Mutual influence of implicit and explicit attitudes

Research and theory distinguish two types of attitude: automatic evaluative reactions and deliberate evaluative judgments, referred to as implicit and explicit attitudes, respectively. Although these attitudes are distinct, they may influence each other. Four studies tested whether implicit and explicit attitudes are both influenced by propositional and associative learning. We also tested whether changes in one kind of attitude mediate changes in the other. Study 1 found that propositional learning about novel individuals directly influenced explicit attitudes and indirectly influenced implicit attitudes through changes in explicit attitudes. Studies 2 and 3 replicated this finding and extended it by simultaneously demonstrating that associative learning through Evaluative Conditioning directly influences implicit attitudes and indirectly influences explicit attitudes through changes in implicit attitudes. Study 4 replicated these effects for attitudes toward familiar, rather than novel, targets. These results suggest that implicit and explicit attitudes can share common antecedents and influence each other.     

Good vibrations: Analytic process as coupled oscillations

This paper develops a new model for the action of psychoanalysis based on concepts from non-linear dynamics (chaos theory and complexity theory). It shows that the analyst–analysand couple may be conceptualized as a new configuration with its own properties that promote complex development in both members of the couple. These developments are an emergent result of the formation of the analyst–analysand couple and are significantly independent of the particular content of the manifest interaction of the couple. The well-studied phenomena of coupled oscillators suggest the specific features of the analysand–analyst interaction that are likely to be most important in conceptualizing analytic change. The model has substantial clinical applications since efforts to arrange for a coupled oscillator system that is central to it are distinct from many of the traditional considerations associated with creating an analytic situation.     

Changing explicit and implicit attitudes: The case of self-esteem

Three experiments investigated predictions concerning asymmetrical patterns of implicit and explicit self-esteem change. Specifically, we investigated the influence of knowledge about the own self that is momentarily salient as well as the influence of affective valence associated with the self in memory on implicit and explicit self-esteem. The latter was induced by evaluative conditioning, the former by directed thinking about oneself. We found that while evaluative conditioning changed implicit but not explicit self-esteem (Experiment 1), thinking about the own self altered explicit but not implicit self-esteem (Experiment 2). Moreover, in a third experiment, it could be shown that the effect of evaluative conditioning can spill over to the explicit level when participants are asked to focus on their feelings prior to making their self-report judgements (Experiment 3). Implications of our results are discussed in terms of recent controversies regarding dual-process models of attitudes and associative versus propositional modes of information processing.     

An evaluation of counselling and rehabilitation courses for Chronic Fatigue Syndrome

The aim of the current study was to evaluate the services offered by Action for ME to sufferers of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome using measures developed and validated in previous research. Preliminary studies had suggested that clients attending rehabilitation residential courses were benefiting from the service. A further, more in‐depth evaluation process with a greater number of health‐related outcome measures was warranted. In addition, assessment was widened to include other services offered to sufferers of the illness. Data relating to the usefulness and success of the services (rated by the clients) were also collected. Data from client volunteers were collected at baseline (that is, before intervention) and approximately six months later. Quantitative comparative analyses were conducted using within‐group comparisons to assess any improvements in scores at six‐month follow‐up from baseline. Fifty‐six participants completed wide‐ranging questionnaires assessing illness history, psychopathology, psychosocial factors and health and well‐being. Data relating to improvements in illness status and acceptability of treatment were also collected by means of global outcome measures. Both the counselling and residential groups showed improvements in many areas assessed at follow‐up. Most importantly, improvements were indicated in areas such as fatigue and the levels of disability suffered by patients. In addition, there were significant improvements in ratings of mood, anxiety, depression and physical symptoms. Overall, clients reported satisfaction with the care received and most found the services useful. All of the participants who completed the evaluation stated that they would recommend Action for ME services to fellow sufferers. The outcome of the current study is encouraging. The data presented provides evidence of the high level of support and advice Action for ME offers to sufferers of this illness. Furthermore, measurable improvements in scores relating to illness status were accompanied by improvements in mental health and psychosocial variables in the patient group.     

Two Puzzles for Deontologists: Life-Prolonging Killings and the Moral Symmetry Between Killing and Causing a Person to be Unconscious

Some form of agent-relative constraint against the killing of innocent personsis a central principle in deontological moraltheories. In this article I make two claimsabout this constraint. First, I argue that somekillings of innocents performed incircumstances usually not taken to exculpatethe killer are not even pro tanto wrong.Second, I contend that either there is noagent-relative constraint against the killingof innocents or this constraint has a verydifferent shape from that which deontologistsnormally take it to have. My defence of theseclaims rests on two propositions. First, inkilling someone one may actually prolong thatperson's life. Roughly, life-prolongingkillings are possible, because to kill someoneis to perform an act that causes someone'sdeath and it might well be true that, had onenot performed this act, one's ``victim' wouldhave died earlier. Second, all other thingsbeing equal, killing and causing a person to beunconscious are morally equivalent. Both ofthese propositions are defended in thearticle.     

