Racial healthcare disparities: A social psychological analysis

Around the world, members of racial/ethnic minority groups typically experience poorer health than members of racial/ethnic majority groups. The core premise of this chapter is that thoughts, feelings, and behaviours related to race and ethnicity play a critical role in healthcare disparities. Social psychological theories of the origins and consequences of these thoughts, feelings, and behaviours offer critical insights into the processes responsible for these disparities and suggest interventions to address them. We present a multilevel model that explains how societal, intrapersonal, and interpersonal factors can influence ethnic/racial health disparities. We focus our literature review, including our own research, and conceptual analysis at the intrapersonal (the race-related thoughts and feelings of minority patients and non-minority physicians) and interpersonal levels (intergroup processes that affect medical interactions between minority patients and non-minority physicians). At both levels of analysis, we use theories of social categorisation, social identity, contemporary forms of racial bias, stereotype activation, stigma, and other social psychological processes to identify and understand potential causes and processes of health and healthcare disparities. In the final section, we identify theory-based interventions that might reduce ethnic/racial disparities in health and healthcare.     

State-Dependent Memory Effects Using Caffeine and Placebo Do Not Extend to Metamemory

The authors examined the impact of caffeine on human memory and predictions of memory (i.e., metamemory). On Day 1, 83 college students drank a sweetened beverage containing either caffeine (4 mg/kg body weight) or a placebo before they studied 40 pairs of words. While the participants studied, they predicted their future memory performance for each word pair. On Day 2, the participants again received caffeine or a placebo before the memory test. The participants who drank the same beverage on both days (either caffeine or a placebo) recalled more word pairs than did those who drank different beverages (caffeine on 1 day and a placebo on the other day). In contrast, memory predictions were more accurate when the beverages did not match on both days. These data provide evidence for state-dependent memory when caffeine is used, but not for state-dependent metamemory. People's memory and their predictions of memory can be influenced in different ways if they drink caffeine before they study or take a test.     

The Relation of Distressful Childhood Experiences and Empathy in College Undergraduates

We assessed the relation between the empathic responsiveness of young adults and the relative frequency and intensity of distressful events they experienced as children. Undergraduate subjects (N = 111; 56 men and 55 women) were led to believe that they were participating in two separate studies. In the first study, students completed the Distress Experiences in Childhood questionnaire, a filler task, and a slightly abbreviated version of the Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) empathy measure. In the second study, students watched an emotion-laden videotape of a patient (actually an actress) in a therapy session and subsequently completed an emotional-response questionnaire adapted from Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, and Isen (1983). Students who rated their distressful childhood experiences as highly distressing scored higher on both measures of empathy than did students who rated their experiences as relatively less distressing. In contrast, the number of distressful childhood experiences reported was generally unrelated to empathy scores.     

Learning New Letter-like Writing Patterns Explicitly and Implicitly in Children and Adults

A handwriting task was used to test the assumption that explicit learning is dependent on age and working memory, while implicit learning is not. The effect of age was examined by testing both, typically developing children (5–12 years old, n = 81) and adults (n = 27) in a counterbalanced within-subjects design. Participants were asked to repeatedly write letter-like patterns on a digitizer with a non-inking pen. Reproduction of the pattern was better after explicit learning compared to implicit learning. Age had positive effects on both explicit and implicit learning; working memory did not affect learning in either conditions. These results show that it may be more effective to learn writing new letter-like patterns explicitly and that an explicit teaching method is preferred in mainstream primary education.     

Kinesthetic Aftereffect and Augmenting/Reducing: A Two-Session Procedure,and Hence Identification of Stimulus-Governed Subjects,is Contraindicated

A few of the recent researchers of kinesthetic aftereffect (KAE) as an index of augmenting/reducing have continued to employ a two-session procedure. Findings that have accrued in the past decade indicate (a) The first administration of KAE is a reliable (internally consistent) and valid index of augmenting-reducing; (b) there are carry-over effects from the first to the second administration that bias the second session's preinduction scores; (c) KAE scores from sessions after the first do not relate to first-session scores (low retest reliability) and do not measure augmenting/reducing; and (d) unless special procedures are undertaken to avoid using the biased second- (or later-) session preinduction scores, a KAE procedure involving more than one session is contraindicated. When we reached a similar conclusion earlier (Baker et al., 1974), Petrie (1974) disagreed, arguing that a two-session procedure was needed to identify and eliminate an atypical subgroup, the “stimulus governed.” The case for determining which subjects are stimulus-governed is assessed and found wanting. Except in special circumstances, a one-session KAE procedure, in which all preinduction trials precede the first exposure to aftereffect induction, is indicated.     

