Prior sensitivity in theory testing: An apologia for the Bayes factor

A commonly voiced concern with the Bayes factor is that, unlike many other Bayesian and non-Bayesian quantitative measures of model evaluation, it is highly sensitive to the parameter prior. This paper argues that, when dealing with psychological models that are quantitatively instantiated theories, being sensitive to the prior is an attractive feature of a model evaluation measure. This assertion follows from the observation that in psychological models parameters are not completely unknown, but correspond to psychological variables about which theory often exists. This theory can be formally captured in the prior range and prior distribution of the parameters, indicating which parameter values are allowed, likely, unlikely and forbidden. Because the prior is a vehicle for expressing psychological theory, it should, like the model equation, be considered as an integral part of the model. It is argued that the combined practice of building models using informative priors, and evaluating models using prior sensitive measures advances knowledge.     

A comparison of blocked and mixed‐trial methods for teaching auditory–visual discriminations

Behavior analysts typically teach conditional discriminations in a mixed‐trial format but may switch to a blocked‐trial format for learners displaying limited acquisition. No known research has shown that mixed‐trial methods are more effective or efficient than blocked‐trial methods for teaching discriminations, so it is not clear why this format has been adopted as the “first‐line” intervention. We compared blocked and mixed‐trial formats for teaching novel auditory–visual discriminations to three adults with intellectual and developmental disabilities (IDD). Results show blocked‐trial methods resulted in faster skill acquisition in all cases, suggesting this format may be a preferable starting point for instruction.     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

The meta-ethical significance of experiments about folk moral objectivism

The meta-ethical commitments of folk respondents – specifically their commitment to the objectivity of moral claims – have recently become subject to empirical scrutiny. Experimental findings suggest that people are meta-ethical pluralists: There is both inter- and intrapersonal variation with regard to people’s objectivist commitments. What meta-ethical implications, if any, do these findings have? I point out that current research does not directly address traditional meta-ethical questions: The methods used and distinctions drawn by experimenters do not perfectly match those of meta-ethicists. However, I go on to argue that, in spite of this mismatch, the research findings should be of interest to moral philosophers, including meta-ethicists. Not only do these findings extend the field of moral psychology with new data and hypotheses, but they also provide tentative evidence that touches on the adequacy of theses in moral semantics and moral metaphysics. Specifically, they put pressure on arguments in support of moral realism.     

Spirituality in adolescence and young adulthood: A method for a qualitative study

This paper discusses an ongoing research project on contemporary forms of youth and young adult spirituality, highlighting issues in the history and definition of spirituality and in development of appropriate qualitative methods of investigation. Previous research on the topic has been bedevilled by difficulties of definition. 'Spirit' and 'spirituality' have a long history in both philosophy and religion and surviving senses of the terms include both religious and non-religious meanings. This paper suggests that 'lexical' definitions based on usage prove unwieldy because of widely varying and conflicting contents. Only a 'stipulative' definition will serve to provide a research project with a clear focus; our definition of spirituality as 'a conscious way of life based on a transcendent referent' is explained and defended. Next, we outline the distinctive features of our methodology: no direct mention of the term spirituality, an emphasis on personal narration and the use of evocative techniques. We conclude by outlining the 10 dimensions of spirituality which we have developed from our initial investigations.     

Guidance on conducting and reviewing systematic reviews (and meta-analyses) in work and organizational psychology

Systematic reviews and meta-analyses are means of summarizing and synthesizing research evidence in a given topic area. They can be used to define the current state of knowledge and how confident we can be in that knowledge, to identify evidence gaps, and to provide recommendations for policy and practice based on the best available evidence. At European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, our editorial stance is explicitly to encourage the conduct of systematic reviews and meta-analyses. The purpose of this editorial is to provide some guidance to authors and journal referees on the (technical) features of good systematic reviews.     

La santé à l’épreuve de la mobilité : les débuts de parcours de compagnons de l’aéronautique

In this article we relate a research, which has been carried out among workers in an aircraft-manufacturing site. The purpose of the research was to enlighten the links between health and professional mobility. Leaning on quantitative and qualitative analyzes of mobility inside a worksite, we put forward the complex network of itineraries of blue collars, at their beginning. These itineraries combine changes in workstations or in working conditions, and various individual, collective or organizational dimensions. The apprenticeship of mobility frameworks gets involved in wider series of professional norms, which might at the same time prevent from health disorders and make them less visible. Thus, the integration of these various temporal dimensions by blue collars themselves brings depending on organizational context, supports or damages for health.     

质性研究中的资料饱和及其判定

在质性研究中,资料饱和通常被用以评估研究资料的充足性。但在研究实践中,资料饱和却存在概念模糊及操作性问题。作为某项质性研究所抽取的样本量已满足研究需要的标志,按照在研究过程中判定时点的先后顺序,资料饱和可划分为数据饱和、编码或主题饱和、意义饱和及理论饱和4种主要形式。4种形式的资料饱和各有其特定的内涵、评估方式和判定标准。研究认为,达到资料饱和的样本量标准不应统一设定,其检验需嵌入具体的研究过程;资料饱和存在逻辑上的不确定性,适度追加抽样有助于进一步确认;资料饱和作为考察研究质量的一项重要指标,并不适用于所有质性研究。     

Stable Strategies for Personal Development

In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in the real world are sufficiently similar to Margaret’s position in Gunn’s fictional world that we should take this story seriously as grounding an argument from analogy for the conclusion that radical genetic enhancements are, for us, probably a prudential mistake. The paper then defends this method. When the question at hand is one of speculative ethics, there is no method better fit to the purpose than argument from analogy to speculative fiction.