Domain‐Specific Creativity in Relation to the Level of Empathy and Systemizing

This study aimed to explore self‐reported domain‐specific creativity in relation to the level of empathy, systemizing, and the Big Five personality dimensions. The research sample consisted of 1112 college students to whom the Kaufman Domains of Creativity Scale (K‐DOCS ), the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ ), Baron‐Cohen's empathy and systemizing quotients (EQ and SQ ), and NEO ‐FFI were administered. The results suggest that the systemizing quotient (SQ ) significantly correlated positively with the K‐DOCS Mechanical/Science, and Scholarly scales, as well as with the CAQ Invention and Scientific Discovery scales. The empathy quotient (EQ ) significantly correlated in a positive direction with the K‐DOCS Self/Everyday creativity. In spite of the fact that the EQ and SQ overlap to a considerable extent with the five general personality dimensions and are closely linked to gender, the results confirm their incremental validity beyond the framework of these variables. The EQ and SQ explain the considerable amount of variability, particularly in the case of the scales connected with scientific and technical creativity: the SQ is a relevant predictor of the K‐DOCS Mechanical/Science scale and the CAQ Invention and Scientific Discovery scale. By contrast, the EQ represents a significant predictor of Self/Everyday creativity.     

Towards a computational theory of experience

A standing challenge for the science of mind is to account for the datum that every mind faces in the most immediate – that is, unmediated – fashion: its phenomenal experience. The complementary tasks of explaining what it means for a system to give rise to experience and what constitutes the content of experience (qualia) in computational terms are particularly challenging, given the multiple realizability of computation. In this paper, we identify a set of conditions that a computational theory must satisfy for it to constitute not just a sufficient but a necessary, and therefore naturalistic and intrinsic, explanation of qualia. We show that a common assumption behind many neurocomputational theories of the mind, according to which mind states can be formalized solely in terms of instantaneous vectors of activities of representational units such as neurons, does not meet the requisite conditions, in part because it relies on inactive units to shape presently experienced qualia and implies a homogeneous representation space, which is devoid of intrinsic structure. We then sketch a naturalistic computational theory of qualia, which posits that experience is realized by dynamical activity-space trajectories (rather than points) and that its richness is measured by the representational capacity of the trajectory space in which it unfolds.     

Category-contingent face adaptation for novel colour categories: Contingent effects are seen only after social or meaningful labelling

A face appears normal when it approximates the average of a population. Consequently, exposure to faces biases perceptions of subsequently viewed faces such that faces similar to those recently seen are perceived as more normal. Simultaneously inducing such aftereffects in opposite directions for two groups of faces indicates somewhat discrete representations for those groups. Here we examine how labelling influences the perception of category in faces differing in colour. We show category-contingent aftereffects following exposure to faces differing in eye spacing (wide versus narrow) for blue versus red faces when such groups are consistently labelled with socially meaningful labels (Extravert versus Introvert; Soldier versus Builder). Category-contingent aftereffects were not seen using identical methodology when labels were not meaningful or were absent. These data suggest that human representations of faces can be rapidly tuned to code for meaningful social categories and that such tuning requires both a label and an associated visual difference. Results highlight the flexibility of the cognitive visual system to discriminate categories even in adulthood.     

Measuring consciousness: Is one measure better than the other?

What is the best way of assessing the extent to which people are aware of a stimulus? Here, using a masked visual identification task, we compared three measures of subjective awareness: The Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), through which participants are asked to rate the clarity of their visual experience; confidence ratings (CR), through which participants express their confidence in their identification decisions, and Post-decision wagering (PDW), in which participants place a monetary wager on their decisions. We conducted detailed explorations of the relationships between awareness and identification performance, looking to determine (1) which scale best correlates with performance, and (2) whether we can detect performance in the absence of awareness and how the scales differ from each other in terms of revealing such unconscious processing. Based on these findings we discuss whether perceptual awareness should be considered graded or dichotomous. Results showed that PAS showed a much stronger performance-awareness correlation than either CR or PDW, particularly for low stimulus intensities. In general, all scales indicated above-chance performance when participants claimed not to have seen anything. However, such above-chance performance only showed when we also observed a correlation between awareness and performance. Thus (1) PAS seems to be the most exhaustive measure of awareness, and (2) we find support for above-chance performance in the absence of subjective awareness, but such unconscious knowledge only contributes to performance when we observe conscious knowledge as well. Similarities and differences between scales are discussed in the light of consciousness theories and response strategies.     

