Drone affect: Folded points of view as a co-affection method for empathy and care

Drone usage in fieldwork and participatory processes entails direct sensations that fold the pilot/planner and audience into one. Footage from drone filming entails direct kinesthetic and synesthetic effects that occur while one edits the film material, giving rise to affective responses. Through one experimental drone postproduction film, this article discusses how the interplay of vision, motion, and sound works as a set of gestures that comprise sensation as a (self- and co-) affection modus of immediation when one engages with moving images on-screen during drone filming, editing, and screening. The article builds upon Merleau-Ponty's film writings and Puig de la Bellacasa's touch/care perspectives. Specifically, it asks what constitutive aspects characterize the folding of the drone's/pilot's point of view (POV) in relation to the perceiver's POV during postediting, and to the conceiver's POV during subsequent viewings. The article's original contribution is to show how affective experiences are transposed as haptic touch via the same images and folded POVs. It also addresses a research methodological perspective on filmic mediations and written accounts. The article concludes by speculating about how the co-affective potential of the folding of POVs through drone imagery might inform fieldwork and participatory processes from perspectives of care and empathy.     

牟宗三形著说质疑

本文依次从心体是否需要性体保证其客观性,性体能否保证心体的客观性,形著说能否达到预期目的,究竟应该如何看待天道等方面,向牟宗三著名的形著说提出质疑。本文总的结论是,形著说虽有重要的理论意义,但其路子从一开始就没有走对,不仅不能有效解决理论上的难题,而且有叠床架屋之嫌。     

ALL THE (MANY,MANY) THINGS WE KNOW: EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE*

In this paper we explore the potential bearing of the extended mind thesis—the thesis that the mind extends into the world—on epistemology. We do three things. First, we argue that the combination of the extended mind thesis and reliabilism about knowledge entails that ordinary subjects can easily come to enjoy various forms of restricted omniscience. Second, we discuss the conceptual foundations of the extended mind and knowledge debate. We suggest that the theses of extended mind and extended knowledge lead to a bifurcation with respect to the concepts of belief and knowledge. We suggest that this conceptual bifurcation supports a form of pluralism about these concepts. Third, we discuss whether something similar can be said at the metaphysical level.     

心理理论的遗传基础初探

心理理论在社会交往中起着关键作用,其认知过程包括对自我和他人的心理状态进行推断及预测下一步行为.心理理论在不同个体间具有差异,这种差异可能部分归因于与心理理论相关的神经化学物质如多巴胺、五羟色胺、催产素、血管加压素等.来自不同群体的研究结果还发现,与这些神经化学物质有关的基因多态性,如儿茶酚胺氧位甲基转移酶、多巴胺D4受体基因、5-羟色胺受体基因、催产素受体基因等都与心理理论的表现有关.     

Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception

Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our beliefs and past experiences? Cognitive penetration describes the influence of higher level cognitive factors on perceptual experience and has been a debated topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Here, we focus on visual perception, particularly early vision, and how it is affected by contextual expectations and memorized cognitive contents. We argue for cognitive penetration based on recent empirical evidence demonstrating contextual and top-down influences on early visual processes. On the basis of a perceptual model, we propose different types of cognitive penetration depending on the processing level on which the penetration happens and depending on where the penetrating influence comes from. Our proposal has two consequences: (1) the traditional controversy on whether cognitive penetration occurs or not is ill posed, and (2) a clear-cut perception–cognition boundary cannot be maintained.     

Is Probabilistic Evidence a Source of Knowledge?

We report a series of experiments examining whether people ascribe knowledge for true beliefs based on probabilistic evidence. Participants were less likely to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence than for beliefs based on perceptual evidence (Experiments 1 and 2A) or testimony providing causal information (Experiment 2B). Denial of knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence did not arise because participants viewed such beliefs as unjustified, nor because such beliefs leave open the possibility of error. These findings rule out traditional philosophical accounts for why probabilistic evidence does not produce knowledge. The experiments instead suggest that people deny knowledge because they distrust drawing conclusions about an individual based on reasoning about the population to which it belongs, a tendency previously identified by “judgment and decision making” researchers. Consistent with this, participants were more willing to ascribe knowledge for beliefs based on probabilistic evidence that is specific to a particular case (Experiments 3A and 3B).     

Is a modular cognitive architecture compatible with the direct perception of mental states?

The Direct Social Perception Hypothesis maintains that we can perceive other people’s psychological states. Furthermore, it claims that doing so does not require any cognitive process that is simulative or theory-like, putting it in sharp contrast with mainstream accounts of social cognition. This paper contrasts the DSPH against the modular account of mindreading as proposed by Peter Carruthers and H. Clark Barrett. It maintains that the modularity view can respond to the challenges levelled by the DSPH, and that the positions are not as distinct as they originally appear. Finally, the paper discusses the role of non-folk psychological state concepts in our perceptions of other people.     

西方哲学心智转向对心理学的影响

心智哲学是20世纪中末期西方哲学所发生的继语言(义)学转向和语用学转向之后的一次重要转向,它为心理学提供了新的元理论和方法论。(1)为心理学提供了"心智-语言-世界"新的世界观;(2)从哲学角度对人的心理进行了探讨,促进了哲学与心理学的结合并互哺;(3)促使人们对"人是什么"重新审视与理解;(4)引发了对以往心理学尤其是主流心理学的基石——身心二元论的质疑;(5)催生了第二代认知科学、活动主义、情境认知等新取向的兴起。它对心理学有很大启示:第一,人工智能、动物研究等研究是有限度的;第二,应重视身体的作用;第三,应重视人的意向性,注重隐喻分析;第四,应关注人的存在,尤其是生命的意义。     

The Relation Between Children's Trust Beliefs and Theory of Mind Abilities

The study examined the relation between children's trust beliefs and Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities. A sample of 168 Italian children (M = 9 years–6 months, SD = 7 months) were administered the Italian Children's Generalized Trust Beliefs (ICGTB) Scale, two Second‐Order False Belief ToM measures, and an Advanced ToM measure. As expected, the ICGTB scale demonstrated: (1) validity by its three factor structure and (2) reliability by exhibiting acceptable internal consistency and test–retest stability. As expected, the children's emotional trust beliefs in others were associated with both second‐order false belief ToM ability and advanced ToM ability. These relations were not attributable to verbal ability. The findings are discussed with respect to the relations among children's emotional trust beliefs, personal disclosure, and quality of attachment. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.