Studying the variability of handwriting patterns using the Kinematic Theory

The variability observed in handwriting patterns is analyzed from the perspective of integrating the resulting motor control knowledge in the design of more powerful handwriting recognizers in personal digital assistants (PDAs) and smartphones. Using the highest representational level of the Kinematic Theory of Rapid Human Movement, the Sigma-Lognormal model, this article reports basic theoretical and practical results that could be taken into account in the design of such systems. The main movement variability introduced by the neuromuscular system (NMS) and induced through the scheduling of motor tasks by the central nervous system (CNS) is divided into global and local fluctuations. From a fiducial action plan decoded by this model, a wide range of handwriting distortions are artificially generated by acting on the Sigma-Lognormal parameters. The resulting patterns are studied to understand scale changes and rotational deformations, the two basic features that a recognizer has to take into account. An experiment based on the writing of the same word by six writers is also reported. The results, obtained by an ANOVA analysis, corroborate the predictions and support the relevance of the Kinematic Theory for the analysis and synthesis of handwriting disruptions. These findings consolidate the results of previous studies on single strokes using the Sigma-Lognormal model. Overall, this report provides new insights into our understanding of motor control, as well as into practical cues for the development of huge databases of letters and words to train and test on-line handwriting classifiers and recognizers.     

Liking products by the head of a dog: Perceived orientation of attention induces valence acquisition

We show that the valence acquired by an object is sensitive to the perceived attention it receives and that this effect occurs in a quite implicit fashion. Participants were exposed to products (i.e., peppermint brands) associated with the head of dogs oriented toward them, looking straight ahead, or oriented away from them. Participants then completed an affective priming task, which allowed us to assess the valence acquired by the products in a task free of desirability concerns. Results show that the valence of the products increased linearly as the perceived orientation of attention of the targets moved toward them. This finding suggests that mimetic desire effects may be activated in a quite implicit fashion. The theoretical and social implications of this finding are discussed.     

Jackson-5 scales of revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST) and their application to dysfunctional real world outcomes

Revised Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (r-RST) is a neurobiological theory of personality which has many differences compared to the original version. This highlights the need for measurement scales to reflect the revised theory. Study 1 uses exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis to develop and test new scales (the ‘Jackson-5’) which are shown to be internally reliable, have scale inter-relationships matching theory, and to have desirable construct validity properties. Study 2 compares r-RST with original RST in the prediction of delinquency and psychopathy in students. Results suggest the new scales capture the main properties of r-RST and indicate that r-RST provides a substantially different explanation of the personality basis of dysfunctional behavior compared to original RST.     

Children do not follow the rule "ignorance means getting it wrong"

Two experiments tested whether 4- and 5-year-olds follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.” Following this rule should lead children to infer that a character who is ignorant about some situation will also have a false belief about it. This rule should sometimes lead children into error because ignorance does not imply false belief. In Experiment 1, children and adults were told about a girl who is looking for her dog but does not know which of two boxes it is under. Most children predicted that the girl would look in the box with the dog and not in the empty box; adults chose both boxes equally. Experiment 2 used a similar story but varied whether the girl wants to approach or avoid her dog. Again, most children predicted that the girl would succeed. These findings suggest that children do not follow the rule “ignorance means you get it wrong.”     

Action understanding as inverse planning

Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an “intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a “teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nádasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biró, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165-193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent.     

Can chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) discriminate appearance from reality?

A milestone in human development is coming to recognize that how something looks is not necessarily how it is. We tested appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with a task requiring them to choose between a small grape and a big grape. The apparent relative size of the grapes was reversed using magnifying and minimizing lenses so that the truly bigger grape appeared to be the smaller one. Our Lens test involved a basic component adapted from standard procedures for children, as well as several components designed to rule out alternative explanations. There were large individual differences in performance, with some chimpanzees’ responses suggesting they appreciated the appearance-reality distinction. In contrast, all chimpanzees failed a Reverse Contingency control test, indicating that those who passed the Lens test did not do so by learning a simple reverse contingency rule. Four-year-old children given an adapted version of the Lens test failed it while 4.5-year-olds passed. Our study constitutes the first direct investigation of appearance-reality understanding in chimpanzees and the first cross-species comparison of this capacity.     

Comprehension of the representational mind in infancy

A broad array of infant studies are reviewed that appear to be consistent with the idea that belief understanding specifically, and mental attribution generally, emerge much earlier than previously acknowledged. We first examine existing false-belief research, which, while confirming that children under 4 years perform poorly on standard tests, suggests nevertheless that they have more implicit understanding of beliefs than they can express. After surveying theories that both favor and reject early development of theory of mind (TOM), we address two recent bodies of visual fixation research that provide support for the possibility of knowledge and belief attribution in infancy. The first indicates that infants of 13–15 months are sensitive to others’ false beliefs (and therefore have a representational TOM), the second, that by 12 months or younger infants have two antecedently related psychological understandings: (a) that when agents look they “see” and (b) that seeing plays a presumptive role in producing knowledge. This raises the broader question of whether “mentalism” might be part of core knowledge, which takes us to the earliest manifestation of psychological attribution, the construal of agentive behavior as intentional. Contrary to previous assumptions, recent studies indicate that infants of 3–9 months do not accord intentionality exclusively to humans or to self-propelled objects but rather to any entity that: (1) chooses flexibly among means and ends, (2) responds non-randomly to social overtures, and (3) reacts rationally to changing circumstances (i.e., that is not a mere automaton but is selectively and adaptively responsive to the environment). Other evidence is then examined which suggests that infants begin to construe these and other behaviors in mentalist rather than teleological terms much earlier than expected. Finally, the implications of this empirical record for domain-specific and domain-general theories of TOM are considered.     

Organizational Justice,Change Anxiety,and Acceptance of Downsizing: Preliminary Tests of an AET-Based Model

This study tested an AET-based model that integrates cognitions (justice perceptions) and emotions (change anxiety) to explain the effects of change program characteristics on employees' acceptance of downsizing and other work attitudes. Seventy-one employees from an organization that was undergoing downsizing participated in the study. Path analyses and a Q index of .992 offered preliminary support for the proposed model by showing that procedural justice and change anxiety explained the effects of change management procedures on acceptance of downsizing, while interactional justice and change anxiety explained the effects of the quality of change communications on trust in the change managers. Although distributive justice did not have the predicted direct effect on employee morale, it helped explain the effects of procedures on acceptance of change and morale by helping reduce anxiety about the change. Together, these findings support the utility of an AET-based framework in helping understand employee responses to downsizing.     

Proof Nets for the Multimodal Lambek Calculus

We present a novel way of using proof nets for the multimodal Lambek calculus, which provides a general treatment of both the unary and binary connectives. We also introduce a correctness criterion which is valid for a large class of structural rules and prove basic soundness, completeness and cut elimination results. Finally, we will present a correctness criterion for the original Lambek calculus Las an instance of our general correctness criterion.