排序方式: 共有28条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
21.
Baron Reed 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):91-104
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario:
because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is
in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is
another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that
makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies
equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
相似文献
Baron ReedEmail: |
22.
Michael B. Gill 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(2):215-234
23.
John Turri 《Synthese》2009,170(1):147-153
I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper
divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This
puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 相似文献
24.
Mikkel Gerken 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):87-96
There is widespread suspicion that there is a principled conflict between epistemic internalism and content externalism (or
anti-individualism). Despite the prominence of this suspicion, it has rarely been substantiated by explicit arguments. However,
Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup have recently provided a prima facie argument concluding that internalism about knowledge
and externalism about content are incompatible. I criticize the incompatibilist argument and conclude that the purported incompatibility
is, at best, prima facie. This is, in part, because several steps in the argument are faulty and, in part, because there are
promising responses available to the compatibilists.
相似文献
Mikkel GerkenEmail: |
25.
A. David Smith 《Synthese》2008,160(3):313-333
It is argued that Husserl was an “externalist” in at least one sense. For it is argued that Husserl held that genuinely perceptual
experiences—that is to say, experiences that are of some real object in the world—differ intrinsically, essentially and as
a kind from any hallucinatory experiences. There is, therefore, no neutral “content” that such perceptual experiences share
with hallucinations, differing from them only over whether some additional non-psychological condition holds or not. In short,
it is argued that Husserl was a “disjunctivist”. In addition, it is argued that Husserl held that the individual object of
any experience, perceptual or hallucinatory, is essential to and partly constitutive of that experience. The argument focuses
on three aspects of Husserl’s thought: his account of intentional objects, his notion of horizon, and his account of reality. 相似文献
26.
Harold Langsam 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):79-101
In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not
a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification.
The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way;
since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified
iff a relevant possible instance of conscious deliberation would endorse the belief. The importance of conscious deliberation
stems from its role in guiding us in acquiring true beliefs: whereas the externalist holds that if we wish to acquire true
beliefs, we have to begin by assuming that some of our usual methods of belief formation generally provide us with true beliefs, the internalist holds that if
we form beliefs by conscious deliberation, we can be conscious of reasons for thinking that our beliefs are true. Conscious deliberation can make us conscious of reasons because it proceeds via rational
intuitions. I argue that despite the fallibility of rational intuition, rational intuitions do enable us to become conscious
of reasons for belief.
相似文献
Harold LangsamEmail: |
27.
In this paper, we challenge Jaegwon Kim’s version of neural reductionism according to which the causal powers of mental properties
are pre-empted by those of neural properties. Using empirical and theoretical developments from the field of embedded cognition,
we articulate and defend a notion of process externalism that extends Clark and Chalmers’ notion of an extended mind. We argue
that process externalism undermines one of Kim’s key premises leading to the alternative conclusion that mental causation
cannot be reduced to neural causation. Instead, mental properties have their own new causal powers just like other scientifically
established macroproperties. 相似文献
28.
Jeff Behrends 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(2):159-178
Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious. 相似文献