Decoding facial blends of emotion: Visual field,attentional and hemispheric biases

Most clinical research assumes that modulation of facial expressions is lateralized predominantly across the right-left hemiface. However, social psychological research suggests that facial expressions are organized predominantly across the upper-lower face. Because humans learn to cognitively control facial expression for social purposes, the lower face may display a false emotion, typically a smile, to enable approach behavior. In contrast, the upper face may leak a person’s true feeling state by producing a brief facial blend of emotion, i.e. a different emotion on the upper versus lower face. Previous studies from our laboratory have shown that upper facial emotions are processed preferentially by the right hemisphere under conditions of directed attention if facial blends of emotion are presented tachistoscopically to the mid left and right visual fields. This paper explores how facial blends are processed within the four visual quadrants. The results, combined with our previous research, demonstrate that lower more so than upper facial emotions are perceived best when presented to the viewer’s left and right visual fields just above the horizontal axis. Upper facial emotions are perceived best when presented to the viewer’s left visual field just above the horizontal axis under conditions of directed attention. Thus, by gazing at a person’s left ear, which also avoids the social stigma of eye-to-eye contact, one’s ability to decode facial expressions should be enhanced.     

Are the windows to the soul the same in the East and West? Cultural differences in using the eyes and mouth as cues to recognize emotions in Japan and the United States

The current research investigated the hypothesis that, depending on an individual’s cultural background, facial cues in different parts of the face are weighted differently when interpreting emotions. Given that the eyes are more difficult to control than the mouth when people express emotions, we predicted that individuals in cultures where emotional subduction is the norm (such as Japan) would focus more strongly on the eyes than the mouth when interpreting others’ emotions. By contrast, we predicted that people in cultures where overt emotional expression is the norm (such as the US) would tend to interpret emotions based on the position of the mouth, because it is the most expressive part of the face. This hypothesis was confirmed in two studies, one using illustrated faces, and one using edited facial expressions from real people, in which emotional expressions in the eyes and mouth were independently manipulated. Implications for our understanding of cross-cultural psychology, as well of the psychology of emotional interpretation, are discussed.     

Combined reasoning by automated cooperation

Different reasoning systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and often it is useful to combine these systems to gain as much as possible from their strengths and retain as little as possible from their weaknesses. Of particular interest is the integration of first-order and higher-order techniques. First-order reasoning systems, on the one hand, have reached considerable strength in some niches, but in many areas of mathematics they still cannot reliably solve relatively simple problems, for example, when reasoning about sets, relations, or functions. Higher-order reasoning systems, on the other hand, can solve problems of this kind automatically. But the complexity inherent in their calculi prevents them from solving a whole range of problems. However, while many problems cannot be solved by any one system alone, they can be solved by a combination of these systems.We present a general agent-based methodology for integrating different reasoning systems. It provides a generic integration framework which facilitates the cooperation between diverse reasoners, but can also be refined to enable more efficient, specialist integrations. We empirically evaluate its usefulness, effectiveness and efficiency by case studies involving the integration of first-order and higher-order automated theorem provers, computer algebra systems, and model generators.     

Conceptual and physical object qualities contribute differently to motor affordances

Priming studies have demonstrated that an object’s intrinsic and extrinsic qualities (size, orientation) influence subsequent motor behavior thus suggesting that these object qualities ‘afford’ actions that are congruent with the prime. We present four experiments that aim to evaluate the relative effect of conceptual and physical object qualities on action priming. In Experiment 1 equally graspable known and unknown tools are presented as primes. In Experiment 2 the primes depict high versus low graspable unfamiliar tools, and in Experiments 3 and 4 we present simple graspable shapes versus high graspable unfamiliar or familiar tools respectively. In all experiments the (unrelated) task consists of a timed motor response to the direction of a centrally placed arrow that is superimposed on the prime. Whereas tool familiarity reveals no significant difference on reaction time (Exp 1), responses to high graspable unfamiliar tools (Exp 2) and simple graspable shapes (Exps 3 and 4) are significantly faster. We conclude that motor affordances are most readily determined by object qualities that depend on the object’s physical appearance provided by visual information. Conceptual information about the stimuli, such as semantic category or stored knowledge about its function and associated movements, does not appear to produce detectable effects of action priming in this paradigm.     

