存在相继错误记忆效应（DIM）,比听觉通道表现出较强的DIM效应,这不仅说明视觉通道与听觉通道在编码阶段具有不同的脑机制,而且表明DIM效应与学习项目的语义加工有着密切的关系。