精神分析视域下的身心观

身心关系问题是人类长期探究的重要议题。精神分析学家对身心关系具有诸多独特见解,具体表现为：身体是心理的基础,身体是心理的象征,身体与心理的交织。此三种观点不仅反映出不同精神分析学家在方法论、认识论以及本体论上的差异,也蕴含着精神分析不同流派的理论脉络。厘清精神分析视域下的身心观,既有助于自然科学心理学与人文科学心理学在精神分析中寻求一种主客交织的研究视角,也可为心理学和其他学科领域研究身心关系问题提供新的切入点。     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Substantive unconscious and adjective unconscious: the contribution of Wilfred Bion

The author first provides her readers with a brief summary of some of Freud's ideas, as found throughout his work, on the notion of 'unconscious'. The notion of unconscious as noun is contrasted to the idea of unconscious as adjective, this latter being proposed as a quality, or a state, ever temporary, dynamic, and subject to the constant changes going on in the individual's internal psychic world, as well as to external conditions. After presenting some considerations, the author then contrasts the Kleinian model of the mind to the Freudian, and Wilfred Bion's contribution is discussed at some length. Within Bion's conception of psychic functioning, the model of 'dream' is highlighted and, in this regard, clarifications are sought regarding Bion's view of the unconscious. To conclude, a brief and superficial approximation to the work of Carl Jung is touched upon, although the author admits to knowing little of Jung's positions.     

“The Frog Ate the Bug and Made his Mouth Sad”: Narrative Competence in Children with Autism

This study compares the narrative abilities of 13 children with autism, 13 children with developmental delays, and 13 typically developing children matched on language ability. Although groups did not differ in their use of causal language or internal state terms, children with autism and children with developmental delays were less likely than typical children to identify the causes of characters' internal states. Rather, they tended simply to label emotions and explain actions. Children with autism and children with developmental delays also relied on a more restricted range of evaluative devices, which both convey point of view and maintain listener involvement. In addition, the narrative abilities of children with autism were linked to performance on measures of theory of mind and an index of conversational competence, whereas this was not the case among children with developmental delays. Findings are discussed in relation to the social, cognitive, and emotional underpinnings and consequences of narrative activity.     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

文化与心理--研究维果茨基文化历史理论的现代意义

维果茨基文化历史理论对当今研究文化与心理关系问题的启示在于：坚持唯物的辨证方法论是研究文化与心理关系问题的基础;创造性地以符号为中介,以符号作为高级心理机能社会文化历史理论的基础,使文化与心理之间有了联系的桥梁;“实验发生法”为当今实验的生态有效性研究奠定了理论基础;强调从文化的维度来解释人的心理的产生和发展,推动了西方心理学的文化转向;强调社会文化对人的心理发展的决定作用,为心理学的后现代建构提供了理论基础。     

Disposition to recognize goals in infant chimpanzees

Do nonhuman primates attribute goals to others? Traditional studies with chimpanzees provide equivocal evidence for “mind reading” in nonhuman primates. Here we adopt looking time, a methodology commonly used with human infants to test infant chimpanzees. In this experiment, four infant chimpanzees saw computer-generated stimuli that mimicked a goal-directed behavior. The baby chimps performed as well as human infants, namely, they were sensitive to the trajectories of the objects, thus suggesting that chimpanzees may be endowed with a disposition to understand goal-directed behaviors. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.