The Developmental Origin of Metacognition

We explain metacognition as a management of cognitive resources that does not necessitate algorithmic strategies or metarepresentation. When pragmatic, world‐directed actions cannot reduce the distance to the goal, agents engage in epistemic action directed at cognition. Such actions often are physical and involve other people, and so are open to observation. Taking a dynamic systems approach to development, we suggest that implicit and perceptual metacognition emerges from dyadic reciprocal interaction. Early intersubjectivity allows infants to internalize and construct rudimentary strategies for monitoring and control of their own and others' cognitions by emotion and attention. The functions of initiating, maintaining, and achieving turns make proto‐conversation a productive platform for developing metacognition. It enables caregiver and infant to create shared routines for epistemic actions that permit training of metacognitive skills. The adult is of double epistemic use to the infant—as a teacher that comments on and corrects the infant's efforts, and as the infant's cognitive resource in its own right. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Frequency and Nature of Rumination in Chronic Depression: A Preliminary Study

This study explores the phenomenological experience of rumination in a sample of 22 chronically depressed people and looks at the extent to which it is consistent with theoretical ideas. The findings indicate that, on average, depressed people ruminate about at least two different topics, and that there is wide variability in how long each episode lasts. Rumination is a complex process frequently involving imagery as well as verbal thoughts and is almost invariably associated with multiple emotions. Although there was some evidence for stop rules being involved, most individuals attributed ending a period of rumination to distraction, whether external or internally generated.     

Experiential Avoidance as an Emotion Regulatory Function: An Empirical Analysis of Experiential Avoidance in Relation to Behavioral Avoidance,Cognitive Reappraisal,and Response Suppression

The purpose of the present study was to empirically test the suggestion that experiential avoidance in an emotion regulation context is best understood as an emotion regulatory function of topographically distinct strategies. To do this we examined whether a measure of experiential avoidance could statistically account for the effects of emotion regulation strategies intervening at different points of the emotion-generative process as conceptualized by Gross' (1998) process model of emotion regulation. The strategies under examination were behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression. The specific hypotheses to be tested were (1) that behavioral avoidance, cognitive reappraisal, and response suppression would statistically mediate the differences in measures of psychological well-being between a clinical and nonclinical sample, but that (2) these indirect effects would be reduced to nonsignificant levels when controlling for differences in experiential avoidance. The results provide clear support for the first hypothesis with regard to all the studied strategies. In contrast to the second hypothesis, the results showed the predicted outcome pattern only for the response-focused strategy “response suppression” and not for cognitive reappraisal or behavioral avoidance. The results are interpreted and discussed in relation to theories on experiential avoidance and emotion regulation.     

杏仁核对感觉刺激的情绪性加工:自动化过程和注意调控过程的整合

利用有限的认知资源应对多变的环境刺激,选择性注意和情绪加工一个重要的共同机制是优先化关键信息的加工。尽管情绪性刺激(特别是威胁刺激)能够影响注意资源的分配,但一些关键脑区(如杏仁核)的对情绪性刺激的加工是自动化过程还是受到注意调节一直是个有争议的问题。最新的结合高时间分辨率和高空间分辨率的神经生理记录研究表明,情绪加工的重要核团,杏仁核,对情绪性刺激的加工包含早期快速的不依赖于注意资源和认知加工负荷的自动化加工成分和晚期受到额-顶叶皮层自上而下的注意调控成分,这种功能整合证实杏仁核情绪性加工存在并行的皮层下和皮层通路。     

Emotion regulation,disgust sensitivity,and psychophysiological responses to a disgust-inducing film

Abstract

Using a disgust-inducing film, Gross (1998) showed that the instruction to suppress mimic expression (suppression) triggered physiological arousal, while the instruction to think about the film in order to adopt a detached and unemotional attitude (reappraisal) reduced affective strain compared to a condition instructing subjects simply to watch the film (watch). The present paper investigates, if disgust sensitivity has a moderating role in this context. Physiological, subjective, and behavior responses were recorded in 120 males divided according to high/low disgust sensitivity who were exposed to the disgust-inducing film used by Gross. The instruction effects reported by Gross could not be replicated. However, high disgust-sensitive subjects were more physiologically and emotionally aroused than low disgust-sensitive subjects. Interactions between disgust sensitivity and the three film instructions can possibly be traced back to a repressive coping style of subjects with low disgust sensitivity.     

