Direct reciprocity in animals: The roles of bonding and affective processes

The presence of direct reciprocity in animals is a debated topic, because, despite its evolutionary plausibility, it is believed to be uncommon. Some authors claim that stable reciprocal exchanges require sophisticated cognition which has acted as a constraint on its evolution across species. In contrast, a more recent trend of research has focused on the possibility that direct reciprocity occurs within long‐term bonds and relies on simple as well as more complex affective mechanisms such as emotional book‐keeping, rudimentary and higher forms of empathy, and inequity aversion, among others. First, we present evidence supporting the occurrence of long‐term reciprocity in the context of existing bonds in social birds and mammals. Second, we discuss the evidence for affective responses which, modulated by bonding, may underlie altruistic behaviours in different species. We conclude that the mechanisms that may underlie reciprocal exchanges are diverse, and that some act in interaction with bonding processes. From simple associative learning in social contexts, through emotional contagion and behavioural mimicry, to empathy and a sense of fairness, widespread and diverse social affective mechanisms may explain why direct reciprocity may not be a rare phenomenon among social vertebrates.     

A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases

The three most common responses to Taurek’s ‘numbers problem’ are saving the greater number, equal chance lotteries and weighted lotteries. Weighted lotteries have perhaps received the least support, having been criticized by Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Hirose ‘Fairness in Life and Death Cases’ (2007). This article considers these objections in turn, and argues that they do not succeed in refuting the fairness of a weighted lottery, which remains a potential solution to cases of conflict. Moreover, it shows how these responses actually lead to a new argument for weighted lotteries, appealing to fairness and Pareto-optimality.

Fair process revisited: Differential effects of interactional and procedural justice in the presence of social comparison information

The competing views of fairness theory ( [Folger and Cropanzano, 1998] and [Folger and Cropanzano, 2001]) and fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) were tested by studying the effects of interactional (IJ), procedural (PJ), and distributive justice (knowledge of others’ outcomes [OO]) upon evaluations of outcome fairness and customer satisfaction. The participants, 369 undergraduates, were randomly allocated to scenario-based experimental conditions. A 2 (IJ) × 2 (PJ) × 4 (OO) MANOVA and stepdown analyses provided evidence of “fair process” across all levels of distributive justice for outcome fairness (p<.001) and satisfaction (p<.001), but only in relation to the effects of interactional justice. No such effects were found for procedural justice. Implications for the development of justice theory are discussed.     

Self-interest and fairness in coalition formation: A social utility approach to understanding partner selection and payoff allocations in groups

In this chapter we present a social utility approach to coalition formation. The central tenet of our approach is that outcome allocations and partner selection in multiparty situations are affected by self-interest and fairness. Inspired by the social utility model we argue that the relative weight assigned to both components is affected by structural aspects of the situation and individual characteristics of the negotiators. We first investigate how coalition bargainers substantiate their coalition demands. We show that bargainers are self-serving in their choice of allocation rules, indicating that perceptions of fairness can be coloured by self-interest. Second, we investigate how the alignment of self-interest and fairness fosters the formation of coalitions that maximise the payoffs of its members. Finally, we present a series of experiments that expands the notion of being fair to those who are excluded from a coalition. We show that bargainers are reluctant to benefit themselves when this harms the outcomes of others and that this is dependent on personal factors (e.g., social value orientations), situational factors (e.g., the valence of outcomes), and whether bargainers negotiate in an interindividual or in an intergroup setting.     

A social-psychological perspective on tacit coordination: How it works,when it works, (and when it does not)

We present a programmatic line of experimental studies which focus on the how and when of tacit coordination (i.e., the phenomenon that people can successfully coordinate their decisions without communication). We investigated this phenomenon using different types of economic games (i.e., social dilemmas as well as coordination games). Our studies broadly cover three themes: (a) fairness as a coordination rule, (b) uncertainty and common understanding, (c) social information as a cue. By focusing on these themes we have obtained several new insights on the prerequisites and boundary conditions of tacit coordination. We conclude that tacit coordination is often facilitated by mutual adherence to social norms (e.g., fairness rules, rules of deference, etcetera), but that in order to employ such norms people need sufficient environmental and/or social information.     

