Generation,intentionality of processing at encoding and retrieval,and age-related associative deficits

This research tested age-related differences in the retrieval of self-generated new associations under conditions that required intentional or incidental processing. Under intentional or incidental encoding conditions, young and older adults generated new associations by producing a response to a two-letter stem paired with a cue/prime word (e.g., throne–mo_____). Memory for these new associations was tested under intentional or incidental retrieval conditions by pairing the word stem with the previous cue/prime word, its homophone partner, or a prime/cue not previously presented. Results indicated equivalent priming and cueing effects for both age groups in all conditions. These results suggest that generation of new associations can eliminate age-related associative deficits, even under intentional encoding and retrieval conditions that typically disadvantage older adults.     

Serial position-dependent false memory effects*

ABSTRACT

Evidence for false recognition within seconds of encoding suggests that semantic-associative influences are not restricted to long-term memory, consistent with unitary memory accounts but contrary to dual store models. The present study sought further relevant evidence using a modified free recall converging associates task where participants studied 12-item lists composed of 3 semantically distinct quartets (sublists) related to a separate, non-presented theme word (i.e., words 1–4/theme1, 5–8/theme2, and 9–12/theme3). This list construction permits assessment of false recall errors from each sublist, and, particularly, the primacy and recency sublists that have been linked to long- and short-term memory stores. Experiment 1 tested immediate free recall for items. Associative false memories were evident from all sublists, however, significantly less so from the recent sublist, which also showed the highest levels of veridical memory. By inserting a brief (3?s) distractor prior to recall, Experiment 2 selectively reduced veridical memory and increased false memory for the recent sublist while leaving the primacy sublist unaffected. These recall results converge with prior evidence indicating the immediacy of false recognition, and can be understood within a unitary framework where the differential availability of verbatim features and gist-based cues affect memory for primacy and recency sublists.     

Putting false memories into context: the effects of odour contexts on correct and false recall*

ABSTRACT

False memories created by the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm are often accompanied by contextual information. Yet, research investigating the effects of context on false memories is surprisingly scarce. We used the context-dependent memory (CDM) model to construct same versus different context conditions using odours as contexts and DRM lists as to-be-remembered stimuli. Experiment 1 showed that levels of correct recall were higher in the same-context condition than in the changed-context condition, but no effects of context were observed in false recall. Experiment 2 used different odours and a longer retention interval and showed that context-dependent memory effects were found for both true and false memory. For true memory, context reinstatement improved memory, whilst simultaneously reducing false memory. Theoretical and forensic implications of these findings are discussed.     

The influence of partial‐match cues on event‐based prospective memory

In event‐based prospective memory tasks people form an intention to respond when an environmental cue signals that conditions are appropriate to fulfil an intended activity. In the ongoing activity the authors embedded partial‐match cues that only partially, but not completely, satisfied the conditions required to make a prospective response. The consequence of encountering these partial‐match cues was to increase responses to appropriate prospective memory cues encountered later. This outcome occurred both with semantic and orthographic cues, but only the former led to longer processing latencies of the partial‐match cues. This asymmetry suggests that partial‐match cues may not need to be processed consciously in order to benefit event‐based prospective memory. A parametric manipulation of the number of partial‐match cues resulted in numerically but not statistically better prospective memory. Consequently, partial‐match cues may function as overt reminders of the intention to respond or they may serve to engage participants in self‐initiated remindings of the intention.     

False and veridical collaborative recognition

Participants who witness an event and later receive post-event information that omits a critical scene are less likely to recall and to recognise that scene than are participants who receive no post-event information (Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). The present study used the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which participants study lists of semantic associates (e.g., hot, snow, warm, winter) that commonly elicit false memories of critical non-presented words (e.g., cold), to determine whether omitting information from a second presentation decreases memory for both presented and non-presented information. Participants were presented with a list of the semantic associates of six non-presented words. For half the participants, this list was presented a second time with the semantic associates of one of the non-presented words omitted. As expected, participants were less likely to recall and to recognise the presented words when they had been omitted from the second presentation. Omission also decreased the rate at which non-presented words were recalled, although false recognition of these words was not reduced. These results suggest that false recognition may be particularly difficult to attenuate and that post-event omission may be more detrimental to memory accuracy than previously thought.     