Partial awareness distinguishes between measuring conscious perception and conscious content: Reply to Dienes and Seth

In their comment on Sandberg, Timmermans, Overgaard, and Cleeremans (2010), Dienes and Seth argue that increased sensitivity of the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS) is a consequence of the scale being less exclusive rather than more exhaustive. According to Dienes and Seth, this is because PAS may measure some conscious content, though not necessarily relevant conscious content, “If one saw a square but was only aware of seeing a flash of something, then one has not consciously seen a square.” In this reply, we claim that there is a difference between conscious visual experience, which may be partial, and the resulting conscious content, which is conceptual. Whereas PAS measures the first, confidence judgments and post-decision wagering measure the second.     

Neural network applications in consumer behavior

This article introduces the concepts and terminology of artificial neural networks. The approach is demonstrated on data that represent a domain of interest to the consumer psychologist. ANNs are mathematical models that are commonly used in business applications to model relationships between variables. A key strength of ANNs is their flexibility, i.e. their ability to easily accommodate linear and non-linear relationships without any a priori functional form specification. They can easily be used to study topics of interest to consumer psychologists such as persuasion, influence, segmentation etc and can offer distinct advantages over traditional statistical techniques such as ANOVA and regression. We demonstrate the application of ANNs in three different areas: regression, non-linear principal component analysis and classification.     

Category contingent aftereffects for faces of different races, ages and species

Exposure to faces biases perceptions of subsequently viewed faces such that normality judgments of similar faces are increased. Simultaneously inducing such an aftereffect in opposite directions for two groups of faces might indicate discrete responding of the neural populations coding for those groups. Here we show such "category contingent" aftereffects following exposure to faces differing in eye-spacing (wide versus narrow) for European versus African faces, adult versus infant faces, and human versus monkey faces. As aftereffects reflect changes in responses of neural populations that code faces, our results may then suggest that functionally distinct neural populations code faces of different ages, races and species and that the human brain potentially contains discrete representations of these categories.     

When Effort is Threatening: The Influence of the Belief in a Just World on Americans' Attitudes Toward Antipoverty Policy

In the political context of the reauthorization of federal welfare reform legislation, a nationally representative sample of 1,570 adults in the United States completed a survey examining the factors that affect attitudes and policy preferences with regard to aid for low-income individuals and families in the United States. This study utilized an innovative survey technique, the factorial survey methodology (Rossi & Nock, 1982), which allows for the simultaneous experimental manipulation of a large number of factors through the use of a vignette. This research demonstrates how the portrayal of difficulties faced by people in need and the ways in which they attempt to overcome these difficulties affect support for policies designed to aid low-income individuals and families. In addition, this study of public attitudes considers the role that psychological orientations of the evaluators play in judgments of families in need. In this case, we examined how the evaluators' belief that the world is a just place influences their evaluations of deservingness. Consistent with our expectations, we found that the more efforts the vignette subject engaged in improving her situation, the less deserving of government benefits she was judged to be by respondents with a strong belief in a just world. The reverse was found among respondents with a weaker belief: more efforts were associated with greater judgments of deservingness.     

Deconstructing executive deficits among persons with autism: implications for cognitive neuroscience

Individuals with autism demonstrate impairments on measures of executive function (EF) relative to typically developing comparison participants. EF is comprised of several processes including inhibition, working memory and set shifting that develop throughout the lifespan. Impairments in EF may appear early in development and persist, or may represent a more transient delay which resolves with time. Given the unevenness of the cognitive profile of persons with autism, understanding the development of EF poses methodological challenges. These issues include those related to matching measures and the choice of comparison participants to which the performance of persons with autism will be compared. In the current review, we attempt to break down the processes of inhibition, working memory and set shifting among persons with autism. We propose to do this within a developmental perspective that highlights how matching measures and comparison participants can affect the interpretation of research findings.     

Dysfunctional implications of narrow window theory: variability in the intuitive assessment of correlation

Narrow Window theory, suggested by Y. Kareev ten years ago, has so far focused on one central implication of the limited capacity of working memory on intuitive correlation estimation, namely, overestimation of the distal population correlation. This paper points to additional and perhaps more dramatic implications due to the large dispersion of intuitive estimates: (a) large estimation errors, possibly causing overestimation of negligible rhos, misses of strong rhos, and distorted hierarchies of the rhos between different pairs of variables; and (b) large interpersonal differences in the estimation of any given rho and highly incongruent hierarchies of estimated correlations between different pairs of variables. These implications impede both individuals' adaptation to the empirical world and communication among themselves.