视错觉产生的神经机制

传统认知心理学对视觉错觉的解释存在局限性。认知神经科学在移动错觉、轮廓错觉、颜色错觉研究中的一批新发现,可以综合并概括为一种视错觉发生的神经关联重叠机制。该重叠性表现为错觉与相应的真实知觉具有本质上相同的神经活动,即错觉与真实知觉享有共同的神经关联,没有只对错觉反应而不对真实知觉反应的特定神经关联物,而错觉神经活动的特别之处是在真实知觉发生的相同脑区有更强烈的激活     

Attenuation of size illusion effect in dual-task conditions

We over-estimate or under-estimate the size of an object depending its background structure (e.g., the Ebbinghaus illusion). Since deciding and preparing to execute a movement is based on perception, motor performance deteriorates due to the faulty perception of information. Therefore, such cognitive process can be a source of a failure in motor performance, although we feel in control of our performance through conscious cognitive activities. If a movement execution process can avoid distraction by the illusion-deceived conscious process, the effect of the visual illusion on visuomotor performance can be eliminated or attenuated. This study investigated this hypothesis by examining two task performances developed for a target figure inducing the Ebbinghaus size illusion: showing visually perceived size of an object by index finger-thumb aperture (size-matching), and reaching out for the object and pretending to grasp it (pantomimed grasping). In these task performances, the size of the index finger-thumb aperture becomes larger or smaller than the actual size, in accordance with the illusion effect. This study examined whether the size illusion effect can be weakened or eliminated by the dual-task condition where actors’ attention to judge the object’s size and to produce the aperture size is interrupted. 16 participants performed the size-matching and pantomimed grasping tasks while simultaneously executing a choice reaction task (dual task) or without doing so (single task). Using an optical motion capture system, the size-illusion effect was analyzed in terms of the aperture size, which indicates the visually perceived object size. The illusion effect was attenuated in the dual task condition, compared to it in the single task condition. This suggests that the dual task condition modulated attention focus on the aperture movement and therefore the aperture movement was achieved with less distraction caused by illusory information.     

Your life satisfaction will change more than you think: A comment on Harris and Busseri (2019)

Harris and Busseri (2019) examined the changes in life satisfaction people predicted vs. experienced for 30-years based on the three waves of the Midlife in the United States (MIDUS) survey. They conclude that “Contrary to the EOHI [end of history illusion], most individuals either were accurate or anticipated too much change into the future, rather than too little” (abstract). Examining these same data we arrive at the opposite conclusion, that people systematically underestimate future changes to their life satisfaction. The discrepancy arises because Harris and Busseri find stability in the average life satisfaction across the entire sample, while we find instability in life satisfaction within individuals. Both of these can happen. Although the average altitude of all the elevators in a skyscraper is remarkably stable over time, the altitude of each elevator changes by the second.     

Sustained perceptual invisibility of solid shapes following contour adaptation to partial outlines

Contour adaptation (CA) is a recently described paradigm that renders otherwise salient visual stimuli temporarily perceptually invisible. Here we investigate whether this illusion can be exploited to study visual awareness. We found that CA can induce seconds of sustained invisibility following similarly long periods of uninterrupted adaptation. Furthermore, even fragmented adaptors are capable of producing CA, with the strength of CA increasing monotonically as the adaptors encompass a greater fraction of the stimulus outline. However, different types of adaptor patterns, such as distinctive shapes or illusory contours, produce equivalent levels of CA suggesting that the main determinants of CA are low-level stimulus characteristics, with minimal modulation by higher-order visual processes. Taken together, our results indicate that CA has desirable properties for studying visual awareness, including the production of prolonged periods of perceptual dissociation from stimulation as well as parametric dependencies of that dissociation on a host of stimulus parameters.     

