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1.
Dan Zahavi 《Synthese》2008,160(3):355-374
The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with
the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue
that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism,
and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements
in Husserl’s transcendental idealism, including his rejection of representationalism and metaphysical realism, is shared with
a number of prominent contemporary defenders of an externalist view on the mind. Ultimately, however, it will be suggested
that the very alternative between internalism and externalism—an alternative based on the division between inner and outer—might
be inapplicable when it comes to phenomenological conceptions of the mind–world relation. 相似文献
2.
Louis E. Loeb 《Synthese》2006,152(3):321-338
Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference is justified is part of the data to be explained. Bad argument is therefore excluded as the cause of inductive inference; and there is no good argument to cause it. Does this reinstate the problem of induction, undermining Hume’s own assumption that induction is justified? It does so only if justification must derive from “reason”, from the availability of a cogent argument. Hume rejects this internalist thesis; induction’s favorable epistemic status derives from features of custom, the mechanism that generates inductive beliefs. Hume is attracted to this externalist posture because it provides a direct explanation of the epistemic achievements of children and non-human animals—creatures that must rely on custom unsupplemented by argument. 相似文献
3.
Arvid Båve 《Synthese》2009,169(1):51-73
The article first rehearses three deflationary theories of reference, (1) disquotationalism, (2) propositionalism (Horwich),
and (3) the anaphoric theory (Brandom), and raises a number of objections against them. It turns out that each corresponds
to a closely related theory of truth, and that these are subject to analogous criticisms to a surprisingly high extent. I
then present a theory of my own, according to which the schema “That S(t) is about t” and the biconditional “S refers to x
iff S says something about x” are exhaustive of the notions of aboutness and reference. An account of the usefulness of “about”
is then given, which, I argue, is superior to that of Horwich. I close with a few considerations about how the advertised
theory relates to well-known issues of reference, the conclusions of which is (1) that the issues concern reference and aboutness
only insofar as the words “about” and “refer” serve to generalise over the claims that are really at issue, (2) that the theory
of reference will not settle the issues, and (3) that it follows from (2) that the issues do not concern the nature of aboutness
or reference. 相似文献
4.
Jonathan Ellis 《Synthese》2007,159(1):47-60
Some philosophers argue that the thesis of content externalism, according to which the contents of a subject’s thoughts are
in part individuated by environmental factors, threatens the standard idea that a subject can know the contents of her thoughts
without empirical investigation. It is typically assumed, however, that this thesis does not threaten another common idea
about privileged access: that a subject can know the phenomenal character of her experience–its “what it’s like” aspect–without
empirical investigation. That is, even if content externalism is true and does imply that a subject cannot know without empirical
investigation the contents of some of her thoughts (e.g., her thoughts about water), surely she can know without empirical
investigation what it’s like for her to be having whatever experience she is having. I argue that if content externalism threatens
privileged access to content (I do not discuss whether it does), then it also threatens privileged access to phenomenal character.
My argument does not involve claiming that phenomenal character is itself externally individuated. Rather, it depends on two
other claims: (1) that introspective access to phenomenal character is conceptual; and (2) that standard arguments for content
externalism suggest that some phenomenal concepts are externally individuated. 相似文献
5.
6.
Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g., Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2006; Wilson, 2000, 2004) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world. 相似文献
7.
Carleton B. Christensen 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):123-150
Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle. 相似文献
8.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(5):688-707
Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief. 相似文献
9.
Andrew Sneddon 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):393-408
This paper examines extant ways of classifying varieties of psychological externalism and argues that they imply a hitherto
unrecognized distinction between shallow and deep externalism. The difference is between starting points: shallowly externalist
hypotheses begin with the attribution of psychological states to individuals, just as individualistic hypotheses do, whereas
deeply externalistic hypotheses begin with agent-environment interaction as the basis of cognitive processes and attribute
psychological states to individuals as necessary for such interaction. The over-arching aim is to show how deep externalism
works and what its implications are for psychological and philosophical theorizing.
相似文献
Andrew SneddonEmail: |
10.
Markos Valaris 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(3):427-445
There is reason to expect a reasonable account of a priori knowledge to be linked with an account of the nature of conceptual
thought. Recent “two-dimensionalist” accounts of conceptual thought propose an extremely direct connection between the two:
on such views, being in a position to know a priori a large number of non-trivial propositions is a necessary condition of
concept-possession. In this paper I criticize this view, by arguing that it requires an implausibly internalist and intellectualist
conception of capacities we bring to bear in applying concepts in experience. Empirical concept-application depends on the
exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label “recognitional”. As I argue,
two-dimensionalism cannot accommodate a plausible account of such capacities. This suggests that the link between a priori
knowledge and the nature of conceptual thought is not as direct as twodimensionalists take it to be. I close by briefly sketching
a different way to think of that link.
相似文献
Markos ValarisEmail: |