No evidence for a role of reconsolidation in updating of paired associates

Reconsolidation theory states that memories are labilized through reactivation, making them prone to change, before being re-consolidated. When information in memory requires updating, reconsolidation theory therefore predicts that reminders of previously learned information should facilitate updating of that information and should thus improve memory for the updated information. In two experiments, we tested this prediction by investigating memory for word pairs over a short time-scale. Participants studied word pairs (A–B), some of which were subsequently updated with word pairs that shared the first word (A–C). Half of the A–C pairs received a pre-study reminder of the first word in the pair so as to reactivate and labilize A–B memory. In a recognition memory test targeting the A–C list, reminders by and large had no effect on memory. Results thus failed to support the predictions of reconsolidation theory.     

False consensus in situational judgment tests: What would others do?

We introduce an alternative response instruction to reduce the fakability of situational judgment tests. This novel instruction is based on the false consensus effect, a robust social psychological bias whereby people infer that the majority of other people’s thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors are aligned with their own. In four studies, including both field and laboratory data (total N = 882), we demonstrate that participants show a false consensus bias when asked what others would do in situational judgment tests. Furthermore, the situational judgment test based on the false consensus effect turned out to relatively difficult to be fake, and produced scores that were meaningfully correlated with conceptually related traits, as well as both self-reported and behavioral outcomes.     

Spatial But Not Oculomotor Information Biases Perceptual Memory: Evidence From Face Perception and Cognitive Modeling

Recent research put forward the hypothesis that eye movements are integrated in memory representations and are reactivated when later recalled. However, “looking back to nothing” during recall might be a consequence of spatial memory retrieval. Here, we aimed at distinguishing between the effect of spatial and oculomotor information on perceptual memory. Participants’ task was to judge whether a morph looked rather like the first or second previously presented face. Crucially, faces and morphs were presented in a way that the morph reactivated oculomotor and/or spatial information associated with one of the previously encoded faces. Perceptual face memory was largely influenced by these manipulations. We considered a simple computational model with an excellent match (4.3% error) that expresses these biases as a linear combination of recency, saccade, and location. Surprisingly, saccades did not play a role. The results suggest that spatial and temporal rather than oculomotor information biases perceptual face memory.     

Non‐Arbitrariness in Mapping Word Form to Meaning: Cross‐Linguistic Formal Markers of Word Concreteness

Arbitrary symbolism is a linguistic doctrine that predicts an orthogonal relationship between word forms and their corresponding meanings. Recent corpora analyses have demonstrated violations of arbitrary symbolism with respect to concreteness, a variable characterizing the sensorimotor salience of a word. In addition to qualitative semantic differences, abstract and concrete words are also marked by distinct morphophonological structures such as length and morphological complexity. Native English speakers show sensitivity to these markers in tasks such as auditory word recognition and naming. One unanswered question is whether this violation of arbitrariness reflects an idiosyncratic property of the English lexicon or whether word concreteness is a marked phenomenon across other natural languages. We isolated concrete and abstract English nouns (N  = 400), and translated each into Russian, Arabic, Dutch, Mandarin, Hindi, Korean, Hebrew, and American Sign Language. We conducted offline acoustic analyses of abstract and concrete word length discrepancies across languages. In a separate experiment, native English speakers (N  = 56) with no prior knowledge of these foreign languages judged concreteness of these nouns (e.g., Can you see, hear, feel, or touch this? Yes/No). Each naïve participant heard pre‐recorded words presented in randomized blocks of three foreign languages following a brief listening exposure to a narrative sample from each respective language. Concrete and abstract words differed by length across five of eight languages, and prediction accuracy exceeded chance for four of eight languages. These results suggest that word concreteness is a marked phenomenon across several of the world's most widely spoken languages. We interpret these findings as supportive of an adaptive cognitive heuristic that allows listeners to exploit non‐arbitrary mappings of word form to word meaning.     

Tailoring the Mode of Information Presentation: Effects on Younger and Older Adults' Attention and Recall of Online Information

Previous studies have mainly focused on tailoring message content to match individual characteristics and preferences. This study investigates the effect of a website tailored to individual preferences for the mode of information presentation, compared to 4 nontailored websites on younger and older adults' attention and recall of information, employing a 5 (condition: tailored vs. text, text with illustrations, audiovisual, combination) × 2 (age: younger [25–45] vs. older [≥65] adults) design (N = 559). The mode‐tailored condition (relative to nontailored conditions) improved attention to the website and, consequently, recall in older adults, but not in younger adults. Younger adults recalled more from nontailored information such as text only or text with illustrations, relative to tailored information.     

Reduced effects of pictorial distinctiveness on false memory following dynamic visual noise

High levels of false recognition for non-presented items typically occur following exposure to lists of associated words. These false recognition effects can be reduced by making the studied items more distinctive by the presentation of pictures during encoding. One explanation of this is that during recognition, participants expect or attempt to retrieve distinctive pictorial information in order to evaluate the study status of the test item. If this involves the retrieval and use of visual imagery, then interfering with imagery processing should reduce the effectiveness of pictorial information in false memory reduction. In the current experiment, visual-imagery processing was disrupted at retrieval by the use of dynamic visual noise (DVN). It was found that effects of DVN dissociated true from false memory. Memory for studied words was not influenced by the presence of an interfering noise field. However, false memory was increased and the effects of picture-induced distinctiveness was eliminated. DVN also increased false recollection and remember responses to unstudied items.     

Emotional intensity in episodic autobiographical memory and counterfactual thinking

Episodic counterfactual thoughts—imagined alternative ways in which personal past events might have occurred—are frequently accompanied by intense emotions. Here, participants recollected positive and negative autobiographical memories and then generated better and worse episodic counterfactual events from those memories. Our results suggest that the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event is significantly higher than but typically positively related to the emotional intensity while remembering/imagining the event. Furthermore, repeatedly simulating counterfactual events heightened the emotional intensity felt while simulating the counterfactual event. Finally, for both the emotional intensity accompanying the experience of remembering/imagining and the projected emotional intensity during the simulated remembered/imagined event, the emotional intensity of negative memories was greater than the emotional intensity of upward counterfactuals generated from them but lower than the emotional intensity of downward counterfactuals generated from them. These findings are discussed in relation to clinical work and functional theories of counterfactual thinking.     

An artificial intelligent counter

This article, using a counter as an example, explores a novel approach in constructing a cognitive system. The system is a paired memory system of “left and right brain” consisting of a number of memory units. The “left brain” is dedicated to the cognitive process of symbols, and the “right brain” to the representation of the symbols. The left and right subsystems are connected by bundles of internal communication signals. The paired memory system can learn facts and generalize concepts. Its cognitive capability is realized through the communication among these memory units at different cognitive levels within the system. The key claims in this paper are supported by empirical findings and theoretical principles. An AI counter is built and demonstrated in terms of concept learning and responding.     

Dissociation and memory suppression: A comparison of high and low dissociative individuals’ performance on the Think–No Think task

The present study examined whether high and low dissociative individuals differ in their ability to keep target stimuli out of their awareness (suppression) and how this relates to their memory of those targets during a later cued recall task. The prediction was that high dissociators display a general inability to focus attention and that their distractibility undermines successful suppression, thereby enhancing memory for suppressed items. College students with high (n = 35) and low (n = 33) scores on the Dissociative Experiences Scale participated in a Dutch version of Anderson and Green’s (2001) Think–No Think (TNT) task. Overall, a significant suppression effect emerged. However, no differences between high and low dissociators were observed. Thus, the present results do not confirm that dissociation is linked to heightened distractibility.