The double-edged pen: Omnipotent fantasies in the creativity and addictions of Stephen King

The legendary debate over whether a connection between creativity and addictions exists is one that is shrouded in mystery and intrigue, but also one that continuously returns to the circuitous metaphor of the chicken and the egg. In an effort to better understand nuances in the relationship between creativity and addictions, this paper examines the life of Stephen King, and the omnipotent fantasies from which both his creative processes and addictive behaviours emerged. Since the early twentieth century, psychodynamic thinkers have highlighted omnipotent fantasies as a psychological force driving creative processes as efforts towards personal transformation. Similarly, numerous psychodynamic theories have highlighted omnipotent fantasies as playing a cardinal role in the psychological processes that propel substance abuse. And yet, the construct of omnipotence has yet to be examined as a theoretical bridge to bind such theories of creativity and substance abuse together. While fostering personal meaning and self-transformation when manifested in his creative writing processes, omnipotent fantasies have also lead Stephen King down a precarious path of addictive behaviours. Through a narrative analysis of the life of Stephen King, who has written in great depth about both his creativity and substance abuse, I will illustrate how omnipotent fantasies often shape and foster both healthy, creative processes towards growth and maladaptive, addictive impulses towards self-destruction.     

Illusory line motion is not caused by object-differentiating mechanisms or endogenous attention

Christie and Klein [2005. Does attention cause illusory line motion? Perception & Psychophysics, 67(6), 1032–1043] published line motion ratings consistent with illusory line motion (ILM) after peripheral endogenous cues but not central arrow cues. When attention was directed endogenously on the basis of the shape of one of two peripherally presented objects, participants reported small, but significant motion away from the attended object, and this was attributed to participant bias, or to a peripherally directed object-based attention system endogenously recruited to differentiate the peripheral shapes. By using a unique cueing method with identical peripheral markers, but still allowing them to act as cues, the findings of Christie and Klein Experiment 4 were replicated. This reduces the likelihood that object discrimination or object attention mechanisms are responsible for the reported ILM-like effects.     

Contingency bias in probability judgement may arise from ambiguity regarding additional causes

We tested whether preventive and generative reasoning processes are symmetrical by keeping the training and testing of preventive (inhibitory) and generative (excitatory) causal cues as similar as possible. In Experiment 1, we extinguished excitors and inhibitors in a blocking design, in which each extinguished cause was presented in compound with a novel cause, with the same outcome occurring following the compound and following the novel cause alone. With this novel extinction procedure, the inhibitory cues seemed more likely to lose their properties than the excitatory cues. In Experiment 2, we investigated blocking of excitatory and inhibitory causes and found similar blocking effects. Taken together, these results suggest that acquisition of excitation and inhibition is similar, but that inhibition is more liable to extinguish with our extinction procedure. In addition, we used a variable outcome, and this enabled us to test the predictions of an inferential reasoning account about what happens when the outcome level is at its minimum or maximum (De Houwer, Beckers, & Glautier, 2002). We discuss the predictions of this inferential account, Rescorla and Wagner's (1972) model, and a connectionist model—the auto-associator.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Eye movements during recall of aversive memory decreases conditioned fear

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders typically involves exposure to the conditioned stimulus (CS). Despite its status as an effective and primary treatment, many patients do not show clinical improvement or relapse. Contemporary learning theory suggests that treatment may be optimized by adding techniques that aim at revaluating the aversive consequence (US) of the feared stimulus. This study tested whether US devaluation via a dual task – imagining the US while making eye movements – decreases conditioned fear. Following fear acquisition one group recalled the US while making eye movements (EM) and one group merely recalled the US (RO). Next, during a test phase, all participants were re-presented the CSs. Dual tasking, relative to the control condition, decreased memory vividness and emotionality. Moreover, only in the dual task condition reductions were observed in self-reported fear, US expectancy, and CS unpleasantness, but not in skin conductance responses. Findings provide the first evidence that the dual task decreases conditioned fear and suggest it may be a valuable addition to exposure therapy.     

Body ownership and beyond: Connections between cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology

During the past few decades, two disciplines that rarely come together—namely, cognitive neuroscience and linguistic typology—have been generating remarkably similar results regarding the representational domain of personal possessions. Research in cognitive neuroscience indicates that although the core self is grounded in body ownership, the extended self encompasses a variety of noncorporeal possessions, especially those that play a key role in defining one’s identity. And research in linguistic typology indicates that many languages around the world contain a distinct grammatical construction for encoding what is commonly called “inalienable” possession—a category of owned objects that almost always includes body parts, but that also tends to include several other kinds of personally relevant entities. Both of these independent lines of investigation are summarized, and a number of interdisciplinary connections between them are discussed.