On becoming neutral: effects of experimental neutralizing reconsidered

Behaviour Research and Therapy 34 (1996) 889–898 found that writing out a negative thought produced anxiety and an urge to neutralize the thought, that instructing participants to neutralize the thought reduced anxiety/neutralization urge in the short run (i.e. within 2 min), but that in the control group 20 min without instruction was attended by the same reduction in anxiety/urge to neutralize (“natural decay”). The observations were made with pariticipants who scored high on “thought action fusion” and the experiment was set up as exerimental model of obsessions. We repeated the study with participants that were not selected on thought action fusion. All the findings reported by Behaviour Research and Therapy 34 (1996) 889–898 were replicated. Correlational analysis indicated that the strength of the effect was not related to scores on scales measuring “thought action fusion”. Behaviour Research and Therapy 34 (1996) 889–898 did not assess whether non-neutralizing was followed by immediate reductions in distress. We did assess this and found that the larger part of the immediate reduction of distress after neutralization also occurs when no neutralization instruction is given. The effects of neutralization instructions in the present type of experiment are considerably less powerful than suggested earlier.     

JUST WAR THEORY,HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION,AND THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION

The primary purpose of government is to secure public goods that cannot be achieved by free markets. The Coordination Principle tells us to consolidate sovereign power in a single institution to overcome collective action problems that otherwise prevent secure provision of the relevant public goods. There are several public goods that require such coordination at the global level, chief among them being basic human rights. The claim that human rights require global coordination is supported in three main steps. First, I consider Pogge's and Habermas's analyses as alternatives to Hobbesian conceptions of justice. Second, I consider the core conventions of international law, which are in tension with the primacy of state sovereignty in the UN system. Third, I argue that the just war tradition does not limit just causes for war to self‐defense; it supports saving innocent third parties from crimes against humanity as a just reason for war. While classical authors focused less on this issue, the point is especially clear in twentieth‐century just war theories, such as those offered by the American Catholic bishops, Jean Elshtain, Brian Orend, and Michael Walzer. Against Walzer, I argue that we add intractable military tyranny to the list of horrors meriting intervention if other ad bellum conditions are met. But these results require us to reexamine the “just authority” of first resort to govern such interventions. The Coordination Principle implies that we should create a transnational federation with consolidated powers in place of a treaty organization requiring near‐unanimity. But to be legitimate, such a global institution must also be directly answerable to the citizens of its member states. While the UN Security Council is inadequate on both counts, a federation of democracies with a directly elected executive and legislature could meet both conditions.     

Unintentional collective action

In this paper, I examine the manner in which analyses of the action of single agents have been pressed into service for constructing accounts of collective action. Specifically, I argue that the best analogy to collective action is a class of individual action that Carl Ginet has called ‘aggregate action.’ Furthermore, once we use aggregate action as a model of collective action, then we see that existing accounts of collective action have failed to accommodate an important class of (what I shall call) ‘unintentional collective actions.’     

Community Engagement as Liberal Performance,as Critical Intellectualism and as Praxis

This article aims to illustrate that engagement is a dynamic and evolutionary process, moulded by contesting ideological, social actor and contextual forces. For purposes of illustration, I draw on a university-affiliated, participatory enactment of community engagement as a case example. The case illustrates that community engagement may assume a form of action, critical intellectualism and praxis. As action, community engagement is oriented towards performance of liberal democracy. Community engagement, as shaped by the critical intellectualism of the Black Consciousness philosophy, reflects community self-affirmation, autonomy and intellectual independence. Community engagement as praxis may be characterised by reflexivity, vision-making and the building of interpersonal relationships. Community engagement is marked by a dynamic interplay between race, power and counter-hegemonic ideology.     

Temporal coordination between performing musicians

Many common behaviours require people to coordinate the timing of their actions with the timing of others' actions. We examined whether representations of musicians' actions are activated in coperformers with whom they must coordinate their actions in time and whether coperformers simulate each other's actions using their own motor systems during temporal coordination. Pianists performed right-hand melodies along with simple or complex left-hand accompaniments produced by themselves or by another pianist. Individual performers' preferred performance rates were measured in solo performance of the right-hand melody. The complexity of the left-hand accompaniment influenced the temporal grouping structure of the right-hand melody in the same way when it was performed by the self or by the duet partner, providing some support for the action corepresentation hypothesis. In contrast, accompaniment complexity had little influence on temporal coordination measures (asynchronies and cross-correlations between parts). Temporal coordination measures were influenced by a priori similarities between partners' preferred rates; partners who had similar preferred rates in solo performance were better synchronized and showed mutual adaptation to each other's timing during duet performances. These findings extend previous findings of action corepresentation and action simulation to a task that requires precise temporal coordination of independent yet simultaneous actions.