Multiple-criteria decision aid: Some epistemological considerations

This paper attempts to analyse in a critical way some essential aspects of the multiple-criteria decision aid (MCDA) methodology using modern epistemological instruments. Particular attention is paid to the problem of information precision and uncertainty and to the distinction considered essential between the concepts of choice and decision. Since it is maintained that the respect of subjectivity in decision aid is of fundamental importance, an analysis follows of the main approaches by which MCDA methods attempt to take the subjective component of the decision maker into account, indicating some characteristics which may be desirable in an MCDA model for this purpose.     

Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions

Various studies show moral intuitions to be susceptible to framing effects. Many have argued that this susceptibility is a sign of unreliability and that this poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy. Recently, doubt has been cast on this idea. It has been argued that extant evidence of framing effects does not show that moral intuitions have an unreliability problem. I argue that, even if the extant evidence suggests that moral intuitions are fairly stable with respect to what intuitions we have, the effect of framing on the strength of those intuitions still needs to be taken into account. I argue that this by itself poses a methodological challenge for moral philosophy.