Dynamic adjustments of cognitive control during economic decision making

Decision making in the Ultimatum game requires the resolution of conflicts between economic self-interest and fairness intuitions. Since cognitive control processes play an important role in conflict resolution, the present study examined how control processes that are triggered by conflicts between fairness and self-interest in unfair offers affect subsequent decisions in the Ultimatum game. Our results revealed that more unfair offers were accepted following previously unfair, compared to previously fair offers. Interestingly, the magnitude of this conflict adaptation effect correlated with the individual subjects' focus on economic self-interest. We concluded that conflicts between fairness and self-interest trigger cognitive control processes, which reinforce the focus on the current task goal.     

Financial deprivation selectively shifts moral standards and compromises moral decisions

Previous research suggests people firmly value moral standards. However, research has also shown that various factors can compromise moral behavior. Inspired by the recent financial turmoil, we investigate whether financial deprivation might shift people’s moral standards and consequently compromise their moral decisions. Across one pilot survey and five experiments, we find that people believe financial deprivation should not excuse immoral conduct; yet when people actually experience deprivation they seem to apply their moral standards more leniently. Thus, people who feel deprived tend to cheat more for financial gains and judge deprived moral offenders who cheat for financial gains less harshly. These effects are mediated by shifts in people’s moral standards: beliefs in whether deprivation is an acceptable reason for immorality. The effect of deprivation on immoral conduct diminishes when it is explicit that immoral conduct cannot help alleviate imbalances in deprived actors’ financial states, when financial deprivation seems fair or deserved, and when acting immorally seems unfair.     

The utility of a multifoci approach to the study of organizational justice: A meta-analytic investigation into the consideration of normative rules,moral accountability,bandwidth-fidelity,and social exchange

Multifoci justice pulls from research on social exchange theory to argue that despite the proliferation of rule sets in the literature (often referred to as the “types” of justice), individuals seek to hold some party accountable for the violation/upholding of such rules, and it is these parties (e.g., supervisors, the organization as a whole) that are most likely to be the recipients of attitudes and behaviors (i.e., target similarity effects). To explore these issues, we meta-analytically (k = 647, N = 235,682) compared the predictive validities of source- vs. type-based justice perceptions and found that (a) multifoci justice perceptions more strongly predicted outcomes directed at matched sources than did type-based justice perceptions, (b) multifoci justice perceptions more strongly predicted target similar than dissimilar outcomes, and (c) the relationships between multifoci justice perceptions and target similar outcomes were mediated by source-specific social exchange.     

Enticing for me but unfair to her: Can targeted pricing evoke socially conscious behavior?

Prior research shows that consumers stop purchasing from firms that treat them badly. In this research we show that consumers also resist firms that treat other consumers badly while favoring them. In three experiments, we demonstrate such social consciousness in the context of targeted pricing, where firms offer lower prices to new (versus old) customers. A significant proportion of consumers in our experiments give up money to resist the price-discriminating firm, especially when the discrimination is more salient or is not justified. Further, perceived unfairness mediates the relationship between the salience and justification of the pricing practice and consumer resistance.     

The two faces of cooperation: On the unique role of HEXACO Agreeableness for forgiveness versus retaliation

Cooperation requires a tendency for fairness (versus exploitation) and for forgiveness (versus retaliation). Exactly these tendencies are distinguished in the HEXACO model of personality, which attributes the former to Honesty-Humility (HH) and the latter to Agreeableness (AG). However, empirical dissociations between these basic traits have primarily supported the substantial and unique role of HH, whereas the picture for AG has remained somewhat inconclusive. To overcome limitations of prior studies, we introduce an economic paradigm, the Uncostly Retaliation Game, to more conclusively test the unique role of AG for forgiveness versus retaliation. In two fully incentivized experiments, we found that AG (and not HH) indeed negatively predicts retaliation decisions in the face of prior exploitation. Furthermore, the results confirm that the paradigm provides a more direct measure of retaliation (beyond individual payoff-concerns and social preferences such as inequality aversion) than previous measures and that it may thus serve future investigations into the reactive aspect of cooperation.