What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Simulationist models of face-based emotion recognition

Recent studies of emotion mindreading reveal that for three emotions, fear, disgust, and anger, deficits in face-based recognition are paired with deficits in the production of the same emotion. What type of mindreading process would explain this pattern of paired deficits? The simulation approach and the theorizing approach are examined to determine their compatibility with the existing evidence. We conclude that the simulation approach offers the best explanation of the data. What computational steps might be used, however, in simulation-style emotion detection? Four alternative models are explored: a generate-and-test model, a reverse simulation model, a variant of the reverse simulation model that employs an "as if" loop, and an unmediated resonance model.     

Organizational expectations of the novice teacher

The study focuses on the teacher as an organization person, that is, a professional working in an organizational setting, and forms part of its administrative and human fabric. The purpose of the article is to describe the novice teachers expectations from teaching as a profession and from the school as a work organization. The novice teachers who participated in trainee programs at five large teacher training colleges in Israel, completed a self-report questionnaire. The questionnaire items expressed teachers expectations of their work at the outset of their professional career. Facet Theory was the methodological approach used for the study. It was found that novice teachers expectations focus on the following areas of interest and activity expectations of professional and social recognition; expectations of responsive conduct on the part of students; of involvement and support from parents, and of collegiality from other staff, parents and the principal; and expectations that teaching and those associated with it will contribute to strengthening the teachers professional sense of self. The findings were also examined based on self-psychology perspectives. The article discusses the implications of these expectations pertaining to teacher training.     

Disposition to recognize goals in infant chimpanzees

Do nonhuman primates attribute goals to others? Traditional studies with chimpanzees provide equivocal evidence for “mind reading” in nonhuman primates. Here we adopt looking time, a methodology commonly used with human infants to test infant chimpanzees. In this experiment, four infant chimpanzees saw computer-generated stimuli that mimicked a goal-directed behavior. The baby chimps performed as well as human infants, namely, they were sensitive to the trajectories of the objects, thus suggesting that chimpanzees may be endowed with a disposition to understand goal-directed behaviors. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.     

Cognitive behaviour therapy for eating disorders: a "transdiagnostic" theory and treatment

This paper is concerned with the psychopathological processes that account for the persistence of severe eating disorders. Two separate but interrelated lines of argument are developed. One is that the leading evidence-based theory of the maintenance of eating disorders, the cognitive behavioural theory of bulimia nervosa, should be extended in its focus to embrace four additional maintaining mechanisms. Specifically, we propose that in certain patients one or more of four additional maintaining processes interact with the core eating disorder maintaining mechanisms and that when this occurs it is an obstacle to change. The additional maintaining processes concern the influence of clinical perfectionism, core low self-esteem, mood intolerance and interpersonal difficulties. The second line of argument is that in the case of eating disorders shared, but distinctive, clinical features tend to be maintained by similar psychopathological processes. Accordingly, we suggest that common mechanisms are involved in the persistence of bulimia nervosa, anorexia nervosa and the atypical eating disorders. Together, these two lines of argument lead us to propose a new transdiagnostic theory of the maintenance of the full range of eating disorders, a theory which embraces a broader range of maintaining mechanisms than the current theory concerning bulimia nervosa. In the final sections of the paper we describe a transdiagnostic treatment derived from the new theory, and we consider in principle the broader relevance of transdiagnostic theories of maintenance.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.     

Weak coherence,no theory of mind,or executive dysfunction? Solving the puzzle of pragmatic language disorders

Deficits in pragmatic language ability are common to a number of clinical populations, for example, right-hemisphere damage (RHD), Autism and traumatic brain injury (TBI). In these individuals the basic structural components of language may be intact, but the ability to use language to engage socially is impaired. Despite the nature of these difficulties being well documented, exactly what causes these difficulties is less clear. Furthermore, the current status of causal explanations for pragmatic difficulties across these populations is divergent and sometimes contradictory. This paper explores the empirical validity of three theories that attempt to explain pragmatic language impairment. It is recommended that a new, more convergent approach to investigating the causes of pragmatic language disability be adopted.