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151.
Paul Bloom 《Cognition》2007,105(3):649-655
In four experiments, Malt and Sloman [Malt, B. C., & Sloman, S. A. (2007). Category essence or essentially pragmatic? Creator’s intention in naming and what’s really what. Cognition, 105, 615-648] show that the naming of artifacts is affected by discourse context. They see this phenomenon as posing a problem for the intentional-history theory of artifact categorization (e.g., [Bloom, P. (1996). Intention, history, and artifact concepts. Cognition, 60, 1-29]), and as supporting instead their alternative theory that naming is determined by communicative goals. This response begins by distinguishing the problem of artifact categorization (determining the categories that artifacts belong to) from the problem of artifact naming (deciding how to talk about members of these categories). In light of this distinction, it turns out that Malt and Sloman’s findings are fully consistent with all theories of artifact categorization, including the intentional-historical one. Moreover, contrary to what they argue, there are actually many cases where the relative contributions of categorization and pragmatics can be clearly distinguished. Finally, it is argued that Malt and Sloman’s own account of artifact naming presupposes a capacity for artifact categorization; it cannot work without one. 相似文献
152.
Predicting how another person will evaluate the intention underlying an action involves consideration of second-order mental states. Children (ages 5-10 years) and college students (N=105) predicted an observer's belief about an actor's intention and evaluated the actor from both their own perspectives and the perspective of the observer. Younger children were more likely than older children and adults to attribute a belief to the observer that mismatched the actor's prior intention. Attributed beliefs about intention were more likely to match negative prior intentions than to match positive prior intentions and were also more likely to match prior intentions when the observer knew the actor's prior intention than when the observer did not know the actor's prior intention. The judgments attributed to the observer were based on the beliefs about intention attributed to the observer, showing use of second-order mental states to infer another's sociomoral judgments. 相似文献
153.
Robert J. Howell 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(2):145-177
In this paper I argue that Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument is better considered not as an argument against physicalism,
but as an argument that objective theories must be incomplete. I argue that despite the apparent diversity of responses to
the knowledge argument, they all boil down to a response according to which genuine epistemic gains are made when an individual
has an experience. I call this the acquaintance response. I then argue that this response violates an intuitive stricture
on the objectivity of theories. Therefore, the knowledge argument does show that objective theories cannot provide a complete
understanding of the world. The result, however, is that both objective dualism and objective physicalism are refuted by the
argument. In the end it is suggested that the notion of “subjective physicalism” is one that should be pursued. 相似文献
154.
探讨我国住院医师规范化培训的现况及对策 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
黄贞杰 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2007,28(10):64-65
临床住院医师规范化培训是培养高水平专业人才的重要手段,是提高我国医疗水平的重要环节和措施,是一项有关卫生事业发展的重要工作.目前,我国住院医师培训还存在不少问题.在各方面的不断努力和探索下,一定能够使住院医师规范化培新工作做得更好. 相似文献
155.
156.
Bernard E. Rollin 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):253-274
Although 20th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors
– John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given
the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear.
That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation
or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as
a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible
for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability
of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the
major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain
in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about
animal thought and feeling. 相似文献
157.
Peter Carruthers 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(3):275-297
This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense
of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning
psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating
that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals do make such claims on us. 相似文献
158.
by Leonard Angel 《Zygon》2009,44(3):699-718
Extension of the system that includes the key substrates for sensation, perception, emotion, volition, and cognition, and all representational sources for cognition, supports the view that there is an extended mind and an extended body. These intellectual views can be made practical in a humanist system based on extensions and in religious systems based on extensions. Independently, there is also an institutional extension of secularism. Hence, I maintain, there are five principal forms of extension. 相似文献
159.
by Teed Rockwell 《Zygon》2009,44(3):659-674
Certain philosophers and scientists have noticed that there are data that do not seem to fit with the traditional view known as the Mind/Brain Identity theory (MBI). This has inspired a new theory about the mind known as the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC). Now there is a growing controversy over whether these data actually require extending the mind out beyond the brain. Such arguments, despite their empirical diversity, have an underlying form. They all are disputes over where to draw the line between intrinsic and relational causal powers. The second-century Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna deals with similar issues when he argues for a middle way between the two positions that were known in his time by the terms eternalism and nihilism. Eternalism, like MBI, asserts that the mind is a permanent enduring substance (although the two theories disagree as to how long mind endures). Nihilism argued that the mind had no intrinsic existence, and today some argue that HEC could lead us to a similar conclusion. Nagarjuna's argument for a middle way between these two extremes is similar to an argument that can be made for HEC. We can accept that neither the brain nor any other single physical item is identical to the mind without falling down the slippery slope that leads to "The mind does not really exist, and therefore we are one with everything." Nagarjuna was correct to say that the mind has conventional reality—that the mind exists even though there is no sharp border between the mind and the world. 相似文献
160.