Epistemic buck-passing and the interpersonal view of testimony

Two ideas shape the epistemology of testimony. One is that testimony provides a unique kind of knowledge. The other is that testimonial knowledge is a social achievement. In traditional terms, those who affirm these ideas are anti-reductionists, and those who deny them are reductionists. There is increasing interest, however, in the possibility of affirming these ideas without embracing anti-reductionism. Thus, Sanford Goldberg uses the idea of epistemic buck-passing to argue that even reductionists can accept the uniqueness of testimonial knowledge, and Jennifer Lackey gives both speaker and hearer an essential role in testimonial justification, rejecting both reductionism and anti-reductionism in favor of what she calls dualism. After distinguishing a weaker and a stronger notion of buck-passing, we show how anti-reductionists can use the stronger notion to motivate their position, and to answer Goldberg’s and Lackey’s challenges.     

The inner witness

The inner witness is a mechanism that develops in response to a reasonable experience of infantile helplessness, the resulting maternal impingement and the presence of a sufficient experience of a third. Being crucial to the subject's capacity to shift between the first person and the third person of experience, it also has an essential role in coping with trauma. Three types of testimonial narrative are differentiated in terms of the presence of the inner witness in their syntax. The first mode is one in which the inner witness is accessible, enabling the imaginary shift between the voice of the victim and the voice of the witness. The second mode, which remains a 'first-person' mode of report, preserves and enacts the traumatic memories and the traumatic features. The third, psychotic mode attacks both the first and the third person, separating the subject from both his memories and his sense of selfhood. This mode can evolve as a reaction to an adult massive trauma, but is more likely to emerge as a result of early traumatization. The above ideas and their implications for recovery are illustrated by a case study and through a reading of Samuel Beckett's Waiting for Godot.     

Effects of mothers’ conversation style and receipt of misinformation on children's event reports

Can memory sharing conversations with mothers lead to errors in children's event memory when mothers are exposed to misinformation about what their children experienced and does this effect vary as a function of maternal memory-sharing style? Mothers were exposed to a false suggestion about a non-shared event and then discussed that event with their children. When later interviewed, those children whose mothers were provided this misinformation were likely to wrongly report experiencing activities consistent with the maternal suggestion and embellish their reports of these activities with elaborative detail. Moreover, children whose mothers spoke in a highly elaborative manner were more likely to recall occurrences in line with the maternal suggestion and provided more fictitious narrative detail describing non-occurring-but-suggested information than did children whose mothers used a less elaborative style. These findings suggest that when mothers hold false beliefs about a non-shared event, an elaborative maternal style is associated with an increase in children's false reports reflecting maternal beliefs.     

Locke on testimony

ABSTRACT

There is good reason to regard John Locke’s treatment of testimony as perhaps the most important of the early modern period. It is sophisticated, well developed, pioneering, and seems to have given shape to the later debate that would occur between Hume and Reid. I attempt to do three things in this essay. First, I argue that Hume’s landmark treatment of testimony is an appropriation of that developed by Locke. Second, I suggest that understanding Locke’s view of testimony is of critical importance to Locke’s broader epistemology. Finally, I claim that Locke’s reflection on testimony is valuable in its own right in that it is not confined to isolating the conditions under which testimonial beliefs are warranted or justified. Locke’s interest is, rather, in a variety of doxastic states, or degrees of assent, that testimony may serve to ground.     

Searching for the sequential line-up advantage: A distinctiveness explanation

Signal Detection models as well as the Two-High-Threshold model (2HTM) have been used successfully as measurement models in recognition tasks to disentangle memory performance and response biases. A popular method in recognition memory is to elicit confidence judgements about the presumed old/new status of an item, allowing for the easy construction of ROCs. Since the 2HTM assumes fewer latent memory states than response options are available in confidence ratings, the 2HTM has to be extended by a mapping function which models individual rating scale usage. Unpublished data from 2 experiments in Bröder and Schütz (2009) validate the core memory parameters of the model, and 3 new experiments show that the response mapping parameters are selectively affected by manipulations intended to affect rating scale use, and this is independent of overall old/new bias. Comparisons with SDT show that both models behave similarly, a case that highlights the notion that both modelling approaches can be valuable (and complementary) elements in a researcher's toolbox.     

Emotional discussions reduce memory recall

People often discuss events they have seen and these discussions can influence later recollections. We investigated the effects of factual, emotional, and free retelling discussion on memory recollections of individuals who have witnessed an event. Participants were shown a video, made an initial individual recall, participated in one of the three retelling conditions (emotional versus factual versus free) or a control condition, and then recalled the event individually again. Participants in the factual and free retelling conditions reported more items not previously recalled than participants in the control condition did, while the emotional condition did not show the same advantage. Participants in all three retelling conditions failed to report more previously recalled items as compared with the control condition. Finally, a memory conformity effect was observed for all three retelling conditions. These findings suggest that eyewitnesses’ discussions may influence the accuracy of subsequent memory reports, especially when these discussions are focused on emotional details and thoughts.     

Evidence of differential performance on simultaneous and sequential lineups for individuals with autism-spectrum traits

Given the impaired facial recognition of autistic individuals, we examined whether certain autism-spectrum traits affected eyewitness identification performance in a general adult population. In a sample of 120 individuals, levels of autism-spectrum traits were examined in relation to performance on simultaneous vs. sequential lineups using a signal detection paradigm. For simultaneous lineups, total Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) scores and scores on the excessive Attention to detail subscale were related to fewer hits and a more conservative response criterion. Attention to detail interacted with lineup type in that it was significantly related to improved discrimination accuracy and a less conservative response criterion in sequential lineups, but with impaired discrimination accuracy and a more conservative response criterion in simultaneous lineups. Higher AQ scores on the Attention switching subscale resulted in fewer hits, lower discrimination accuracy, and a more conservative response criterion with sequential lineups. Additionally, partial disguises led to more false alarms but not decreased accuracy. More thorough investigations of the effect of lineup type on identifications are needed before policy changes are recommended.     

Trust as a Meta‐Emotion

The aim of this article is to present trust as a meta‐emotion, such that it is an emotion that precedes first‐order emotions. It examines how trust can be considered a meta‐emotion by establishing criteria for identifying trust as a meta‐emotion. How trust plays out differently in aesthetic and ordinary contexts can provide another mode for investigating meta‐emotions. The article illustrates how it is possible to recognize these meta‐emotions in narratives. Finally, it presents one of the aims of trust, sharing knowledge between agents, when someone who provides testimony shares knowledge in an epistemic trust process with others. It shows a relationship construction between subjects and objects thanks to the trust, a meta‐emotion that represents emotional ties between subjects to achieve another emotion.     

False rumors and true belief: Memory processes underlying children’s errant reports of rumored events

Previous research has shown that overhearing an errant rumor—either from an adult or from peers—about an earlier experience can lead children to make detailed false reports. This study investigates the extent to which such accounts are driven by changes in children’s memory representations or merely social demands that encourage the reporting of rumored information. This was accomplished by (a) using a warning manipulation that eliminated social pressures to report an earlier heard rumor and (b) examining the qualitative characteristics of children’s false narratives of a rumored-but-nonexperienced event. Findings indicated that overheard rumors can induce sensory and contextual characteristics in memory that can lead children to develop genuine false beliefs in seeing rumored-but-nonexperienced occurrences. Such constructive tendencies were especially likely among 3- and 4-year-olds (relative to 5- and 6-year-olds) and when rumors were picked up from peers during natural social interactions (relative to when they were planted by an adult).