Older sisters and younger brothers: The impact of siblings on preference for competition

Psychology studies have long argued the possibility that sibling structure, such as birth order and the sex of siblings, shapes one’s personality traits. One of the core issues involved is that of who rates subjects’ personality traits in studies. The present studies (N = 135 in Study 1, N = 232 in Study 2) surpassed the examinations performed in previous studies by obtaining information regarding one of the key personality traits, preference for competition, using a framework developed via experimental economics rather than subjective ratings. Despite the fact that the two studies involved different types of task, we consistently observed that older sisters exerted a significant impact on their younger siblings in both studies. In particular, having an older sister was negatively associated with men’s competitive preferences. We also obtained suggestive evidence that having an older sister was positively associated with women’s competitive preferences. Our results support sibling hypotheses from the perspective of experimental economics.     

The challenges and opportunities of first-person inquiry in experimental psychology

Psychology is concerned with outward (behavioural) and inward (mental and experiential) dimensions of inquiry. To study behaviour, psychologists are equipped with a comprehensive repertoire of measurement instruments. These instruments are not well suited to study the qualitative nature of inner experience, however: they yield data which, by their very nature as symbolic representations, abstract away from the primary phenomenon. To study qualitative experience, it would hence appear logical to engage a first-person, introspective method of inquiry. Psychology has a turbulent relationship to introspective research, however. In this article we review the concerns regarding the introspective approach; delineate the strengths – and also the limitations – of the experimental method; and, critically, outline a hybrid approach towards studying experience by exploring how important ingredients of the experimental approach can be transferred to the study of qualitative experience. This approach is a methodological proposal rather than an epistemological or ontological defence of introspection.     

The phantom limb in dreams

Mulder and colleagues [Mulder, T., Hochstenbach, J., Dijkstra, P. U., Geertzen, J. H. B. (2008). Born to adapt, but not in your dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1266–1271.] report that a majority of amputees continue to experience a normally-limbed body during their night dreams. They interprete this observation as a failure of the body schema to adapt to the new body shape. The present note does not question this interpretation, but points to the already existing literature on the phenomenology of the phantom limb in dreams. A summary of published investigations is complemented by a note on phantom phenomena in the dreams of paraplegic patients and persons born without a limb. Integration of the available data allows the recommendation for prospective studies to consider dream content in more detail. For instance, “adaptation” to the loss of a limb can also manifest itself by seeing oneself surrounded by amputees. Such projective types of anosognosia (“transitivism”) in nocturnal dreams should also be experimentally induced in normally-limbed individuals, and some relevant techniques are mentioned.     

Acceptance versus distraction: brief instructions, metaphors and exercises in increasing tolerance for self-delivered electric shocks

The current study compared the effects of an acceptance versus distraction rationale on coping with experimentally induced pain. Eighty participants were randomly assigned to one of five conditions: Full-Acceptance, Full-Distraction, Instruction-only-Acceptance, Instruction-only-Distraction and No-Instructions. Participants completed a simple matching task and were intermittently given the choice either to receive an electric shock and continue, or to avoid the shock and terminate the task. Only the Full-Acceptance strategy (that included experiential exercises and a metaphor) had a significant effect on task tolerance as measured by an increase in the number of shocks delivered post-intervention relative to baseline. In addition, the participants in both of the acceptance conditions showed lower levels of believability in that they were more likely to continue with the task even when reporting more pain. The results support the prediction that acceptance-based interventions work by undermining the behavioural-control functions of pain-related thoughts and feelings, and call for a systematic analysis of how metaphors and exercises work in analogue research.     

Justice and forgiveness: Experimental evidence for compatibility

A 3 (justice prime: restorative, retributive, no prime) × 3 (contextual prime: criminal justice system, intimate relationship, workplace) experimental design was used with 173 participants reading hypothetical transgression scenarios to test the hypothesis that people associate forgiveness more with restorative justice than with retributive justice, and that such relationships hold regardless of the social context. As predicted, there were main effects for justice prime, with participants more likely to associate benevolent responding, and less likely to associate revenge and avoidant responses, with restorative justice than with retributive justice. They were also more likely to associate benevolence, and less likely to associate revenge and avoidant responses, with intimate relationships than with criminal justice and the workplace. Also as predicted, there was no interaction between justice and context for benevolence and revenge. Although one should be cautious about extrapolating from ‘no difference’ hypotheses, these results provide some indication that the forgiveness-justice relationship may be generalised beyond the criminal justice system.     

Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: a test of the expertise defense

Many philosophers appeal to intuitions to support some philosophical views. However, there is reason to be concerned about this practice as scientific evidence has documented systematic bias in philosophically relevant intuitions as a function of seemingly irrelevant features (e.g., personality). One popular defense used to insulate philosophers from these concerns holds that philosophical expertise eliminates the influence of these extraneous factors. Here, we test this assumption. We present data suggesting that verifiable philosophical expertise in the free will debate—as measured by a reliable and validated test of expert knowledge—does not eliminate the influence of one important extraneous feature (i.e., the heritable personality trait extraversion) on judgments concerning freedom and moral responsibility. These results suggest that, in at least some important cases, the expertise defense fails. Implications for the practice of philosophy, experimental philosophy, and applied ethics are discussed.     

The limited effects of power on satisfaction with joint consumption decisions

We conduct three experiments in which participants in dyads choose between two restaurants, each of which is preferred by only one participant, and one participant has the power to decide which restaurant both will patronize. We find that the power to make a joint decision increases satisfaction with the choice only when those involved have a competitive decision orientation, a weak or anonymous relationship, and the outcome they choose is subsequently available. Participants who have a cooperative orientation are satisfied whether or not they have power and whether or not the resulting choice is consistent with their initial preferences.     

Social desirability, approval and public good contribution

Behaviour in public good experiments is usually attributed partly to rational self-interest and partly to social norms and preferences. This paper examines if sensitivity to social desirability affects public good contribution and in what way. A pre-experimental measure of social desirability (SDS17) was used to match partners in a two-person public good game. Half the participants received experimenter approval based upon their investment. Contrary to predictions, the highest public good investment was by low social desirability participants in the approval condition. Social desirability was not positively related to pro-social behaviour. We consider its relation to experimental and social conformity.     

Are observer memories (accurate) memories? Insights from experimental philosophy

A striking feature of our memories of the personal past is that they involve different visual perspectives: one sometimes recalls past events from one’s original point of view (a field perspective), but one sometimes recalls them from an external point of view (an observer perspective). In philosophy, observer memories are often seen as being less than fully genuine and as being necessarily false or distorted. This paper looks at whether laypeople share the standard philosophical view by applying the methods of experimental philosophy. We report the results of five studies suggesting that, while participants clearly categorize both field and observer memories as memories, they tend to judge that observer memories are slightly less accurate than field memories. Our results suggest, however, that in lay thought, the difference between field and observer memories is not nearly as clear-cut as philosophers have generally taken it to be.