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21.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
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Luca MorettiEmail: |
22.
Sydney Shoemaker 《Synthese》2008,162(3):313-324
The paper is concerned with how neo-Lockean accounts of personal identity should respond to the challenge of animalist accounts.
Neo-Lockean accounts that hold that persons can change bodies via brain transplants or cerebrum transplants are committed
to the prima facie counterintuitive denial that a person is an (biologically individuated) animal. This counterintuitiveness
can be defused by holding that a person is biological animal (on neo-Lockean views) if the “is” is the “is” of constitution
rather than the “is” of identity, and that a person is identical with an animal in a sense of “animal” different from that
which requires the persistence conditions of animals to be biological. Another challenge is the “too many minds problem”:
if persons and their coincident biological animals share the same physical properties, and mental properties supervene on
physical properties, the biological animal will share the mental properties of the person, and so should itself be a person.
The response to this invokes a distinction between “thin” properties, which are shared by coincident entities, and “thick”
properties which are not so shared. Mental properties, and their physical realizers, are thick, not thin, so are not properties
persons share with their bodies or biological animals. The paper rebuts the objection that neo-Lockean accounts cannot explain
how persons can have physical properties. To meet a further problem it is argued that the biological properties of persons
and those of biological animals are different because of differences in their causal profiles. 相似文献
23.
Recent findings suggest that infants are capable of distinguishing between different numbers of objects, and of performing simple arithmetical operations. But there is debate over whether these abilities result from capacities dedicated to numerical cognition, or whether infants succeed in such experiments through more general, non-numerical capacities, such as sensitivity to perceptual features or mechanisms of object tracking. We report here a study showing that 5-month-olds can determine the number of collective entities -- moving groups of items -- when non-numerical perceptual factors such as contour length, area, density, and others are strictly controlled. This suggests both that infants can represent number per se, and that their grasp of number is not limited to the domain of objects. 相似文献
24.
Young infants construct models of the world composed of objects tracked through time and occlusion. To date little is known about the degree to which these models are sensitive to the material make-up of the represented individuals. Two experiments probed 8-month-olds' ability to represent different kinds of entities: rigid, cohesive objects, flexible, cohesive objects, and non-rigid, non-cohesive portions of sand. In Experiment 1, infants represented an array of two rigid, cohesive objects hidden behind a single screen, but failed to represent hidden arrays of two flexible objects or two portions of sand. In Experiment 2, entities were hidden behind two screens instead of one, thereby reducing the information processing demands of the task. In that case, infants succeeded in representing arrays of both types of object stimuli, but again failed to represent the portions of sand. It is argued that (1) the processes by which infants individuate and track entities are sensitive to material kind, (2) rigid cohesive objects occupy a privileged status in this system, and (3) early knowledge about objects and substances has a quantificational aspect. 相似文献