Individual differences in false memory from misinformation: Cognitive factors

This research investigated the cognitive correlates of false memories that are induced by the misinformation paradigm. A large sample of Chinese college students (N=436) participated in a misinformation procedure and also took a battery of cognitive tests. Results revealed sizable and systematic individual differences in false memory arising from exposure to misinformation. False memories were significantly and negatively correlated with measures of intelligence (measured with Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices and Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale), perception (Motor-Free Visual Perception Test, Change Blindness, and Tone Discrimination), memory (Wechsler Memory Scales and 2-back Working Memory tasks), and face judgement (Face Recognition and Facial Expression Recognition). These findings suggest that people with relatively low intelligence and poor perceptual abilities might be more susceptible to the misinformation effect.     

Memory and the Moses illusion: Failures to detect contradictions with stored knowledge yield negative memorial consequences

Although contradictions with stored knowledge are common in daily life, people often fail to notice them. For example, in the Moses illusion, participants fail to notice errors in questions such as “How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the Ark?” despite later showing knowledge that the Biblical reference is to Noah, not Moses. We examined whether error prevalence affected participants' ability to detect distortions in questions, and whether this in turn had memorial consequences. Many of the errors were overlooked, but participants were better able to catch them when they were more common. More generally, the failure to detect errors had negative memorial consequences, increasing the likelihood that the errors were used to answer later general knowledge questions. Methodological implications of this finding are discussed, as it suggests that typical analyses likely underestimate the size of the Moses illusion. Overall, answering distorted questions can yield errors in the knowledge base; most importantly, prior knowledge does not protect against these negative memorial consequences.     

So that's why I don't remember: Normalising forgetting of childhood events influences false autobiographical beliefs but not memories

We investigated changes in autobiographical belief and memory ratings for childhood events, after informing individuals that forgetting childhood events is common. Participants received false prevalence information (indicating that a particular childhood event occurred frequently in the population) plus a rationale normalising the forgetting of childhood events; false prevalence information alone; or no manipulation, for one (Study 1) or two (Study 2) unlikely childhood events. Results demonstrated that combining prevalence information and the “forgetting rationale” substantially influenced autobiographical belief ratings, whereas prevalence information alone had no impact (Study 1) or a significantly lesser impact (Study 2) on belief ratings. Prevalence information consistently impacted plausibility ratings. No changes in memory ratings were observed. These results provide further support for a nested relationship between judgements of plausibility, belief, and memory in evaluating the occurrence of autobiographical events. Furthermore, the results suggest that some purported false memory phenomena may instead reflect the development of autobiographical false beliefs in the absence of memory.     

Variation in working memory capacity and intrusions: Differences in generation or editing?

The current study explored the reason for the relation between individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) and intrusions in free recall. High and low WMC individuals were tested in standard delayed free recall and externalised free recall in which participants recalled everything that came to mind. Additionally, in externalised free recall participants were instructed to press a key for each item that they knew was an intrusion. In delayed free recall, low WMC individuals recalled fewer correct items and more previous list and extralist intrusions than high WMC individuals. In externalised free recall, differences only arose in previous list intrusions. Furthermore, in externalised free recall it was found that low WMC were less likely to identify both types of intrusions than high WMC individuals. It is argued that the reason low WMC individuals recall more intrusions than high WMC in free recall is due to differences in both generation and editing abilities.     

Dissonance-induced false memories: Evidence from a free-choice paradigm

People often misremember the past as consistent with the present. Recent research using an induced-compliance paradigm has revealed that cognitive dissonance is one mechanism that can underlie this memory distortion. We sought to replicate and extend this finding using a free-choice paradigm: Participants made either an easy or a difficult choice between two smartphones and, either immediately or two days later, reported their memories for their decision experience. Participants who made a difficult decision produced the spread-of-alternatives effect expected by dissonance theory, and they were also more likely than those in the easy conditions to misremember their initial decision more favourably than they had initially rated it. Overall, our findings replicate the effect of dissonance on memory distortion and, further, show that the effect generalises to other dissonance-inducing situations.