Understanding the multiframe caricature advantage for recognizing facial composites

Eyewitnesses often construct a “composite” face of a person they saw commit a crime, a picture that police use to identify suspects. We described a technique (Frowd, Bruce, Ross, McIntyre, & Hancock, 2007) based on facial caricature to facilitate recognition of these images: Correct naming substantially improves when composites are seen with progressive positive caricature, where distinctive information is enhanced, and then with progressive negative caricature, the opposite. Over the course of four experiments, the underpinnings of this mechanism were explored. Positive-caricature levels were found to be largely responsible for improving naming of composites, with some benefit from negative-caricature levels. Also, different frame-presentation orders (forward, reverse, random, repeated) facilitated equivalent naming benefit relative to static composites. Overall, the data indicate that composites are usually constructed as negative caricatures.     

The recognition of mental states from dynamic and static facial expressions

The ability to recognize mental states from facial expressions is essential for effective social interaction. However, previous investigations of mental state recognition have used only static faces so the benefit of dynamic information for recognizing mental states remains to be determined. Experiment 1 found that dynamic faces produced higher levels of recognition accuracy than static faces, suggesting that the additional information contained within dynamic faces can facilitate mental state recognition. Experiment 2 explored the facial regions that are important for providing dynamic information in mental state displays. This involved using a new technique to freeze motion in a particular facial region (eyes, nose, mouth) so that this region was static while the remainder of the face was naturally moving. Findings showed that dynamic information in the eyes and the mouth was important and the region of influence depended on the mental state. Processes involved in mental state recognition are discussed.     

Top-down control settings and the attentional blink: Evidence for nonspatial contingent capture

Previous studies have shown that spatial attention can be “captured” by irrelevant events, but only if the eliciting stimulus matches top-down attentional control settings. Here we explore whether similar principles hold for nonspatial attentional selection. Subjects searched for a coloured target letter embedded in an RSVP stream of letters inside a box centred on fixation. On critical trials, a distractor, consisting of a brief change in the colour of the box, occurred at various temporal lags prior to the target. In Experiment 1, the distractor produced a decrement in target detection, but only when it matched the target colour. Experiments 2 and 3 provide evidence that this effect does not reflect masking or the dispersion of spatial attention. The results establish that (1) nonspatial selection is subject to “capture”, (2) such capture is contingent on top-down attentional control settings, and (3) control settings for nonspatial capture can vary in specificity.     

The roles of leader emotion management and team conflict for team members' personal initiative: A multilevel perspective

Employees' personal initiative (i.e., their active and future-oriented engagement at work) is of high relevance to organizations that strive for innovation and competitiveness. To better understand its drivers and diminishers, the present study refers to Affective Events Theory and examines the impact of leader emotion management, team conflict, and affective well-being on personal initiative. Data from 300 members of 59 work teams in Germany were gathered from multiple sources at three points in time over the course of 2 weeks. Multilevel analyses indicated that leader emotion management positively affected team members' personal initiative and that this effect was mediated by team members' affective well-being. Data also revealed a contrasting negative indirect effect of task conflict within the team on team members' personal initiative via team members' affective well-being. The study's results suggest that the improvement of leaders' emotion management as well as the establishment of work conditions and experiences that foster affective well-being should be seriously considered by organizations wishing to facilitate personal initiative in team settings.     

Love: gloriously amoral and arational

I argue that an evaluational conception of love collides with the way we value love. That way allows that love has causes, but not reasons, and it recognizes and celebrates a love that refuses to justify itself. Love has unjustified selectivity, due to its arbitrary causes. That imposes a non-tradability norm. A love for reasons, rational love or evaluational love would be propositional, and it therefore allows that the people we love are tradable commodities. A moralized conception of love is no less committed to treating those we love as tradable commodities; it is just that they are tradable moral commodities. An evaluative criterion of adequacy, I suggest, encourages the opposite view – a non-rational and non-evaluational concept of love. Such a love can set up partial obligations, which may even demand that one sacrifice one's life. Only a love that has causes but not reasons can have the kind of value that we think love has, and thus it would only be rational to pursue and foster such a love.