Fairness lies in the heart of the beholder: How the social emotions of third parties influence reactions to injustice

The present research explores third parties’ (e.g., jurors, ombudsmen, auditors, and employees observing others’ encounters) ability to objectively judge fairness. More specifically, the current research suggests that third parties’ justice judgments and reactions are biased by their attitudes toward the decision recipient and, in particular, the affective aspect of those attitudes as characterized by their felt social emotions. We explore how the congruence of a social emotion (i.e., the extent to which the emotion reflects feeling a subjective sense of alignment with the target of the emotion) can influence their evaluations of recipients’ decision outcomes. The five studies presented show that congruence can lead third parties to react positively to objectively unfair decision outcomes and, importantly, that the influence of social emotions on subjective justice judgments drive third party reactions to decisions, decision makers, and even national policies.     

Younger and older adults weigh multiple cues in a similar manner to generate judgments of learning

One’s memory for past test performance (MPT) is a key piece of information individuals use when deciding how to restudy material. We used a multi-trial recognition memory task to examine adult age differences in the influence of MPT (measured by actual Trial 1 memory accuracy and subjective confidence judgments, CJs) along with Trial 1 judgments of learning (JOLs), objective and participant-estimated recognition fluencies, and Trial 2 study time on Trial 2 JOLs. We found evidence of simultaneous and independent influences of multiple objective and subjective (i.e., metacognitive) cues on Trial 2 JOLs, and these relationships were highly similar for younger and older adults. Individual differences in Trial 1 recognition accuracy and CJs on Trial 2 JOLs indicate that individuals may vary in the degree to which they rely on each MPT cue when assessing subsequent memory confidence. Aging appears to spare the ability to access multiple cues when making JOLs.     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

A Psychometric Analysis of the “Divide and Conquer” Principle in Multicriteria Decision Making

The principle of “Divide and Conquer” (DAC) suggests that: (1) complex decision problems should be decomposed into smaller, more manageable parts and (2) these smaller parts should be logically aggregated to derive an overall value for each alternative. Typically, decompositional procedures have been compared to holistic evaluations that require decision makers to simultaneously consider all of the relevant attributes in the evaluation of the objects under consideration. These comparisons between decompositional and holistic judgments have primarily used a variant of Multiattribute Utility Theory (MAUT).We presented a general experimental framework that allows for a more extensive assessment of the DAC principle, as well as the effects of decision complexity on both holistic and decompositional procedures. We illustrate this approach with a study that uses the Simple Multiattribute Rating Technique with Swing Weights (SMARTS; Edwards & Barron, 1994) and the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP; Saaty, 1980). We report data comparing the convergent validity (e.g the agreement between decompositional and holistic strategies) and the temporal stability for decompositional and holistic judgments on a variety of dependent measures. Decision complexity did not significantly affect the correspondence between decompositional and holistic judgments for both SMARTS and AHP judgments. Results from an ordinal measure of temporal stability indicated the DAC principle was violated for the AHP judgments. For a linear measure of temporal stability, trends in the data indicated that the predicted effects of decision complexity on the DAC principle was violated for the SMARTS judgments.     

Why we can still believe the error theory

The error theory is a metaethical theory that maintains that normative judgments are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and that these properties do not exist. In a recent paper, Bart Streumer argues that it is impossible to fully believe the error theory. Surprisingly, he claims that this is not a problem for the error theorist: even if we can’t fully believe the error theory, the good news is that we can still come close to believing the error theory. In this paper I show that Streumer’s arguments fail. First, I lay out Streumer’s argument for why we can’t believe the error theory. Then, I argue against the unbelievability of the error theory. Finally, I show that Streumer’s positive proposal that we can come close to believing the error theory is actually undermined by his own argument for why we can’t believe the error theory.