Adolescents’ preferences for sexual dimorphism are influenced by relative exposure to male and female faces

Exposure to a particular population of faces can increase ratings of the normality and attractiveness of similar-looking faces. Such exposure can also refine the perceived boundaries of that face population, such that other faces are more readily perceived as dissimilar. We predicted that relatively less exposure to opposite-sex faces, as experienced by children at single-sex compared with mixed-sex schools, would decrease ratings of the attractiveness of sexual dimorphism in opposite-sex faces (that is, boys at single-sex schools would show a decreased preference for feminised faces, and girls at single-sex schools would show a decreased preference for masculinised faces). Consistent with this prediction, girls at single-sex compared with mixed-sex schools demonstrated significantly stronger preferences for facial femininity in both male and female faces. Boys at single-sex compared with mixed-sex schools demonstrated marginally stronger preferences for facial masculinity in male faces, but did not differ in their ratings of female faces. These effects were attenuated among some single-sex school pupils by the presence of adolescent opposite-sex siblings. These data add to the evidence that long-term exposure to a particular face population can influence judgements of other faces, and contribute to our understanding of the factors leading to individual differences in face preferences.     

Do we listen to advice just because we paid for it? The impact of advice cost on its use

When facing a decision, people often rely on advice received from others. Previous studies have shown that people tend to discount others’ opinions. Yet, such discounting varies according to several factors. This paper isolates one of these factors: the cost of advice. Specifically, three experiments investigate whether the cost of advice, independent of its quality, affects how people use advice. The studies use the Judge–Advisor System (JAS) to investigate whether people value advice from others more when it costs money than when it is free, and examine the psychological processes that could account for this effect. The results show that people use paid advice significantly more than free advice and suggest that this effect is due to the same forces that have been documented in the literature to explain the sunk costs fallacy. Implications for circumstances under which people value others’ opinions are discussed.     

Feelings of control: Contingency determines experience of action

The experience of causation is a pervasive product of the human mind. Moreover, the experience of causing an event alters subjective time: actions are perceived as temporally shifted towards their effects [Haggard, P., Clark, S., & Kalogeras, J. (2002). Voluntary action and conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4), 382-385]. This temporal shift depends partly on advance prediction of the effects of action, and partly on inferential “postdictive” explanations of sensory effects of action. We investigated whether a single factor of statistical contingency could explain both these aspects of causal experience. We studied the time at which people perceived a simple manual action to occur, when statistical contingency indicated a causal relation between action and effect, and when no such relation was indicated. Both predictive and inferential “postdictive” shifts in the time of action depended on strong contingency between action and effect. The experience of agency involves a process of causal learning based on statistical contingency.     

Studying action representation in children via motor imagery

The use of motor imagery is a widely used experimental paradigm for the study of cognitive aspects of action planning and control in adults. Furthermore, there are indications that motor imagery provides a window into the process of action representation. These notions complement internal model theory suggesting that such representations allow predictions (estimates) about the mapping of the self to parameters of the external world; processes that enable successful planning and execution of action. The ability to mentally represent action is important to the development of motor control. This paper presents a critical review of motor imagery research conducted with children (typically developing and special populations) with focus on its merits and possible shortcomings in studying action representation. Included in the review are age-related findings, possible brain structures involved, experimental paradigms, and recommendations for future work. The merits of this review are associated with the apparent increasing attraction for using and studying motor imagery to understand the developmental aspects of action processing in children.     

The effects of social anxiety and depression on the evaluation of facial crowds

Facial crowds of emotion connoting approval or criticism are linked to the fears of socially anxious individuals. We examined evaluation ratings and decision latencies of mixed facial displays by individuals with generalized social phobia (GSPs, n = 18), individuals with comorbid depression and GSP (COMs, n = 18), and normal controls (CONs, n = 18). First, we postulated that GSPs will assign more negative ratings to predominantly disapproving audiences as compared to CONs, and that GSPs will be faster in their evaluation of these audiences (negative bias hypothesis). Second, we expected depression, but not social anxiety, to be associated with diminished positive evaluation of audiences containing predominantly happy expressions and with a slower processing of such positive cues (the impaired positivity hypothesis). Results supported the negative bias hypothesis, and provided partial support for the impaired positivity hypothesis. The importance of examining the processing of complex non-verbal cues in social anxiety and in depression is discussed.     

The development of facial emotion recognition: the role of configural information

The development of children's ability to recognize facial emotions and the role of configural information in this development were investigated. In the study, 100 5-, 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds and 26 adults needed to recognize the emotion displayed by upright and upside-down faces. The same participants needed to recognize the emotion displayed by the top half of an upright or upside-down face that was or was not aligned with a bottom half that displayed another emotion. The results showed that the ability to recognize facial emotion develops with age, with a developmental course that depends on the emotion to be recognized. Moreover, children at all ages and adults exhibited both an inversion effect and a composite effect, suggesting that children rely on configural information to recognize facial emotions.