The role of faith in intuition, need for cognition and method of attitude formation in implicit–explicit brand attitude relationship strength

We tested the hypothesis that Faith in Intuition (FI) would moderate implicit–explicit attitude relationship strength for attitudes formed via associative processes, but not propositional processes. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that FI moderated I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via evaluative conditioning. High FI people had stronger I–E correlations. Experiment 2 showed that FI did not moderate I–E relationship strength for attitudes formed via propositional reasoning. Those low in Need for Cognition (NC), however, showed stronger I–E correlations than those high in NC. The importance of considering trait variables in combination with the method of attitude formation is discussed.     

On the role of attention in generating explicit awareness of contingent relations: evidence from spatial priming

In a series of four experiments, we examine the hypothesis that selective attention is crucial for the generation of conscious knowledge of contingency information. We investigated this question using a spatial priming task in which participants were required to localize a target letter in a probe display. In Experiment 1, participants kept track of the frequency with which the predictive letter in the prime appeared in various locations. This manipulation had a negligible impact on contingency awareness. Subsequent experiments requiring participants to attend to features (color, location) of the predictive letter increased contingency awareness somewhat, but there remained a large proportion of individuals who remained unaware of the strong contingency. Together the results of our experiments suggest that the construct of attention does not fully capture the processes that lead to contingency awareness, and suggest a critical role for bottom-up feature integration in explicit contingency learning.     

Testing multiple motives in feedback seeking: The interaction of instrumentality and self protection motives

Research indicates that information received from feedback seeking is valuable for both individual and organizational outcomes. Previous research examining the feedback seeking process has consistently suggested that individual's feedback behaviors are directly influenced by three motives. Specifically, individuals are instrumentally motivated to obtain valued information but are also motivated to protect and/or enhance their ego and to protect others' impressions of them (Ashford, Blatt and VandeWalle, 2003). The current study simultaneously examined these motives by testing the interactive effects of them on feedback seeking behavior. As predicted, they did significantly interact and the results present a deeper understanding of these motives and how employees weigh various factors in deciding whether to seek feedback within the organization.     

From Virtue to Freedom through Emotion

Spinoza conceived human freedom as a matter solely of rationality, but an understanding of the role emotion plays in moral virtue can lead one toward viewing emotionality as also essential to human freedom. A large part of human freedom consists in our tendency to give intrinsic importance to people or things outside ourselves and take them into our lives; this sense of importance, in rich and various ways, brings emotion into the center of our lives and our freedom as individuals.     

Right Motive, Wrong Action: Direct Consequentialism and Evaluative Conflict

In this paper I look at attempts to develop forms of consequentialism which do not have a feature considered problematic in Direct Consequentialist theories (that is, those consequentialist theories that apply the criterion of rightness directly in the evaluation of any set of options). The problematic feature in question (which I refer to as ‘evaluative conflict’) is the possibility that, for example, a right motive might lead an agent to perform a wrong act. Theories aiming to avoid this phenomenon must argue that causal relationship entails motives and acts (for example) having the same moral status. I argue that attempts to ensure such ‘evaluative consistency’ are themselves deeply problematic, and that we must therefore accept evaluative conflict.     

Implicit but not explicit self-esteem predicts future depressive symptomatology

To date, research on the predictive validity of implicit self-esteem for depressive relapse is very sparse. In the present study, we assessed implicit self-esteem using the Name Letter Preference Task and explicit self-esteem using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale in a group of currently depressed patients, formerly depressed individuals, and never depressed controls. In addition, we examined the predictive validity of explicit, implicit, and the interaction of explicit and implicit self-esteem in predicting future symptoms of depression in formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls. The results showed that currently depressed individuals reported a lower explicit self-esteem as compared to formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls. In line with previous research, all groups showed a positive implicit self-esteem not different from each other. Furthermore, after controlling for initial depressive symptomatology, implicit but not explicit self-esteem significantly predicted depressive symptoms at six months follow-up. Although implicit self-esteem assessed with the Name Letter Preference Test was not different between formerly depressed individuals and never depressed controls, the findings suggest it is an interesting variable in the study of vulnerability for depression relapse.     

事后聪明式偏差的理论模型及影响因素

事后聪明式偏差是指人们在得知事件结果后,会因记忆扭曲、对自身预测能力或事件发生必然性的需要的诱发,而表现出过高估计自己在事前预测能力的现象。许多研究表明,该偏差普遍存在于实验和真实情境中,很难通过实施策略而减小。该现象的理论模型主要基于认知过程和社会性动机,影响因素有研究方法、个人特质、能力变量、年龄因素、个人相关度和事件效价,在未来研究中应注重对理论的整合以及校正策略在应用中的探索     

Mutual influence of implicit and explicit attitudes

Research and theory distinguish two types of attitude: automatic evaluative reactions and deliberate evaluative judgments, referred to as implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively. Although these attitudes are distinct, they may influence each other. Four studies tested whether implicit and explicit attitudes are both influenced by propositional and associative learning. We also tested whether changes in one kind of attitude mediate changes in the other. Study 1 found that propositional learning about novel individuals directly influenced explicit attitudes and indirectly influenced implicit attitudes through changes in explicit attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this finding and extended it by simultaneously demonstrating that associative learning through Evaluative Conditioning directly influences implicit attitudes and indirectly influences explicit attitudes through changes in implicit attitudes. Study 4 replicated these effects for attitudes toward familiar, rather than novel, targets. These results suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes can share common antecedents and influence each other.     

Changing explicit and implicit attitudes: The case of self-esteem

Three experiments investigated predictions concerning asymmetrical patterns of implicit and explicit self-esteem change. Specifically, we investigated the influence of knowledge about the own self that is momentarily salient as well as the influence of affective valence associated with the self in memory on implicit and explicit self-esteem. The latter was induced by evaluative conditioning, the former by directed thinking about oneself. We found that while evaluative conditioning changed implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiment 1), thinking about the own self altered explicit but not implicit self-esteem (Experiment 2). Moreover, in a third experiment, it could be shown that the effect of evaluative conditioning can spill over to the explicit level when participants are asked to focus on their feelings prior to making their self-report judgements (Experiment 3). Implications of our results are discussed in terms of recent controversies regarding dual-process models of attitudes and associative versus propositional modes of information processing.