Extended emotion

Recent thinking within philosophy of mind about the ways cognition can extend (e.g., Clark, 2008; Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Menary, 2006; Wilson, 2000, 2004) has yet to be integrated with philosophical theories of emotion, which give cognition a central role. We carve out new ground at the intersection of these areas and, in doing so, defend what we call the extended emotion thesis: the claim that some emotions can extend beyond skin and skull to parts of the external world.     

阅读中的“心不在焉”:理论假设和影响因素

人们在阅读时,思维有时会游离到所读内容之外,此时人们的目光虽然还在沿着所读材料移动,但认知加工却游离到一些与任务无关的内容上,这就是所谓阅读中的"心不在焉"。本文总结归纳了阅读中"心不在焉"的三个主要理论假设:执行控制理论、控制失败假说和注意解离假说。分析了阅读中"心不在焉"的三种影响因素:第一,阅读方式,即被试采取朗读或默读的阅读方式以及阅读时是否有时间限制等;第二,阅读材料,即材料难度、阅读兴趣与词汇特征;第三,被试的年龄、元觉察能力和工作记忆容量。最后提出了一些目前阅读中的"心不在焉"研究中存在的问题和未来可能的研究方向,为后续的研究提供一定的启发和借鉴。     

Accidentally True Beliefs and the Williamsonian Mental State of Knowing

In this paper, I will explore some philosophical implications of Williamson’s thesis that knowing is a state of mind (KSM). Using the fake barn case, I will introduce a way to evaluate Williamson’s KSM thesis and determine whether the Williamsonian mental state of knowing can be plausibly distinguished from certain other similar but epistemologically distinctive states of mind (i.e., accidentally true beliefs). Then, some tentative externalist accounts of the supposed differences between the Williamsonian mental state of knowing and accidentally true beliefs will be critically assessed, implying that the evaluated traditional versions of externalism in semantics and epistemology do not fit well with Williamson’s KSM thesis. Ultimately, I suggest that the extended-mind or extended-knower approach may be more promising, which indicates that active externalism would be called for by Williamson’s KSM thesis.     

Social cognition and social functioning in patients with amnestic mild cognitive impairment or Alzheimer’s dementia

The aim of the present study was to examine social cognition and social functioning in a group of amnestic mild cognitive impairment (aMCI) and Alzheimer’s dementia (AD) patients. Thirty one people with aMCI, 29 individuals with AD, and 45 healthy older adults participated in the study. Facial expressions of happiness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise presented in different intensities had to be labelled. Mentalizing was assessed using first-order belief theory of mind (ToM) stories and everyday social functioning by the Inventory of Interpersonal Situations (IIS), completed by an informant. aMCI patients were impaired in recognizing the emotions anger, disgust, and fear, while AD patients were impaired in recognizing the emotions anger, disgust, and surprise. More importantly, no significant differences between aMCI and AD patients were found on overall emotion recognition. Both the aMCI and AD patients were impaired on the ToM task, but no differences between the aMCI and AD patients were found. On everyday social functioning, only the AD patients showed impairments. No associations between the IIS and ToM were found, but the IIS and emotion perception were significantly correlated. Regression analysis taking all potentially confounding variables into account showed that only mood, but not the social-cognitive task performance or any other cognitive variable, predicted social functioning. aMCI and AD patients demonstrated impairments in mentalizing and facial emotion perception, and showed decrements in everyday social functioning. Informing caregivers about these deficits may help them to understand deficits in social cognition that may be present already in the MCI stage of Alzheimer’s disease.     

Zhi and Neng belong to mind: a study of the capacity to be good in the mind of Xunzi

ABSTRACT

The mainstream of academia thinks that Xunzi’s theory of human nature, which claims that human nature is bad, is in contrast with those of Confucius and Mencius and is unable to provide a foundation for human moral subjectivity. However, there are more and more scholars bringing up different ideas, such as Lu Debin and Fung Yiuming. They think that Xunzi’s wei 偽 (artifice), which includes zhi知 (knowing) and neng 能 (capacity), is a kind of inborn capacity to think and activate that belongs to xing. This paper points out that zhi and neng belong to xin 心 (mind) rather than xing. In the text of Xunzi, xing is mainly regarded as human emotions and desires which would result in chaos if not controlled. Making zhi and neng belong to xing does not accord with Xunzi’s theory and will confuse people with the connotation of Xunzi’s xing.     

Cryptic Emotions and the Emergence of a Metatheory of Mind in Popular Filmmaking

Hollywood movies can be deeply engaging and easy to understand. To succeed in this manner, feature‐length movies employ many editing techniques with strong psychological underpinnings. We explore the origins and development of one of these, the reaction shot. This shot typically shows a single, unspeaking character with modest facial expression in response to an event or to the behavior or speech of another character. In a sample of movies from 1940 to 2010, we show that the prevalence of one type of these shots—which we call the cryptic reaction shot—has grown dramatically. These shots are designed to enhance viewers’ emotional involvement with characters. They depict a facial gesture that reflects a slightly negative and slightly aroused emotional state. Their use at the end of conversations, and typically at the end of scenes, helps to leave viewers in a state of speculation about what the character is thinking and what her thoughts may mean for the ongoing narrative.     

Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception

One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of spatial attention. While the sceptic is correct that some putative cases are accurately deflected in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention might play in relevant contexts. This paper identifies alternative ways that selective attention might play a role in cognitive effects on perception. What emerges is a plausible and well-evidenced mental schema that describes attention-mediated cognitive penetration.     

Emotional Schemas

Beck's cognitive model has stressed the influence of cognitive processing in eliciting and maintaining emotional disorders. The concept of schema is extended in Emotional Schema Therapy to account for beliefs, assumptions, and strategies that comprise problematic theories of emotion that result in unhelpful strategies of emotion regulation and acceptance of emotion. In the present paper the central concepts of Emotional Schema Therapy are elucidated and research supporting the model is reviewed.     

Willing and able? Theory of mind,social motivation,and social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence

This study investigated the links between theory of mind, social motivation, and children's social competence in middle childhood and early adolescence. Two hundred and sixty four children (136 girls, 128 boys) aged between 8 and 13 years (M Age = 10.88 years, SD = 1.45) completed theory-of-mind tests and self-report questionnaires measuring social motivation. Teachers rated children's social competence at school. Teacher-rated social competence was associated with individual differences in both theory of mind and children's motivation to develop and maintain social relationships. Results suggest that while individual differences in social motivation and theory of mind are partially overlapping, both theory of mind ability and social motivation contribute to successful social interaction at school.